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ABSTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN ACTION:
A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY OF USAIR'S 
ACQUISITION OF PACIFIC SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
MISZAK, JOAN A . , Ed.D. University of San Diego, 1989
313 pp.
Director: Joseph C. Rost, Ph.D.
Five dominant theories of organizational change have 
emerged from the literature. Each of these models expressly 
expand on a singular and specific paradigm of how change can 
be viewed within organizations. The models of change are 
the micro-personal-therapeutic, meso-rational-managerial, 
meso-systems-organic, macro-cultural-symbolic and 
macro-political-economic. While the contemporary literature 
on organizational change has done much to further our 
understanding about the future of organizational change, 
very few works provide us with case study examples of 
organizational change in action. Missing is an 
understanding of what facilitators of change actually do in 
the process of change.
The present study sought to provide a descriptive 
analysis of how one organizational change took shape in one 
major American corporation. Throughout an in-depth 
description of the acquisition of Pacific Southwest Airlines 
by USAir, five deliberate and planned actions resulted which 
were part of a strategic change plan designed to facilitate
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
a smooth transition from one organization (PSA) to another 
(USAir). These actions were the internal mechanisms used 
for articulating the change, the external mechanisms used 
for articulating the change, the programmatic processes used 
during the change, the impacting leader actions and the 
grass roots movement. The actions were thoroughly described 
and analyzed in relation to the dominant change models. 
Trends from these actions revealed that specific paradigms 
emerged.
The author concludes that a more multi-dimensional, 
rather than a singular, paradigm of change permeated the 
acquisition period. Although all models were represented, 
the political-economic and the systems-organic models 
dominated.
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D E D IC A T IO N
To the employees of Pacific Southwest Airlines, who 
made aviation history by making flying fun!
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Introduction
In every aspect of modern life and all over the world 
today, we are being bombarded with change. The vastness 
and complexity of all that is changing around us often 
creates difficulties among our nations, our communities, 
our businesses, our families and ourselves. Change on the 
current corporate stage is common and constant. The 
organizational actors are weakened and ineffective if 
their scripts are memorized, as if to imply that their 
lines will remain the same. The organizational actors who 
can master the art of improvisation and extemporaneous 
thought are those that become strengthened by flexibility 
and effective by accepting the notion that their 
environment is fluid and dynamic. Furthermore, the 
organizational actors must also be intertwined with their 
audience in order to create a domain which both sees and 
produces change.
From an organizational perspective, the idea .of 
seeing, creating and facilitating change is one of the 
most difficult, perplexing and challenging opportunities 
faced by organizational theorists, managers and leaders. 
This challenge has often led to increasingly unfavorable
1
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outcomes. Corporate America is in a change crisis.
Kanter (1983) articulated a thought-provoking 
reflection of the condition of today's business community 
by asserting that:
Business organizations are facing a change more 
extensive, more far-reaching in its implications, and 
more fundamental in transforming quality than 
anything since the "modern" industrial system took 
shape in the years between, roughly, 1890 and 
1920. . . .  In this second transforming era, between 
1960 and 1990, American industry will need to learn 
to operate in a wholly new mode. (p. 16)
There seems to be a kind of compulsion on the part of 
the American business community to bring about fundamental 
and long-lasting change. The exerted pressure to change 
has come from forces such as domestic and international 
competition, deregulation, reregulation, realigned social 
orders, new technologies, and more. As a result, there 
has been vast restructuring of organizations through 
mergers and acquisitions.
Ward (1987) has estimated that more than half of the 
Fortune 1,000 companies in the United States have 
experienced substantial reorganization activity in the 
1980s. During 1986 alone, an astonishing 4,000 
organizations were engaged in this change fervor at the 
cost of some $200 billion.
In concert with the overwhelming amount of change
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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that impacts every human being today, Peters and Waterman 
(1982) and Ruch and Goodman (1983) believe that 
ineffective leadership, traditional management practices, 
the MBA programs in business schools and ineffective 
education in our elementary and secondary schools are at 
the root of the change crisis. With changing worldwide 
and domestic business needs, changing roles and values, 
changing external influences such as unionization and the 
media, there indeed is a fundamental need to keenly focus 
on all dimensions of organizational change, while 
simultaneously modifying our thinking on the subject. 
Burns (1978) explained that:
The leadership process must be defined, in short, as 
carrying through from the decision-making stages to 
the points of concrete changes in people's lives, 
attitudes, behaviors, and institutions. Even the 
sweep of this process is not enough, however, for we 
must include another dimension: time. Attitude and
behavior can change for a certain period; as in a 
war, popular fads and emotional political movements 
change only to revert later. Real change means a 
continuing interaction of attitudes, behaviors, and 
institutions, monitored by alteration in individual 
and collective hierarchies of values, (p. 414) 
Planning for change within an organization is the 
specific dimension where the crux of the change issue 
lies. Organizations often engage in the planning process
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without regard to the fact that the plan itself may need 
to be altered. Activity is generated around preserving 
the plan instead of changing the plan further due to 
changes in the internal and external environment. Almost 
of greater importance is the fact that plans are made with 
regard to how to get to the end result, void of how to 
facilitate change in the very process of achieving the 
result. Some of these notions of planned organizational 
change are detailed in the literature on organizational 
development (Alderfer, 1977; Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Friedlander & Braun, 1974; Katz & Kahn, 1976). The 
problem is that the people in organizations have not yet 
sufficiently incorporated these and other change theories 
into how they manage and lead.
Burns (1984) has argued that the process of planning 
for structural change is in essence the ultimate moral 
test of decision making leadership which is inspired by 
goals and values and which is intent on achieving real 
change. He suggested that this process of planning is the 
leader's most potent weapon.
It is a weapon in that a well-conceived plan, along 
with available planning technology, supplies leaders 
with an estimate of the human, material and 
intellectual resources necessary to draw up and drive 
through a plan for substantial social change. 
Planning is designed to anticipate and to counter the 
myriad factors that impair the line of decision and
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action between the policy-making of planning leaders 
and real change in the daily lives of great numbers 
of people, (p. 419)
If Burns is correct in suggesting that the planning 
process for organizational change is in fact a weapon for 
real change, it should not come as a shock to recognize 
that our difficulty in implementing change is hindered by 
our inability to cultivate effective change processes.
If, as the preceding discussion suggests, there is a 
change crisis facing American business and the world 
today, it is vital that we as scholars, practitioners, 
managers and potential leaders confront the problems 
associated with narrow views or single models of change 
and develop a new understanding of this constant, fluid, 
on-going, dynamic, always present and evolutionary process 
which moves individuals and organizations.
The Issue
Few companies today are immune to the threat of a 
merger or acquisition. This is particularly true in the 
airline industry. As deregulation took shape in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, airlines were faced with competitive 
pressures as they had never experienced before. Wrought 
with bankruptcies, abrupt acquisitions, mergers and 
hostile takeovers, the airline industry became highly 
vulnerable. Competing corporations became vultures for 
market share and in doing so reduced fares, cut costs, 
trimmed wages, conserved fuel, reacted to pressures from
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
government and labor unions, pulled in and out of cities, 
established operating hubs in major cities, cross utilized 
employees to gain productivity; and service to the 
consumer in the process, plummeted. Some airlines 
weakened and as a result were gobbled up by stronger 
airlines. The surge of airline mergers began. Republic 
Airlines took over Hughes AirWest and then Northwest 
Airlines took over Republic Airlines. Texas Air 
Corporation purchased People's Express and then 
Continental Airlines and finally the failing Eastern 
Airlines. American Airlines acquired Air Cal and most 
recently USAir purchased the troubled Pacific Southwest 
Airlines.
The present condition of the American airlines 
industry is anything but stable; it is an aggressively 
competitive environment in which only the financially 
strong will survive. In order to continue to survive, 
change is inevitable. Moreover, for those that were 
consumed, such as Pacific Southwest Airlines by USAir, the 
process of how change took place becomes critical and can 
be a predictor to future survivability.
While the contemporary literature on change in 
organizations has done much to foster our understanding 
about the nature of change, very few works provide us with 
real case study examples of substantial processes or 
organizational change in action. Writers and scholars 
have described key facets of change which theoretically
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and conceptually frame issues of the change process. 
However, these works and studies do little to demonstrate 
the application of a given theory, model or concept 
through the use of actual examples. This is a serious 
void in the literature on change because without case 
study examples it is difficult to distinguish what 
determines a successful change from one that is not 
successful. Moreover, the existence of only a few deep, 
ethnographic studies in the literature makes it extremely 
difficult for both scholars and practitioners to apply how 
real, intended change can effectively be implemented. 
Missing is a broad understanding of what is actually done 
in the process of planned organizational change. In 
essence, the literature on change has not yet fully 
changed to address the very means by which ends are 
accomplished.
While there is some research that looks at both the 
leadership abilities and the change agent abilities of 
high level executives using the case study method (Bennis 
& Nanus, 1985; Levinson & Rosenthal, 1984), only a few of 
the examples in these studies touch upon organizational 
change in a multidimensional and meaningful fashion. This 
is also a compounded problem because it is difficult for 
researchers to gain access into organizations before, 
during and after a significant structural change has taken 
place. Therefore, it is crucial that scholars seeking to 
broaden their understanding of the change process study
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deeply situations in which researchers have implanted 
themselves into the very fiber of the organization for a 
duration of time which accurately portrays the change 
cycle.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to provide an in-depth 
description of how the acquisition of PSA by USAir 
progressed from the point just before the acquisition was 
publicly announced until the merger legally and officially 
closed. The examination will predominantly focus on the 
changes that took place at PSA during this eight month 
slice of time. To effectively accomplish this purpose the 
following research questions will be addressed in this 
case study:
1. What specific actions were taken by PSA to 
deliberately facilitate the change, who initiated these 
actions, and why?
2. To what extent does this case exemplify and 
operationalize the five primary models of organizational 
change?
3. To what extent was the implementation of this 
organizational change skewed toward one single paradigm of 
change or to a more multidimensional paradigm of change?
4. What conclusions can be drawn so that scholars 
and practitioners of organizational change can gain from 
the thick description of this case study and its 
relationship to the predominant change models?
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It is the position of this researcher that if we are 
going to increase and deepen our understanding about 
planned organizational change, we must examine specific 
change processes in specific contexts.
Definition of Terms
The following terms will be referred to and used 
throughout the course of this research.
Acquisition: The legal and financial process in
which one party or organization purchases the majority of 
stock, thereby becoming the majority stockholder of 
another entity.
Change: The alteration of one state to another.
What is to be made different could be attitudes, beliefs, 
behaviors, interaction patterns of roles or groups, or 
organizations (adapted from Goodman et al., 1982).
Intervention: Planned programmatic activities which
take place during organizational change. These activities 
are designed to improve the organization's functioning by 
enabling members of the organization to better manage 
their environments in a productive fashion.
Leadership: A sustained, developmental process in
which a leader seeks to heighten the moral aspirations of 
followers by producing real intended change, by 
accomplishing the mutual goals of both leader and led, by 
articulating a vision which moves followers to purposeful 
action, by shaping values, by mobilizing resources to meet 
mutual needs, by capitalizing on competition and conflict,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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by building strong organizational cultures and by 
establishing caring relationships with followers that will 
optimally inspire the emergence of other leaders.
Merger: A process of blending two business entities
into one; the integration of policy, practice, procedure, 
image, beliefs, attitudes, methods of operating, language, 
style, culture, equipment, resources, and organization.
It is a process of blending two business entities into 
one.
Organization Symbolism: Those aspects of an
organization that its members use to reveal or make 
comprehensible the unconscious feelings, images, and 
values that are inherent in that organization.
Planned Organizational Change: A set of activities
included in a formal process intentionally designed to 
change the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and/or 
groups in an organization as well as organizational 
structures and processes (adapted from Goodman et al., 
1982).
Ritual: Relatively elaborate, dramatic, planned sets
of activities that consolidate forms of cultural 
expressions into one event and which are carried out 
through social interactions, usually to benefit an 
audience (adapted from Trice, 1984).
Symbol: Any object, act, event, quality or relation
that serves as a vehicle for conveying meaning (adapted 
from Trice, 1984).
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Dissertation Organization
In describing how the concept of organizational 
change is operationalized by one company, the second 
chapter of this investigation presents a review of 
literature surrounding the major components of the 
concept.
The research design and methodology for the study is 
outlined in Chapter Three.
Chapter Four describes the history of Pacific 
Southwest Airlines. This chapter provides the background 
of the organization which is necessary for understanding 
the growth and development of PSA.
Chapter Five presenLs the thick description of five 
comprehensive change actions and how those actions relate 
to appropriate models of change. Some of the researcher's 
observations and interpretations of the data collected are 
also included in this chapter. Additionally, Chapter Five 
presents an array of figures that complement and go into 
even more detail, the data gathered through observation.
Finally, Chapter Six presents a summary of the study 
and the researchers' conclusions regarding the degree to 
which the subject of this investigation reflects the 
models of change. The summary and conclusions in this 
chapter are followed by a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the study and the researcher's concluding 
remarks.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Leadership and Change Link 
In his description of transformational leadership, 
Burns (1978) was quite explicit about the significant link 
between change and leadership. He advocated that the 
process of leadership is identifying expressed and 
unexpressed wants among followers, bringing them to higher 
levels of consciousness regarding their needs, and 
transforming their needs into hopes and expectations. The 
dynamic of transforming leadership is to initiate and 
govern change. Burns (1978) concluded that:
The essence of leadership in any polity is the 
recognition of real need, the uncovering and 
exploiting of contradictions among values and between 
values and practice, the realigning of values, the 
reorganization of institutions where necessary, and 
governance of change. The leader's fundamental act 
is to induce people to be aware or conscious of what 
they feel— to feel their true needs so strongly, to 
define their values so meaningfully, that they can be 
moved to purposeful action, (pp. 43-44)
Transforming leadership includes the process of 
producing real, intended change. When the change process
12
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is triggered or initiated by a leader for some purpose, 
and when it is substantial and transforming in the end and 
when the change recognizes the mutual goals of leaders and 
followers, the important link between organizational 
change and leadership is significantly strengthened.
Transitioning to a more expansive focus on the
organizational change dynamic, it is clear that we must 
study change more fully if we are ever to consider its 
enormous impact and influence on the overall subject of 
leadership. Baldridge & Deal (1983) stated:
The most stable fact about organizations . . .  is 
that they change. Change can be a major overhaul or 
a cosmetic afterthought, a substantive renovation or 
a lively ritual, a response to a crisis or an
opportunity for excitement and adventure. But
whether changes are minute or monumental in scope, 
the constant in our modern society is that
organizations are always shifting, changing, 
transforming, and realigning, (p. 1- 2)
Change and Competitive Advantage 
The increasingly turbulent environment of the last 
ten years has worked to focus executives' attentions on 
the need to aggressively seek out and exploit competitive 
advantages as the means to organizational survival. In 
today1s rapidly changing world economy > however, 
traditional competitive mechanisms such as pricing, 
product and technological advantage are becoming less
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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effective as competitors meet or copy every corporate 
initiative.
The decade of the 1980s will no doubt be remembered 
as the time of transition in business (Thorrow, 1981). 
For the economy as a whole, pressures for transition have 
grown as indicated by Ulrich (1987) in the following data: 
o The federal budget deficit has ballooned from $75 
billion in 1971 to over $220 billion in 1986 (U.S.
Commerce Department).
o Merchandise trade balance imbalance has worsened from 
$-25 billion in 1981 to $-140 billion in 1986 (U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget).
o Direct foreign investment in the U.S. has grown from 
$82.9 billion in 1980 to $182.9 billion in 1985 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce).
o Business failures per 10,000 concerns has risen from 
42 per year in 1980 to 190 in 1985 (Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1986) .
o National income originating in manufacturing has 
continued to drop to a low of 22% in 1984 while the gap 
between employees in service related (74%) and goods 
related (26%) has increased to an all time high 
(Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986). 
o Total value of takeovers (mergers and acquisitions) 
has increased from $30 billion in 1980 to over $170 
billion in 1986.
These national and economic conditions expose
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significant and dramatic change throughout the United 
States economy through the first half of the 1980s 
(Abernathy, 1981; Lund & Hansen, 1986; Reich, 1983).
These underlying economic conditions have exposed 
many industries to enormous transitions.
According to Ulrich (1987):
Bank failures have risen from 10 per year in 1980 to 
over 140 in 1986. Over 200 airlines have been merged 
or sold since 1978 to respond to the competitive 
pressures of deregulation; deregulation has equally 
affected trucking, telecommunications, and oil 
industries. Even agriculture has undergone dramatic 
change with the total number of farmers being reduced 
from 1.6 million to 1.3 million with further 
reductions expected, (p. 170)
These industry transitions have translated to many 
firms dramatically transforming their businesses. The 
turbulent decade of the 1980s may be characterized by two 
central themes. First, change: Rapid and dramatic change
has transformed the economy, traditional industry 
structures, and firms. Global competition, technological 
growth, federal legislation and policies, and increased 
service economy represent national illustrations of these 
quick and fundamental changes. Second, competitiveness: 
Response to these rapid and dynamic changes has forced 
United States organizations to focus on gaining and 
maintaining a competitive advantage.
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Mergers and Acquisitions
The literature on cases of organizational change, 
particularly in the area of mergers and acquisitions is 
quite small. Thee have been, however, some valuable 
writings on the subject which can add insight into both 
the philosophical as well as practical views of 
organizational change.
In 1986 Wells Fargo merged with Crocker National 
Corporation. Quinn (1987) described the $1.07-billion 
deal as the largest in United States history and one of 
the few that will be financially justifiable in the long 
run. To achieve its goals, Wells Fargo fired 1,650 
employees as soon as the merger became effective, and the 
manner in which Wells handled its employees negatively 
affected morale. The shift in attitude and commitment by 
employees led to a period of productivity decline so 
significant that management reacted with post chaos fix 
attempts such as communication sessions and employee 
involvement strategies.
Along the same line, according to an anonymous writer 
(1987) , when Midwest Commerce acquired the $65-million 
First National Bank of Goshen, there were several severe 
problems of community rivalries and differences in the 
bank cultures. Shortly thereafter, NBD Bancorp Inc. 
acquired Midwest Commerce. This merger was said to have 
been handled well as employees were kept as informed as 
was possible, and there were no displacements as a result
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of the merger.
Some of the common patterns of behavior and 
communication in corporate mergers and acquisitions are 
cited in a paper written by Bastien (1987). A study was 
conducted of common patterns of communications and 
behavior in mergers and acquisitions. Data were collected 
via interviews with 21 managers in the acquired company in 
three separate acquisitions. The data were then 
aggregated to construct three cases that described some 
common patterns of behavior and communication in mergers 
and acquisitions. Three central issues became evident.
First, personal uncertainty was pervasive and should 
have been ameliorated through communication management.
Second, the individual and social processes of coping 
with this uncertainty involved sudden switches between 
opposites rather than gradual change from one state to 
another.
Last, culture change and culture shock were 
definitionally present in mergers and acquisitions and 
these factors should be managed.
Further on the communication theme of organizational 
change in a merger or acquisition, Bertrand (1987) 
contended that despite the increase in corporate mergers 
and acquisitions, many companies do not communicate well 
with key audiences as the agreement unfolds, or even after 
it is complete. However, silence causes speculation, 
which results in the buyer’s and seller's credibility
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suffering. Customers, investors, and employees may 
defect, and stock prices, productivity, and sales may 
decline. Companies can communicate about what is 
happening by using a full spectrum of corporate 
communications vehicles, from advertising to employee 
publications. Communications can be used to:
1. Establish a new corporate identity of two merged 
companies.
2. Position companies for an acquisition or merger.
3. Obtain investor support for an offering.
4. Tell employees and customers what is being done 
to protect them.
Some mergers result in staff trimmings, plant 
closings or consolidations, and large scale relocation of 
employees. Sometimes companies acquire other companies, 
encounter difficulties in integrating them and spin off 
parts of the acquisition. Some divest portions of 
themselves to avoid a takeover. Therefore, according to 
Gerard (1986) successful divestitures and mergers demand 
that five issues be faced and resolved:
1. Employees should be informed fully as soon as 
possible about any change.
2. Careful consideration must be given to what 
specialized talent is needed and what skills are no longer 
useful to the company.
3. Severance and relocation policies need to be 
designed specially to fit the individual situation.
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4. Location decisions should balance considerations 
of real estate, operations, and people.
5. Major operations of the business must continue 
while merger or divestiture discussions are taking place. 
All of these issues need to be addressed during the 
negotiations leading up to a merger.
Clearly the concept of merger mania is enveloping the 
corporate world, affecting all employees. Often the 
stakes are very high in negotiations that top management 
must keep secret to protect public shareholder value. 
Unfortunately, as believed by Howard (1986), the people 
who have the most at stake in a hostile takeover or merger 
are usually the last to know. However, confidentiality, 
secrecy, and abrupt announcements take a heavy toll on 
employees. Thus, there is an urgent need for a broader 
1 scope of information and substance in employee 
communication in three areas:
1. A greater emphasis on the employee's role in 
profitability and the enhancement of shareholder value.
2. A greater awareness of how the merger 
environment affects the economy.
3. A  greater understanding of basic issues like 
pensions and health insurance plans.
Once these factors are accomplished, employees will better 
# understand what is happening and will feel much less 
stressed.
It appears that the impact of corporate restructuring
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on employees is often overlooked. Merrell (1986) 
suggested that the organization will suffer during a 
restructuring as long as workers are uncertain about their 
future. The lack of information and failure to 
communicate with employees during restructuring 
intensifies feelings of uncertainty. The results of 
uncertainty are insecurity and a loss of motivation. 
♦Several elements can be integrated into restructuring 
plans to cope with personnel issues. These elements 
include precision and clarity of planning and 
communication and consistency in personnel policies. 
Termination benefits should be fair, and intentions should 
not be revealed until management is sure of them. 
Management should put the organization to work immediately 
on a challenging task to give employees a sense of 
direction. It is also helpful if the restructuring 
includes promotions to improve motivation.
An interesting perspective offered by Price (1985) 
pointed out that sometimes mergers do not go through and 
that under these circumstances, attention still needs to 
be paid to the change process. Merger or acquisition 
•negotiations that fail cause many problems, especially for 
the employees of the companies involved. Companies thus 
should include in their strategy a plan to minimize these 
negative effects on personnel. A company does not have to 
be actually merged or acquired for the workforce to be 
disrupted and the company's operating effectiveness
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•damaged. It is important for corporate managers to 
anticipate the negative impact of a failed acquisition or 
merger and respond to problems in a timely, 
action-oriented manner. Upon initiation of takeover 
discussions, management should selectively communicate to 
"employees what is occurring. In the event that the deal 
fails, management should reassure personnel and reaffirm 
corporate goals and objectives, using this period to gain 
a stronger leadership role and to restore their 
credibility.
Dimensions of Change 
Not all change should be studied as a result of a 
merger or acquisition. Change can also be viewed and 
studied as it is compared to some specific dimension.
A study conducted by Bloomquist (1986) investigated 
the relationship between school staff job satisfaction or 
morale and number of organizational changes occurring at 
the Portsmouth (New Hampshire) Junior High School. The 
issues under examination included homogeneous vs. 
♦heterogeneous groupings, class length, school within a 
school or teaming, department chairs vs. house 
coordinators, a flexible or modular scheduling as factors 
that might affect staff morale, communication, and 
student learning. Using an evaluation design, the 
research team undertook a descriptive case study of the 
match between school philosophy and the scheduling 
practices related to teacher teaming and student ability
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grouping. Data were collected from all school practices, 
along with self-report measures of staff emotional 
exhaustion, negative attitudes toward students, and 
feelings of personal accomplishment. The findings
suggested that low levels of emotional exhaustion and high 
feelings of personal accomplishment correlate strongly 
■with providing adequate time for people to reach time 
management objectives and planning objectives. 
Researchers concluded that scheduling should include staff 
input to reflect people's need for effective planning 
time.
A view of the process of change can certainly be 
integrated to that which is becoming new or modernized.
As in the case of technological advancements, change is 
propelling at an enormously rapid rate.
Automated office technologies, such as office 
automation systems, management information systems, 
teleconferencing, message systems, and robotics, are 
providing momentum for the trend towards the "paperless 
office" by allowing new means of carrying out office tasks 
♦and aiding in the management of time, data, and messages. 
According to Licata (1984) the success of these systems 
depends on how effectively they are introduced into the 
office. Such efforts as solicitation of employee input 
are needed to overcome resistance to change and encourage 
acceptance of the new technology. The potential impact of 
a new technology should be studied both at the micro level
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(of the individual and his/her performance changes, job 
satisfaction, stress level, and attitude toward the job 
and the technology), and at the macro level (including 
changes in organizational efficiency, departmental 
interactions, quality of work life, and changing patterns 
of work). Potential impacts can be either positive or 
negative. Positive impacts include improved intellectual 
performance, increased work discipline, reduction in 
wasted time, increased efficiency, increased timing and 
control, increased visibility, increased quantity and 
quality of work, increased flexibility of time and 
location of work, and improved quality of work life. 
'Negative impacts include boredom, problems of dependency 
and stress, feelings of isolation, decrease in 
organizational loyalty, decrease in quantity and quality 
of social interactions, and decrease in the quality of 
work life. The task of management is to investigate the 
changes that are occurring throughout the organization in 
order to aid workers in integrating the new technology 
into their work lives.
Another study relating to new technology conducted by 
Soukup and Boone (1983) tested the premise that people 
cope with ambiguity in change periods in particular ways 
within an organizational context, negotiating for 
understanding and choice through the manipulation of 
power, ideology and technology.
The study focused on the implementation of a
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satellite communications network in local Catholic Church 
offices and on staff members' positive and negative 
perceptions of ambiguity that resulted from the new 
system. Results showed that ambiguity was reduced within 
the offices through the use of power, ideology, and 
technology. From an external perspective, ambiguity was 
used in a positive way to open up possibilities for the 
creative use of technology, for renegotiating the goals of 
the Catholic Communications Network, and for realigning 
the power structure of the communication system of the 
-Church.
Change Strategies
What infiltrates the literature are change strategies 
which can be used in order to effectively implement, 
manage, facilitate, study and view change in 
organizations. Widespread are the advocates of one 
strategy or another; yet many have important insights, 
practices and contributions to make with regard to the 
massive subject of change.
In his paper on the construction of relationships 
from which to change organizations, Lowman (1980) argued 
that organizational consultants should attend to several 
issues when consulting as change agents for organizations. 
He suggested that the client will have explicit ideas 
about the need for help and implicit expectations and 
fears about the role of the consultant. The consultant 
must probe, understand, and often change the client's
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preconceptions and expectations about consulting. In 
establishing a consultant-client relationship, the 
consultant needs to be aware of possible defensive 
reactions, including denial, immediate action demands, and 
control attempts. Three primary tasks faced in the 
preliminary phases of consultation are:
1. Establishing a trust relationship.
2. Making an assessment of the client system.
3. Sharing a futuristic image of the organization.
Ideally, organizational consultants should be trained in 
settings in which they receive intensive supervised 
'experiences in consultation, multiple opportunities to 
increase self-awareness and individual growth, and 
exposure to the diversity of organizational types and 
phenomena. It is only through this process that effective 
change agents can emerge.
A step-by-step strategy for change was developed by 
Hotter and Schlesinger (1979) from their belief that 
organizational change frequently encounters some form of 
human resistance. They prescribe that managers must be 
aware of the most common reasons that people resist 
change:
1. Desire not to lose something of value.
2. Misunderstanding of the change and its 
implications.
3. Belief that the change does not make sense for 
the organization.
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4. Low tolerance for change.
Managers can help overcome people's resistance to
organizational change by:
1. Education and communication.
2. Participation and involvement.
3. Facilitation and support.
4. Negotiation and agreement.
5. Manipulation and co-optation.
6 . Explicit and implicit coercion.
Managers can improve their chances of successfully
implementing organizational change by:
1. Analyzing situations and problems.
2. Analyzing change factors.
3. Selecting change strategies based on analysis.
4. Monitoring the implementation process.
A strategy to involve the employee before, during and 
after an organizational change is one which is commonplace 
in the literature. Benashel (1981) stated that there are 
three important considerations to take before implementing 
large organizational changes which affect employees' 
lives:
1. Time should be provided to help separate the 
psychological impact of the change from its practical 
consequences on the lives of employees.
2. Information should be shared immediately with 
all affected employees.
3. Trust and respect should be expressed in words
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
27
and deeds for the individuals involved by being open about 
changes from the start.
Although providing time, trust, and information when 
implementing changes can make things more difficult for 
the managers at first, in the long run, the effort will 
help make changes run more smoothly and effectively.
Because better communication and involvement are 
frequently cited as an effective change strategy in 
organizations, it would seem that models which aid in 
improving communication and involvement would be sought 
with vigor. This is not always the case, as suggested by 
Graham (1981) , when he wrote about the fact that better 
communication and involvement programs may not be desired 
goals in some organizations, and that there may be some 
people who would benefit from poor communication. He 
stated:
There are benefits to poor communication, which 
include:
1. minimizing the effect of poor planning, 2. 
reducing questions, 3. usefulness as a technique for 
getting and maintaining power, 4. helping to avoid 
confrontation and anxiety, and 5. helping to minimize 
opposition and criticism. It is suggested that the 
effects of the benefits of poor communication should 
be considered as a part of any Management Science 
process. It must be remembered that if there is poor 
communication in an organization, there are a set of
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reasons for it. The Management Science process may 
generate conflict, as people will be affected by a 
model. Those people should be involved in its 
construction, which ultimately involves 
communication, (p. 80)
Planned Organizational Change and Adaptation 
In their explanation of change, Goodman and 
associates (1982) described organizational change as 
categorically planned change and adaptation. Planned 
organizational change is geared toward a progression of 
activities and processes which change individuals, groups, 
and organization structure and process. The most 
important word is planned. The fact that the change is 
planned means that there are intervention strategies that 
are used in order to effect the change.
Adaptation is a concern which modifies an 
organization, or parts of the organization, so that 
adjustment to the environment takes place. Child (1972) 
strongly advocated that managers play a significant role 
in this process by influencing how their organizations 
adapt to the environment.
However, Goodman (1982) stated that "the distinction 
between planned organizational change and adaptation is 
arbitrary. The two concepts are not independent. Planned 
organizational change can increase adaptability, and 
adaptability can lead to planned organizational change" 
(p. 4) .
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Like two sides of the same coin, organizational 
change is planned and/or a process of adaptation. The two 
concepts are interwoven. Goodman (1982) further 
concluded:
Planned organizational change deals with the basis of 
change; adaptation deals with the conditions or 
sources of change. Planned organizational change 
focuses primarily on change within the organization, 
but the adaptation literature focuses primarily on 
populations of organizations and on 
organization-environment interfaces, and on changes 
within an organization that are environmentally 
dictated, (p. 4)
In essence, planned change emphasizes the process of 
actually creating change. It is devoted to methods and 
techniques. Adaptation emphasizes the processual nature 
of change. It is devoted to theorizing about change 
processes and outcomes, whether the changes were planned 
or not.
The Micro-Personal-Therapeutic Model 
The micro-personal-therapeutic model emphasizes the 
change that originates at the individual or personal 
level. The model focuses on both the internalization of 
change and the interpersonal level. It suggests that 
meaningful or real organizational change results only when 
individuals believe and value the change. Foster (1986) 
described this model as follows:
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Since the organization is made up of individuals, 
each acting according to some role or script * to 
change the organization first requires that the 
individuals themselves are changed in some fashion. 
This model includes such topics of concern as 
self-concept, personality, integration, conflict 
management, communication processes, trust 
development, personality fixations, values 
clarifications, and so on. (p. 152)
The complex nature of the micro-personal-therapeutic 
model is clear. This model gets to the root of change and 
becoming changed. It deals with the psychological 
implications of change, and it emphasizes the notion of 
dealing with and shifting personal views and ways of 
thinking from old to new constructed realities.
Lewin's (1951) work on the individual's impact on 
organizational change is most worthy. He described three 
stages in the process of personal change: unfreezing,
changing, and refreezing. In the first stage of 
unfreezing, the interpersonal intervention penetrates the 
current belief system and how one views a particular issue 
or event as it relates to one's self image. Unfreezing 
reveals that a person's constructed reality is different 
from another form of constructed reality. Like an 
ice-cube, a given constructed reality melts. Examples of 
this melting or unfreezing would be when an alcoholic 
admits to being an alcoholic, or when a nonpracticing
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Christian suddenly becomes reborn, or when an employee 
stops resisting a change such as an acquisition by letting 
go of the old situation and the identity that went with 
it.
The refreezing process is the new constructed 
reality. It is the time in which receptivity and 
acceptance occur.
Bridges (1988) suggested that there is a difference 
between change and transition. He differentiated that: 
Change happens when something starts or stops, or 
when something that used to happen in one way starts 
happening in another. It happens at a particular 
time, or in several stages at different times. 
Organizational change is structural, economic, 
technological or demographic. Transition, on the 
other hand, is a three-part psychological process 
that extends over a long period of time and cannot be 
planned or managed by the same rational formula that
works with change, (p. 25)
It is believed that there are three phases that 
people go through.
First, similar to unfreezing, people have to let go 
of the old situation and of the old identity that went 
with it. No one can begin a new role or have a new
purpose if that person has not let go of the old role or
purpose first. Whether people are moved or promoted, 
outplaced or reassigned, they have to let go of who they
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were and where they have been if they are to make a 
successful transition. A great deal of what we call 
resistance to change is really difficulty with the first 
phase of transition.
Second, people have to go through the neutral zone 
between their old reality and a new reality that may still 
be very unclear. In this highly ambiguous time, 
everything feels unreal. It is a time of loss and 
confusion, a time when hope alternates with despair and 
new ideas alternate with a sense of meaninglessness, a 
time when the best one can do sometimes is to go through 
the motions. But it is also the time when the real 
reorientation that is at the heart of transition is taking 
place.
Third, and similar to freezing, people have to make a 
new beginning, a beginning that is much more than the 
relatively simple new start required in a change. The new 
beginning may involve developing new competencies, 
establishing new relationships, becoming comfortable with 
new policies and procedures, constructing new plans for 
the future and learning to think in accordance with new 
purposes and priorities.
It is this three-phase reorientation process from an 
old to a new way of being that organizational leaders 
usually overlook when change is planned. Bridges further 
states:
The planners work hard to show why the changes are
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good; they build coalitions to support them; they 
work out PERT charts to schedule them; they see that 
the necessary funds are appropriated to pay for them; 
they assign managerial responsibility for 
implementing them. And they mumble darkly about 
selfishness, stupidity and treachery when the people 
affected by the changes slow these changes down, 
making the planners spend more money than they had 
forecast. In the end, these same people may even 
abort the very changes on which the organization's 
future depends, (p. 26)
Bridges (1986) concluded that with the unfreezing 
states comes disengagement, disidentification and 
disenchantment. With the change phase comes 
disorientation, disintegration and discovery. With the 
refreezing stages comes receptivity, openness, and 
acceptance.
The Meso-Rational-Managerial Model 
The meso-rational-managerial model emphasizes the 
rational actors in an organization who have been convinced 
by logical facts and evidence that a change is necessary. 
The change can then be implemented or facilitated by a 
step-by-step strategy that moves in succession, over time, 
and is validated with data and evidence along the way.
Cole (1982) pointed out that there is a systematic 
way to view planned change. It is a highly proceduralized 
process which is based upon evidence. It is prescriptive
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and research based.
An example of a systematic procedure can be viewed 
from Havelock's (1973) work in which he used the acronym 
DAETEIM to discuss the types of resources available to the 
change agent and their significance to the process of 
change.
Diagnosis is step one. This step involves developing 
resources appropriate to diagnosis such as key informants 
and other information sources pertinent to the change 
issue.
Awareness is step two. This step builds and 
maintains resource awareness such as networking, 
developing resource files and other knowledge-seeking 
alternatives.
Evaluation is step three, which involves becoming 
specific about the problem or solution like one might 
discover in an observation period or a pretest.
Trial is step four. This step is the pilot of a
procedure to predict its outcome.
Evaluation is step five. This step looks at what has 
occurred during the trial. In essence, it could be a post 
test mechanism.
Installation is step six. This encompasses the 
process of implementation.
Maintenance is step seven, which involves any
follow-up requirements.
This mechanical example of the
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meso-rational-managerial model serves as a clear picture 
of a process of change where checklists, steps, logical 
paths and little diversion and innovation prevail.
The Meso-Systems-Organic Model 
Perhaps Foster (1986) best summarized the emphasis of 
the meso-systems-organic model.
The two major assumptions made in this model are both 
encompassed by the model's description. The organic 
aspect assumes that organizations are similar to 
organisms— they grow, develop, change and die. The 
systems aspect assumes that organizations are systems 
composed of interrelated and interdependent 
subsystems. These twin assumptions have led to the 
largest movement to implement change in 
organizations: organizational development, (p. 154)
Friedlander and Braun (1974) covered a wide range of 
organizational development literature during 1973 and 
1974. During those years organizational development 
writers focused on the methods organizational development 
people used to facilitate change and the development of 
people. The methods involved people, technology, 
organizational processes and structures (Friedlander & 
Braun, 1974, p. 314). The emphasis was on 
technostructural approaches such as job design and job 
enlargement, and on human approaches, such as survey 
feedback and interventions.
Alderfer (1977) indicated that the practice of
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organizational development was no longer ingrained in just 
the business arena. The practice of organizational 
development has spread across both public and private 
sectors. Additionally, there are new and emerging forms 
of survey feedback techniques being used in all arenas. 
These practices are contributing to more sophisticated 
theories on change.
Organizational development and, more specifically, 
the meso-systems-organic model link conceptual framework 
and strategy. The goal is to correct or renew the 
organization. In the process, people within the 
organization learn and interact through a set of 
interventions usually triggered by a consultant. The 
process involves change on the interpersonal level, the 
subsystem level and the overall organizational level.
The Macro-Cultural-Symbolic Model
Rost (1982) suggested that transformational leaders, 
those who have been able to effect real, intended, 
substantive change in their organizations and the lives of 
their followers, have the ability to create visions and 
engage followers' imaginations in pursuit of them. 
Transformational leadership encompasses motivating people 
to action and converting followers into leaders and change 
agents. For this reason, the recognition of symbols, 
rituals, language and other cultural aspects as an 
integral part of organizational change is becoming more 
evident.
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Bolman and Deal (1984) contended that the cultural 
approach to organizational analysis and organizational 
change must be viewed by scholars for a more complete 
picture. They maintained that an effective organization 
operates through widely accepted, interactive, articulated 
and lived myths, symbols and rituals.
If we study organizations and organizational change, 
we must examine how we think and talk about them, for our 
system of talking and what we are talking about are 
intertwined (Pondy, 1978). Because the structure of 
language has constraints that limit our thinking 
(Feyerabend, 1975; Whorff, 1979) , those linguistic limits 
will also shape our level of knowing. Foster (1986) 
stated:
In summary, symbols, rituals, and the like are 
expressions that help us to recognize the social 
world in which we live. We gain an understanding of 
and appreciation for our particular culture only by 
comparing it with other cultures; we recognize our 
sameness, in a sense, only through recognizing 
difference. The idea of culture becomes a means for 
thinking about how a social grouping becomes cohesive 
and develops similar values and world views, (p. 162) 
The Macro-Political-Economic Model 
The macro-political-economic model is a clear lens 
which is comprehensive, relationship-oriented, and 
includes both the internal and external environment. Zald
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(1970) provided a framework which includes four quadrants 
or components of political economy. They are:
1. Polity and environment structure and process.
2. Polity and internal structure and process.
3. Economy and environment structure and process.
4. Economy and internal structure and process.
This framework represents a valuable contribution in that 
it stresses the relevance of how the political economy 
affects organizations, and it emphasizes that both the 
internal and external environment have economic and 
political fiber.
The model itself sees organizations as political 
systems with political actors. The actors have their own 
interests and stakes and stands. Coalitions are formed 
within a political environment. An organization changes 
as a result of shifts in rewards, supply and demand, 
interest groups, negotiation and bargaining.
Zald (1968) further pointed out that the political 
economy approach focuses on "proximal internal and 
external determinants of change. It links change to 
organizational structure and goals as opposed to leaping 
from internal problems to leadership decision; thus, it 
spells out a complete causal and contingent chain" (p. 
222) .
Transformational leaders are political actors who use 
power to "realize the purposes of both leaders and 
followers" (Burns, 1978, p. 18). Thus, it is important to
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note that transformational leaders are individuals with 
broad sociopolitical perspectives (Levinson & Rosenthal, 
1984) that use political savvy and wisdom as positive 
forces in the process of effecting significant 
organizational change.
Conclusion
Real, intended change as suggested by Burns (1978) 
and planned organizational change as suggested by Goodman 
(1982) are deep and highly philosophical constructs yet, 
as the literature implies, it is not without practical 
value. It is philosophical in that it is often 
intellectually far reaching. It is practical in that 
leaders effect significant institutional change by 
addressing the real wants and needs of followers. The 
literature also shows that organizational change 
transcends individual disciplines. Illustrating this 
point as it relates to the broader issue of leadership, 
Burns (1984) recognized that "the problem is that no field 
of study calls for a more difficult and daring crossing of 
disciplinary borders than does the study of leadership, 
and no field suffers more from narrow specialization" (p. 
6). Thus, by its substantial link to leadership, real, 
intended change is multidisciplinary in nature and 
embodies anthropology, communications, linguistics, 
organizational development, organizational theory, 
philosophy, political science, psychology and sociology. 
Collectively, these fields provide us with multiple lenses
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so we can approach the study of change from a broader 
variety of perspectives. Also, by viewing similarities 
and differences in organizational change across 
disciplines, this multidisciplinary approach accounts for 
the vastness and complexity of change. Thus, inherent 
within organizational change is a kind of universal 
quality that confirms the theoretical validity of the 
construct and points out the practical framework for 
application in the real world.
The literature assists us greatly by categorically 
describing change as planned and adaptive (Goodman et al., 
1982). Since planned change spotlights the methods and 
techniques for actually creating change, and since 
adaptation deals with the theory of change processes and 
outcomes, whether the change was planned or not, we as 
scholars cannot segregate these categorically described 
concepts. This thinking automatically helps us broaden 
our view of change.
The most basic understanding of change is that it is 
an integration of models. Bolman and Deal (1984) , Cole 
(1982), Foster (1986), Friedlander and Braun (1974) , Lewin 
(1951) , Zald (1970) and others have all pointed out that 
organizational change models, although distinct in many 
ways, must be integrated in some fashion to order to fully 
see change.
It is clear that a sound theoretical base has been 
established. It is also clear that a practical set of
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techniques and strategies have emerged which espouse the 
way change theories should be applied. The meaningful 
connection of theory in action, however, has not been 
fully addressed in the literature.
While research to date has brought us a long way 
toward understanding that planned organizational change 
and adaptation are interrelated, the actual number of case 
studies describing how change takes place within an 
organization is minimal at best. Missing from the 
literature are examples of how change happens in specific 
settings. What is needed are actual case studies that 
illustrate how these models and theoretical constructs are 
operationalized. To that end, this investigation will 
seek to build upon an already growing body of literature 
by examining the theory of organizational change in 
action.
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Design
In order to fulfill the purpose of this study and to 
sufficiently answer the associated research questions, 
this researcher described the change process involved in 
the acquisition of PSA by USAir. To do this, 25 cells 
have been built, each providing a different view of the 
change event. Like a photographer, several different 
lenses were used to take a picture of the same scene. 
These different looks allowed the researcher to adequately 
glean learnings about this change as they related to the 
change models. As Figure 1 illustrates, a story can be 
told in each cell, comparing and contrasting the 
relationship of the model of change to the specific change 
action taken.
The primary dimensions of planned organizational 
change are:
1. The accomplishment of micro-personal-therapeutic 
actions which focus on individualistic and personal levels 
of change.
2. The accomplishment of meso-rational-managerial 
actions which deal with the prescriptive, step-by-step 
plan for change.
42
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Figure 1 . Dimensions of planned organizational change.
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3. The accomplishment of meso-systems-organic 
actions which view the developmental, communicative, 
systematic and strategic elements of change.
4. The accomplishment of macro-cultural-symbolic 
actions which look at symbols, rituals, myths, stories and 
language.
5. The accomplishment of macro-political-economic 
actions which look at the power-based, interest-based and 
coalition-based aspects of change.
In an effort to accomplish the objectives of this 
case study, the investigator has thoroughly researched 
five aspects of the change events and the relationship of 
these events to the previously mentioned predominant 
change models. The five aspects are:
1. The internal mechanisms and vehicles for
articulating the change (e.g., facts, language, symbols, 
etc.).
2. The external mechanisms and vehicles for
communicating change (e.g., facts, language, symbols, 
etc.).
3. The programmatic processes that deepen
understanding and knowledge about the change.
4. The key actions of a leader impacting on the 
change.
5. The grass roots movement that significantly 
affected the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors about the 
change.
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Methodology
The purpose of this study was to determine the degree 
to which the organizational actions of Pacific Southwest 
Airlines exemplify the predominant models of 
organizational change.
The questions that this particular investigation 
sought to address are embodied within the naturalistic 
research tradition (Bantz, 1983). They are necessarily 
qualitative questions that warrant an understanding of the 
actions, behaviors, processes and communication systems 
which were the instruments of the change event being 
studied. The paramount function of the questions to be 
answered in this study is to provide the most full, rich 
and comprehensive description of organizational change in 
action.
Qualitative research has been described as 
evolutionary or emergent in that the research in progress 
is guided by an interpretive process (Putnam, 1982). This 
investigation may be characterized as a qualitative case 
study because it draws from two approaches that are aimed 
at interpretive understanding: history and ethnography.
This investigation seeks to paint a thick description 
of organizational change in action and how that action 
shaped realities. The study draws from these two 
approaches in that the researcher attempts to understand 
how a change event which has already happened (a 
historical concern) shaped and influenced the social
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construction of organizational realities (an ethnographic 
concern). Hence, this study is neither purely 
ethnographic nor unconditionally historical, but rather a 
blend of two approaches.
The Ethnographic Approach
Those who operate within the naturalistic research 
tradition argue that "the social scientist cannot 
understand human behavior without understanding the 
framework within which the subjects interpret their 
thoughts, feelings, and actions" (Wilson, 1983). This is 
the goal of ethnographic research. In practice, 
ethnographical studies attempt to depict a culture by 
uncovering and explicating the means by which individuals 
"come to understand, account for, take action, and 
otherwise mangle" the social construction of their 
realities (Van Maanen, 1983) . Wolcott (1983) suggested 
that "culture is the major concept and point of departure 
for most American anthropologists, and ethnography is the 
anthropologist's descriptive account of what he has 
observed and understood of another culture" (p. 25) .
While the anthropologist looks at the processual nature of 
culture, recognizing that it is dynamic and ongoing, the 
ethnographer seeks to hold it still or take a slice long 
enough to create a snapshot of it.
It is with this picture of the dynamic process that 
the ethnographer illustrates the ways in which people 
organize themselves into interacting social systems.
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Ethnographic Research Procedures
The ethnographer uses the information that emerges in 
an investigation to guide and direct subsequent data 
collection. The essential research instrument for this 
investigative process is the ethnographer. Therefore, the 
primary method used in the practice of ethnography is 
participant observation. In essence, the ethnographer 
becomes immersed in the realities of those being studied 
as well as the context in which these realities are being 
constructed (Sanday, 1983). Consequently, as a 
participant observer, the ethnographer is able to discover 
the meaning structures of those under investigation or 
that culture which is under investigation.
In the ethnographic process of research, participant 
observation is complemented by a number of equally 
important information-gathering devices (Pelto, 1970). 
The method of particular relevance to this investigation 
is gathering data about the five key mechanisms which were 
used to shape reality that occurred as events of change in 
action. Here the ethnographer becomes involved in the 
change as a true participant observer to gain access to 
the conceptual world in which the organization, and the 
people in it, live. By adopting "an informant's mode of 
thought while retaining full use of this own critical 
faculties" (Mead, 1959, p. 38), the ethnographer develops 
an understanding of the methods social actors use in 
constructing their realities.
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Through the process of participant observation, data 
and information gathering, the ethnographer enters into an 
empathic relationship with participants in which she 
shares in their daily lives and systematically works to 
understand "the meaning particular social actions have for 
the actors whose actions they are" (Geertz, 1973, p. 27). 
Thus, the researcher, through ethnographic inquiry, 
attempts to develop an understanding about social actors 
in a specific context and describe what the knowledge 
gained demonstrates about social life within that very 
context.
The Historical Case Study Approach
The case study historian uses information that has 
already emerged for the purpose of analysis and 
description. By analyzing an event that has already 
occurred, the investigator is able to encompass detailed 
and thick descriptions while insights, trends, and 
conclusions emerge. The researcher seeks to find specific 
examples, facts and illustrations of a given phenomenon so 
that accurate description occurs. This description is 
often an interpretive analysis which is similar to the 
writings of a journalist or investigative reporter. The 
analysis captures the event from some point in time to 
another point in time. After the event has been captured, 
having a start and an end, the investigator looks back.
Wilson (1983) suggested that the historical case 
study approach involves a phenomenon within a framework
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which, because the phenomenon has "ended," deals more with 
a summative view as opposed to a formative view. The 
historical case study is a slice of time which, in this 
particular case, is an six-month period, where a 
descriptive account of what is observed and understood is 
documented. Although there are no rules for how long or 
short the slice of time should be, it should be adequate 
for properly and deeply describing the event being 
studied. The description may take the form of a 
chronology or the flow of given themes.
Change Events 
In essence the senior managers of PSA decided to 
initiate five actions, which were intended to facilitate 
the change more productively. Each of the five actions or 
programs were quite comprehensive and extensive in nature, 
and all were intended to be continuous and ongoing as 
opposed to one time only actions. These five events will 
now be reviewed:
The Internal Mechanisms for Articulating Change 
PSA News Update and PSA/USAir Merger Update were a 
major focus of this case study. These communication 
documents were the primary sources of information and 
became the consistent communication thread throughout the 
acquisition process. Both communication instruments were 
intended to be noneditorial, a rather objective and 
factual account of events, clearly depicting the complex 
chain of events during a highly uncertain and ambiguous
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time. The vehicles were directed toward all 5,000 members 
of the PSA organization. These two sources of 
communication were prepared and released 93 times over a 
six-month period.
The External Mechanisms for Articulating Change 
Newspaper articles from a variety of different 
locations within the United States, particularly from the 
Western United States, were another major source of 
information in this case study. These articles, between 
October 1986 and June 1987, served as another primary 
source of information and communication for 5,000 members 
of PSA, labor unions/officers, investors and customers of 
the carrier. Literally thousands of articles have been 
collected and studied to help frame this change event.
The Programmatic Processes 
A number of programs oriented around organizational 
development themes were designed and implemented during 
the time of acquisition. These programs covered a variety 
of different change-related objectives. One program in 
particular is worthy of detailed analysis and that was an 
intervention in small groups called "Leading in Changing 
Times." A series of in-depth interviews took place in 
order to determine what the organization needed to do so 
that productivity declines during the change process could 
be minimized. The interview data served as a needs 
assessment for a group interactive seminar that was 
delivered to all management employees in the PSA 
organization.
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The Impacting Leader Actions 
Russell Ray, president and chief operating officer of 
Pacific Southwest Airlines, was a focus of this case 
study. Ray was selected because he was a facilitator of 
change in this case study. His role as transactional or 
transformational leader is not the focus; rather his roles 
as orchestrator and constructor of reality are what is 
most applicable to this study. The research does not 
argue conclusively whether or not this individual was 
indeed an effective leader of change. The researcher 
does, however, analyze the impacting actions of this 
individual, along with the other aspects of change events, 
as they relate to the change models mentioned above. The 
data analyzed are videotaped messages to employees, notes 
from meetings which were facilitated by Mr. Ray, and a 
variety of field notes recorded by the researcher in 
private meetings.
The Grass Roots Movement 
A grass roots movement took place during the change 
cycle which can be defined as a kind of speaking out 
uprising. Front line employees felt a strong need to 
express, vent, communicate, ask questions, and articulate 
about the acquisition. The most appropriate vehicle for 
this type of expression was through a nationwide computer 
communications network. Computer chatter, as it was 
called, was voluminous. This computer chatter has been 
captured by retrieving hundreds of messages on printouts
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from employees. Also, field notes are utilized in this 
descriptive section.
Participants
There are numerous participants in this qualitative 
case study. First and foremost, the researcher herself is 
a substantial participant observer. Since the researcher 
was planted into the very fiber of the organization during 
the organizational change, it becomes obvious that her 
view will become essential and relevant to this study.
Other significant participants include a variety of 
employees from Pacific Southwest Airlines from different 
levels and positions within the corporation. These 
participants include the chief executive officer, 
executive vice presidents, vice presidents, directors, 
managers, supervisors, flight attendants, pilots, customer 
service representatives, ticket agents, reservations 
agents and mechanics. All of these participants served as 
key informants in some fashion to the researcher.
Site Selection
The actual site from which this case study takes 
place was at the PSA headquarters in San Diego, 
California. In addition, however, there are numerous 
other city locations from which data was collected. These 
other cities were those on the PSA and/or USAir route 
systems where employees worked. The satellite cities are 
referenced in the context of the study as warranted.
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On-Site Observation 
The researcher spent over six years with Pacific 
Southwest Airlines and was present at the corporate 
offices in San Diego, California, for the duration of the 
change event being studied. Daily operations in all 
departments were observed, field notes were constantly 
collected, and data were consistently and thoroughly 
collected from: PSA News Updates, PSA/USAir Merger
Updates, newspaper articles, videotape scripts, computer 
printouts, memos, letters, announcements, and more. 
Specific sites where observations took place include 
office settings, reception areas, pilot lounges, flight 
attendant lounges, on-board aircraft, cockpits, hallways, 
ticket counters, boarding gates, baggage claim areas, 
ramps and training centers.
Data Gathering 
Bantz (1983) described the documents within an 
organization as those messages that are generated by 
members of the organization and have a permanent 
structure. Bantz explained that since these documents are 
produced by organizational members, they are indicative of 
the internal dynamics of the organization. To a 
naturalistic researcher these documents provide historical 
data just as the Constitution of the United States 
provides us with long-lasting information.
Documents in this investigation are a critical 
element in the study. In addition to the documents
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already mentioned, such as PSA Updates, newspaper 
articles, etc., the researcher also collected annual 
reports, training materials, brochures, letters from the 
chairman of the board and written, audiotaped and 
videotaped messages from a variety of senior managers 
within the organization.
Messages that are disseminated publicly in an effort 
to project a particular corporate image have been labeled 
by Bantz (1983) as organizational outputs. These outputs 
can take the form of press releases, television 
commercials, radio advertisements, billboards, slogans and 
logos. As with organizational documents, organizational 
outputs provide the naturalistic research with yet another 
perspective of the organization. All of these outputs 
were reviewed by this investigator.
Data Analysis
All of the documents used were reviewed and analyzed 
for common themes. A common theme was established when 
various pieces of information were naturally interrelated. 
The researcher then attempted to determine if and how 
these themes were related to the five predominant models 
of change and the five predominant change actions. 
Specifically, the researcher looked for concrete examples 
by drawing inferences from the type of language used, the 
types of behaviors exhibited, and the types of symbolic 
elements such as metaphors, myths and specific words which 
were used to represent broad beliefs and ideas.
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Descriptive Analysis 
It is virtually impossible to fully describe the 
acquisition of PSA by USAir without understanding the 
history of Pacific Southwest Airlines. This is because so 
much of the relevance of this single organizational change 
event emerges out of the significant chronological events 
of the past. Therefore, Chapter IV is a description of 
the rich past which shaped PSA.
Chapter V of this case study is a written analysis 
describing the change event from several different lenses. 
The lenses or cells are built with the horizontal axis 
reflecting the five key models of organizational change 
and with the vertical axis reflecting the five key change 
actions which were demonstrated during this slice of time. 
In a form similar to journalistic accounts, Chapter V 
provides facts, examples, quotes and illustrations which 
accurately fit in each cell. In turn these examples serve 
as the basis for a discussion about the primary research 
questions of this investigation.
Chapter VI will draw some conclusions about 
organizational change, further exploring the research 
questions, and blending key findings which can be relevant 
to both scholars and practitioners of organizational 
change and leadership.
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CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORY OF PACIFIC SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) began initial 
operations on May 6, 1949, flying a leased DC-3 aircraft 
with a seating capacity of 31 once a week between San 
Diego and Oakland via Hollywood/Burbank. The airline 
charged onto the California scene proclaiming that flying 
could be safe, punctual, friendly and affordable.
What was it that set PSA apart from other airlines, 
delivered it from obscurity and ensured its place in the 
annals of United States airline history? If one asked 
passengers, employees, even competitors, one simple word 
comes up again and again: fun. The airline was fun to
fly on, fun to be associated with, and fun to work for. 
"Catch Our Smile" became the airline's maxim.
At a time when the rest of America was extremely 
serious, PSA capitalized on the notion that flying could 
be fun. While other airlines cloaked their planes and 
crews in somber shades of blue and beige, PSA planes wore 
stripes of fuchsia, orange and red with a big, bold smile 
painted under the nose.
Over the years, PSA eventually expanded its service 
over most of the Western states, servicing nearly a 
million passengers per month. Along the way PSA redefined
56
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
the airline industry's corporate culture: innovation was
the order of the day. This new culture truly was a shared 
philosophy, instilled by the airline's founders, Friedkin 
and Andrews, perpetuated by senior management and 
implemented by employees.
PSA came to represent the quintessential California 
mindset: bold, brash, sexy, sometimes off the wall but
always friendly, and always fun.
By the end of 1949, PSA was operating two DC-3 
aircraft and had carried 15,011 revenue passengers over 
321,112 plane miles. The airline posted operating 
revenues of $172,796 against operating expenses of 
$160,902 for a net profit of $11,894.
PSA initially attracted such a large percentage of 
military personnel that its initials were said to stand 
for the "Poor Sailors' Airline." The camaraderie in those 
early days set the tone for PSA's corporate culture. 
Flight attendants cleaned the aircraft after a flight, 
pilots loaded the baggage and everyone had bathroom 
cleaning duty at least once. Everybody basically 
participated in what needed to get done and they 
participated in a fun way.
PSA operated over the same three destination route 
structure in 1950. Revenue passenger totals tripled as 
the airline carried 45,390 passengers. While operating 
revenues advanced to $503,737, expenses increased to 
$517,334 and a net loss of $13,597 was posted.
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By July 1951, PSA added a fourth destination with the 
initiation of service to San Francisco from San Diego and 
Hollywood/Burbank at fares of $17.25 and $11.70, 
respectively. The airline, however, wasn't just beefing 
up its routes; it began to actively cultivate an image of 
fun, innovation and personality.
Scott Newhall, formerly editor of the San Francisco 
Chronicle and an early PSA frequent flyer, pinpoints one 
word to describe PSA in its very earliest days: friendly.
"Their business was to get you there feeling pretty good. 
Sometimes it was like a party, with a little band or 
guitar player. They were on time and had good-looking 
girls.1
At the end of 1951 the number of people employed had 
increased from the original 50 to 119 with an annual 
payroll of $366,605. The idea of maintaining the 
California look prevailed. Even in the early days at PSA, 
it was encouraged that all customer contact employees, 
particularly stewardesses, as they were known then, 
display their outgoing personalities and have fun while 
they worked.
The fleet of DC-3 aircraft increased to four in 1952 
as the airline continued to serve San Diego, 
Hollywood/Burbank, Oakland and San Francisco. PSA carried 
92,484 revenue passengers and logged operating revenues of 
$1,125,364 against operating expenses of $1,151,972 for a 
$26,608 net loss.
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During 1953, service was inaugurated from San Diego 
and Hollywood/Burbank to Long Beach with fares of $4.80 
and $2.25 respectively. For that year, PSA posted a 
higher loss of $37,487 on operating revenues of $1,454,413 
and operating expenses of $1,491,900. The airline carried 
115,028 revenue passengers and flew 1,827,903 plane miles. 
The number of employees increased to 190 with an annual 
payroll of $521,967.
In 195 4, PSA discontinued operations at Oakland and 
Long Beach, and reverted to a three-city route structure, 
serving only San Diego, San Francisco and 
Hollywood/Burbank. Fares ranged from $5.45 to $19.05. 
The number of revenue passengers decreased by 
approximately 13,000 from the previous year as PSA carried 
a total of 102,124; however, the airline posted a net 
profit of $26,711.
PSA purchased two McDonnell-Douglas DC-4 aircraft in 
1955 to replace its DC-3 equipment. The larger and faster 
DC-4s were configured to carry 70 passengers, more than 
twice that of the older DC-3s. As profits rose, fares 
went down. The $19.05 San Diego-Oakland fare dropped to 
$15.44, the Burbank-San Francisco fare was lowered from 
$13.50 to $9.99, while the San Diego-Burbank fare remained 
unchanged at $5.45. These fares remained constant through 
1958.
The airline added a third DC-4 aircraft to its fleet 
in 1956 and carried 191,221 revenue passengers over the
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three-city route structure. Operating revenues increased 
to $2,122,376 and operating expenses increased to 
$2,063,788. Continuing a three-year trend of profits, PSA 
earned $58,588 for the year.
In 1957, a fourth DC-4 was added to PSA's fleet of 
aircraft and the airline's employees increased to 246 with 
an annual payroll of $762,294. By now, PSA had begun a 
reputation of having a playful personality. Employees 
continued to demonstrate a positive attitude with 
customers. Revenue passenger totals increased to 256,454 
as PSA posted another profit of $196,606.
August of 1958 marked the inauguration of service to 
Los Angeles International Airport and, once again, the 
number of destinations in PSA's system increased to four. 
The San Diego-Los Angeles fare was the same as the $5.45 
San Diego-Burbank fare. Fares for Los Angeles-San 
Francisco were set at $11.81, and the San Diego-San 
Francisco fare rose to $17.26. That year, PSA carried
295,818 revenue passengers and flew 1,935,465 plane miles 
as it posted a year end profit of $322,031.
The introduction of three Lockheed L-188 Electra 
propjets into PSA's fleet highlighted 1959. The 98-seat
aircraft was ideally suited to the airline's four
destination route structure and revenue passengers 
increased to 355,099 while plane miles exceeded the 2
million mark for the first time. PSA posted revenues of
$4,362,921 against expenses of $3,907,015 for a net profit
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of $455,906. In 1959, PSA employed 300 people and the 
annual payroll exceeded $1 million.
The stewardess population was now required to wear 
false eyelashes and bright colored make-up. Image and 
appearance were very important.
Disposing of its DC-4 equipment, PSA entered the 
1960s with a fleet that consisted of three Electras and 
one 92-seat DC-6. Available seat miles, plane miles and 
revenue passengers increased to 289,100,100, 2,950,000 and 
621,280 respectively. In October of 1960, PSA reinstated 
service to Oakland but discontinued again in March of 
1961. Fares remained at 1958 levels as the airline posted 
a year end profit of $499.
PSA management actively encouraged crew-passenger 
interaction; by the sixties, flight attendants were 
collecting passenger tickets on the planes in order to 
facilitate more contact. Carol Austin, a
twenty-three-year veteran, recalls those days: "We
treated customers as if they were guests in our homes. We 
were never allowed to go into our work area and hide out, 
talking among ourselves." Flight crews were even given 
opening gambits to initiate conversation with passengers. 
PSA had a perpetual open door policy in the cockpit, until 
the Federal Aviation Administration ordered cockpit doors 
closed in 1972.
PSA was now dubbed the "Personality Sells Airlines." 
But how does a faceless corporation, whose work centers on
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inanimate machinery, evolve a personality?
Len Gross, principal of Gross, Pera & Rockey, the 
firm that became PSA's first ad agency, credits a 
management team that was relaxed and supportive. "They 
were a young, growing airline and they had a lot of fun. 
Their competitors were big guys who were very stuffy, 
formal, terribly dignified. PSA was a bunch of gung-ho 
kids who wanted to build something."
It helped that the operation was small: 50 employees
in 1949, doubled to 119 by 1951, and still only 1,899 in 
1968. Former chief pilot Bogle says he knew the home 
telephone number of each and every crew member and often 
talked to each of his pilots nightly. "We thought we were 
big, but until 1968 we weren't really," he says now. "We 
were big in heart, though."
All agree that one of Kenny Friedkin's greatest 
legacies was his belief that flying should be fun. 
Andrews who carried on as president after Friedkin's death 
in 1962, articulated that philosophy: "Life is tough
enough. If we're not having fun, let's go do something 
else."
Longtime flight attendant Austin echoed this 
sentiment: "Our duty days were twelve hours and thirty
minutes. That's six hundred hellos and goodbyes. We 
sought to make almost a sporting event of it by involving 
the passengers as well as crew members in the fun. The 
uniqueness of this airline? We got people to loosen up."
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Added to this was Friedkin's regard for his employees 
which he viewed as his extended family. Everyone, from 
clerks to senior managers, was on first name, sometimes 
even nickname, terms. Bonnie Johnson, who joined the 
airline's accounting department right out of high school 
of 1960, recalled that the big boss never even wore a 
suit. "Kenny was one of us, and we were all working 
toward the success of PSA."
With the disposition of the DC-6 and the addition of 
another Electra, PSA's 1961 fleet stood at four Electra 
propjets. The carrier flew 713,064 revenue passengers 
over 3.3 million aircraft miles. Operating revenues 
increased to $9.7 million and a year end profit of 
$310,483 was posted. A fifth Electra was added to the 
fleet as PSA's revenue passenger totals exceeded the 1 
million mark for the first time in 1962. PSA carried 
1,032,514 passengers over its four city system and enjoyed 
its best year to date, showing a profit of $1,368,770.
With TWA, United and Western all flying the same four 
hundred mile corridor between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, how had PSA, the comparatively small intrastate 
airline, garnered a 50 percent market share? They all had 
the same type of aircraft and the same schedule, and by 
this point, the same fare structure. What accounted for 
PSA's unprecedented success? In a word: stewardesses.
Every airline in the country had female flight 
attendants, but PSA was known nationally for its sun
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kissed beauties. Not only were they pretty, agreed the 
flying public, they were also warm, intelligent, friendly 
and funny.
As flight attendant uniforms began to get briefer and 
more form fitting, PSA discovered that sex sells. If 
nothing else, PSA will be remembered for its flight 
attendants and their uniforms. In a San Francisco 
Chronicle editorial, Scott Newhall dubbed them "the 
cupcakes of the airplanes, the vestal virgins of the air."
Initially, PSA flight attendants wore the traditional 
two piece military style business suit used by most other 
airlines. However, around 1962, PSA departed from 
tradition and introduced the "banana skin," so called not 
because of its color, which was brown, but because of its 
form fitting silhouette. The banana skin was, as one 
flight attendant recalls, "definitely revealing."
Carol Austin, who wore one, describes the "skin": 
"It was very form fitting with a zipper all the way up the 
front. You really had to peel it on and off. Everything 
showed. It was definitely ahead of its time because 
everyone else was in a boxy business type uniform."
In 1963, the airline operated a fleet of six Electra 
aircraft, a figure that would remain constant through the 
following year. The airline flew 5.5 million plane miles 
and carried 1,305,058 revenue passengers, up 272,544 over 
the previous year. PSA posted operating revenues of 
$17,432,534 against operating expenses of $15,180,815 for
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a net profit of $2,251,719. On February 3, 1963, Pacific 
Southwest Airlines became a public corporation.
PSA earned a net profit of $2,945,881 based on 
revenues of $20,455,295 and expenses of $17,509,414 for 
1964. The airline carried 1,532,243 revenue passengers 
and flew 6.5 million plane miles over the four city route 
system.
In 1965, PSA entered the jet age as it added five 
Boeing 727-100s to its fleet of six Electras. The Boeing 
aircraft were configured to seat 128 passengers. With the 
introduction of jet equipment into its fleet, PSA's 
available seat miles increased to nearly 1 billion as the 
airline carried 1,863,088 passengers and earned yet 
another profit of $2,034,932. In January, PSA initiated 
service to Oakland in June the airline was listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange.
PSA added two more Boeing 7 27-100 aircraft to the 
fleet during 1966, bringing the fleet total to six 
Electras and seven Boeing 727s. With this equipment, PSA 
nearly doubled its passenger totals as it carried 
2,712,811 travelers and posted a net profit of $4,307,289. 
In May, PSA inaugurated routes between San Diego/Los 
Angeles/Burbank and San Jose and offered fares of $19.85, 
$13.50 and $13.50 respectively.
During 1967, the airline added three more jet 
aircraft to the fleet, a Boeing 727-100 and two 
McDonnell/Douglas DC-9s. The Douglas aircraft were
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configured to carry 110 passengers. By the end of the 
year, the six Electras were phased out of the fleet and 
PSA became an all-jet airliner. Year end profit was 
$4,159,823 and service was inaugurated to Sacramento from 
San Diego with a fare of $21.59 and from Los Angeles with 
a fare of $15.24.
During 1968, PSA augmented its fleet of seven 
727-100s and two DC-9s with seven 727-200 aircraft and 
four 737-200 aircraft. By year's end, the fleet total of 
jet aircraft stood at 20. The new stretch 727s were 
configured for 159 passengers, and the twin-engine 737s 
held 114 passengers. PSA carried 3,997,524 revenue 
passengers over a system that included seven California 
destinations with Ontario becoming the eighth when service 
was inaugurated there in June, 19 68. That year, PSA 
employed 1,899 with annual payroll of $13.6 million. The 
airline earned $4 million on operating revenues of $56.2 
million and operating expenses of $52.2 million.
PSA's 1969 fleet consisted of one DC-9, one Boeing 
727-100, fourteen Boeing 727-200s and nine Boeing 
737-200s. PSA carried 4.4 million passengers and posted a 
year end profit of $3,747,016.
PSA entered the seventies with an all Boeing-equipped 
fleet that included one 727-100, sixteen 727-200s and nine 
737-200s. The company topped the 5 million mark in 
passengers carried and posted a profit of $3.6 million. 
Service was started to Long Beach in December of 19 70.
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For the year, the airline flew 20.6 million plane miles 
and 2.9 billion available seat miles.
In 1970 another critical cultural move happened, the 
smiles were painted on the planes and it then became the 
central identifying artwork in all advertising, whether it 
was a smiling plane or just a smile.
The print ads and all collateral materials, from 
brochures to ticket folders, featured some play on this 
smile. A 1976 ad proclaimed, "California is all smiles." 
When PSA began flying interstate, "Catch our smile to 
Portland" and "Smile to Phoenix" made an appearance in 
1978 and 1979. When the airline became the official 
airline of Disneyland, PSA offered "magical smiles." When 
the British Aerospace 146-200 jets joined the fleet in 
1984, they were christened "Smiliners." Still later, when 
the USAir merger was announced in 1986, the smile theme 
was front and center with the advertising tag line, "Now 
our smile is even wider."
The smile came to be so closely identified with the 
airline that it became almost a symbol of the magical aura 
and lightheartedness of PSA. Russell L. Ray, Jr., named 
president and chief operating officer in 1985, says that 
when the USAir merger was announced, "PSA people had two 
questions: 'What's going to happen to me?' and 'What's
going to happen to the smile?' Not necessarily in that 
order. It's the darnedest thing— I can't explain why the 
smile is so important, but it is."
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In 1971, PSA's fleet totalled 27 jet aircraft and 
realized a year end profit of $4,239,335. A milestone was 
hit when 5.6 million passengers were carried that year, an 
increase of nearly a half a million over the previous 
year.
Service to Fresno and Stockton began in July of 1972. 
Inaugural fares between Los Angeles and Fresno and Los 
Angeles and Stockton were $14.82 and $18.52 respectively. 
That year there were 2,594 PSA employees with a $27 
million payroll budget. That year, PSA topped the 6 
million mark in revenue passengers and recorded a profit 
of $5,957,485.
PSA flew 23,063,794 plane miles and carried 6,356,875 
revenue passengers with a fleet of nineteen 727-200 and 
eight 737-200 aircraft during 1973.
Things began to sour in November 1973 when the 
airline was struck for the first time in its history by 
the Teamsters Union. Approximately six hundred 
maintenance personnel and seven hundred station managers 
kept to the outside of the picket line. Management and 
supervisors pitched in and the airline continued 
operations, losing only about 40% of the normal schedule. 
Emotions ran hot, though, and the strike wounded the PSA 
psyche.
The carrier also made its fair share of strategic 
mistakes. In 1972, with the Civil Aeronautics Board 
holding firm in its refusal to grant PSA permission to fly
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interstate routes, Andrews, never at a loss for a good 
marketing idea, steered his company into an ambitious plan 
for diversification: the Fly/Drive/Sleep campaign.
Because passengers were confined to California, the 
thinking was, he says, "to give passengers a reason to fly 
with us, to give them something more, something better 
than the competition." PSA would provide a total service 
to passengers: a plane to fly them to their destination,
a car to drive once they got there and a bed to sleep in 
at night. Each component of the campaign would promote 
the others.
Most notably, PSA bought the hotel portion of the 
Queen Mary in Long Beach, along with several other 
operations up and down the state, including the Islandia 
Hotel in San Diego. Additionally, the airline bought a 
car rental business and several radio stations.
The Fly/Drive/Sleep plan was probably ahead of its 
time, and the campaign quickly fizzled. Fergie Fulmer, a 
PSA employee at the time, says it was doomed by commuter 
behavior: "People go up and back the same day, so it
didn't tie in as it should have." For his part, Andrews 
admits there were two problems: "We should have let the
experts run the program instead of trying to do it 
ourselves, and our timing was bad. Timing killed it." 
Just as the programs got under way, fuel costs zoomed into 
the stratosphere: prices increased tenfold and the crunch
was on.
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Suddenly PSA, the darling of the industry, the 
airline that could do no wrong, was encountering 
turbulence. As consumer affairs director Judy James says, 
that revelation came as something of a shock: "People
were disappointed because for the first time an attempt at 
doing something unique, which PSA was always good at, 
failed."
The labor dispute was settled on December 23; 
however, it was not until several months later that PSA 
resumed normal operations. During 1973, PSA's operations 
revenues topped the $100 million mark for the first time 
as a net profit of $627,123 was posted.
In 1974, PSA took delivery of two Lockheed L-1011 
TriStars. The wide bodied equipment were configured for 
296 passengers and were initially introduced on the 
heavily travelled Los Angeles/San Francisco route.
Not only were the L-lOlls fuel guzzlers, but their 
huge capacity proved a hindrance. Frequent flyer Scott 
Newhall, shuttling back and forth as part of his duties as 
editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, observed that it 
took as much time to load and unload the passengers as it 
did to actually fly from San Francisco to Los Angeles. 
"The L-1011 was a fine plane to fly between California and 
Czechoslovakia, but for this commuter run it was too big." 
Due to a recessionary economy and the government enforced 
fuel quotas, the new generation aircraft were grounded in 
1975. For the year PSA recorded a profit of $1,589,627.
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PSA added a twelfth destination to its route 
structure in April of 1975, when services commenced to 
South Lake Tahoe. The fare from Los Angeles to Lake Tahoe 
was $30.00. During 1975, revenues of $152,521,000 were 
realized while carrying 6,436,436 passengers. However, 
PSA, Inc. incurred a loss of $16.7 million resulting from 
the establishment of a provision for loss on the L-1011 
TriStar aircraft program and a provision for anticipated 
losses on the disposition on the company's subsidiary 
hotel and broadcasting operations.
William R. Shimp became chief executive officer upon 
the retirement of J. Floyd Andrews during 1976. PSA sold 
the remaining two Boeing 737 aircraft and added two leased 
Boeing 727-100s, bringing the fleet to twenty-three 
7 27-200, three 7 27-100, two Lockheed Electra and two 
L-1011 aircraft. The two L-lOlls remained grounded as the 
company sought a prospective buyer for the aircraft. 
During the year, PSA continued the plan to dispose of 
subsidiary hotel and broadcasting operations, selling the 
remaining radio stations and two of the four hotels. PSA 
had earnings of $3,501,000 on revenues of $166,874,000 and 
carried 6,591,000 revenue passengers. Fares remained 
steady during 1976.
During 1977, PSA applied to the Civil Aeronautics 
Board for service from California cities to Las Vegas and 
Reno, at fares from 18 to 43% less than the fares charged 
at that time. If approved, the Nevada service would
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become the first interstate routes for the airline. In 
December, PSA received permanent authority from the 
California Public Utilities Commission to serve South Lake 
Tahoe from Southern California and San Francisco. The 
airline took delivery of five used Boeing 727-100 
aircraft, two of which replaced leased 727-100s. Profits 
were recorded at $2,567,000.
After a great deal of effort PSA was finally granted 
approval by the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1978 to serve 
Nevada. One way fares on the Las Vegas-San Diego market 
were lowered by PSA to $30, a reduction of 35% from 
existing fares on the market. The new interstate service 
was the highlight of the year until, on September 25, 
1978, tragedy struck. PSA flight 182 collided in midair 
with a privately owned Cessna 172, killing 144 people, 
including 37 PSA employees.
Judy James, a PSA employee at the time, recalls that 
day with stunning clarity: "Flight 182 was the
unthinkable. I always felt safe on our airline; it 
couldn't happen to us. It was particularly difficult 
because of the number of PSA employees, our friends, who 
were on board."
During that same year, PSA became the first domestic 
airline to order the new Douglas DC-9 Super 80 aircraft, 
the most quiet and fuel efficient commercial aircraft 
produced. A total of 12 airplanes were ordered for 
delivery in 1980 and 1981. Throughout the year, PSA
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continued its aggressive expansion plans with applications 
to the Civil Aeronautics Board for service between 
California cities and Phoenix, Seattle, Salt Lake City, 
Portland, Houston and seven cities in Mexico. That year, 
PSA carried 7.8 million passengers and earned $11.5 
million on revenues of $229.8 million.
In 1979, PSA's first full year as an interstate 
carrier, success soared, with the airline carrying a 
record 8.6 million passengers and enjoying its best year 
ever financially. PSA added Phoenix, Arizona and Salt 
Lake City, Utah to the route system during the year, while 
dropping service to South Lake Tahoe and Monterey, 
California. At the end of 1979, PSA's route system 
included 15 cities in four states. Although the 
interstate routes were profitable within 90 days, PSA's 
aggressive expansion plans were tempered somewhat by 
skyrocketing costs and limited quantities of aviation 
fuel. Fuel also affected PSA fares. By the end of 1979, 
the carrier still was offering rates below the national 
rate making formula, but the one-way fares rose 
dramatically during the last half of the year, reflecting 
a doubling of fuel costs during that time period. Sample 
year end fares were: Los Angeles-San Diego, $26; Los
Angeles-San Francisco, $40; and Los Angeles-Las Vegas, 
$38.
The airline completed one major building and broke 
ground on another during 1979. A $2.5 million
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reservations center was opened in the Scripps Ranch 
Business Park in San Diego, while construction began on a 
multi million dollar training facility adjacent to the 
reservations complex. All the while, PSA enjoyed its best 
operating year with revenues of $335,838,000 and earnings 
of $23,097,000.
1980 was one of its most dynamic years as the airline 
became an international carrier with service to Mexico, 
became inoperable for the first time in its 32 year 
history by a strike and became the first United States 
airline to operate the McDonnell-Douglas Super 80 
aircraft.
In April, service began to Puerto Vallarta and 
Mazatlan, Mexico from Los Angeles, which meant that the 
airline had made a full transformation from intrastate to 
interstate to international carrier in less than 18 
months.
The pilots, represented by the Southwest Flight Crew 
Association, struck the airline for 52 days, starting on 
September 25, forcing PSA to halt scheduled service for 
the first time in its history.
The pilots' strike affected passenger volume and 
earnings for the year. Some 6 million passengers flew the 
carrier during 1980 with PSA, Inc. reporting year end 
earnings of $12.6 million on revenues of $370,204,000.
While the 153-seat Super 80 is quiet, the 30% 
improved fuel efficiency over the Boeing 727s helped to
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keep fare levels low in the face of rising fuel costs. At 
the end of 1980, PSA was operating a fleet of twenty-two 
Boeing 727s and one Super 80.
PSA's aggressive fleet transition program highlighted 
1981 as the airline received twelve DC-9 Super 80 aircraft 
from McDonnell-Douglas. The new plane's efficiencies, 
particularly in the area of fuel consumption, saved PSA 
approximately $1.7 million per year over the aircraft it 
replaced. By year end, the operating fleet consisted of 
thirteen Super 80s, fifteen Boeing 7 27-200s, and three 
Boeing 727-100 aircraft.
With a major training program accompanying the 
delivery of the new aircraft, the new multi million dollar 
training center at the Scripps Ranch Business Park opened. 
The center housed the nation's first DC-9 Super 80 
simulator.
A deepening recession and flight limitations imposed 
by the Federal Aviation Administration after the national 
strike by the Professional Air Traffic Controller 
Organization had an adverse effect. Although the airline 
operation lost $17 million during the year, profitable 
subsidiaries plus the sale of aircraft and proceeds from 
safe harbor leasing, gave PSA, Inc. a record $28.5 million 
in net income for the year.
PSA entered three new cities during 1981, adding 
Orange County, California in October and Seattle, 
Washington and Tucson, Arizona in December. In keeping
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with PSA's low fare tradition, fares on the new markets 
were lowered below competitor's rates.
In 1982 the fleet transition continued with eight 
more Super 80s added during the year. By October 
twenty-one Super 80s were online with nine Boeing 727s, 
thus making PSA the first major airline to operate the 
majority of its fleet with new-generational aircraft.
Passenger boardings were up 16.6% and PSA flew 7.1 
million passengers. Available seat miles were the highest 
ever achieved and revenue passenger miles were the second 
highest in PSA history.
The economic recession did not abate and, as a 
result, earnings were adversely affected. Despite an 
airline operating loss, PSA, Inc. had year end earnings of 
$19.5 million.
PSA improved its competitive position during 1982 by 
increasing service between California and Phoenix and at 
Burbank. In June, PSA reinstated the Midnight Flyer, its 
late night, low fare service, as it had been suspended in 
1978. In September, service to Puerto Vallarta and Salt 
Lake City was discontinued.
The year ended with PSA entering into an agreement 
with Braniff Airways that would allow the carrier to lease 
and purchase assets from the bankrupt airline to form a 
new PSA division that would operate with a hub at 
Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport. Thirty repainted 
Braniff Boeing 727s were planned to be leased by PSA to 
serve 16 new cities.
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In 1983, PSA abandoned its negotiations with Braniff 
early in the year when deadlines that the airlines set for 
agreement to be reached could not be met. PSA instead 
focused its attention on markets in the West and later in 
the year inaugurated service to Portland, Oregon; Spokane, 
Washington; as well as Albuquerque, New Mexico. This was 
the largest expansion in PSA's recent history.
PSA became the official airline of Disneyland under a 
12 year agreement that included several exclusive 
marketing ties and a PSA sponsored attraction at the famed 
theme park. Other major marketing developments were the 
introduction of the Executive Flyer Program for frequent 
travelers, and, for the first time, seat assignment on all 
flights was initiated.
Competitive pressures abounded during 1983 from 
established carriers and new entrants in PSA markets. 
Although PSA set records for revenue passenger miles and 
available seat miles, PSA, Inc. reported a net loss of 
$9.3 million.
Late in the year, PSA contracted with British 
Aerospace to acquire twenty new BAe 146-200 jets, a 100 
seat aircraft intended to give the company more 
flexibilities to increase frequencies in existing markets 
and to consider expansion into new markets. The BAe 146 
aircraft demonstrated to be the quietest commercial 
jetlines on takeoff ever developed, also was extremely 
fuel-efficient, burning about one-half the amount of fuel 
as a Boeing 727-200.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
78
Eight of the new generation planes were to be 
delivered by the end of 1984, at which time the 727s in 
the fleet would be phased out. The remaining twelve 146s 
were set for delivery in 1985, and the contract with 
British Aerospace included an option for an additional 25 
aircraft.
At the end of 1983, the fleet included twenty-five 
Super 80s, eight Boeing 727s and four DC-9-30s.
The year of 1984 was dominated by measures to cut the 
costs of the airline operations through continued fleet 
transition to more efficient aircraft and through the 
negotiation of new, lower cost labor contracts with all 
employee groups. Both were successful; by the end of the 
year, the company was operating the most modern, fuel 
efficient and quiet fleet of any carrier in the country, 
and necessary wage concessions from employee groups had 
been approved.
The new labor contracts, in effect through 1987, 
offered all employees a 15% stock ownership in the airline 
and a profit sharing program equal to 15% of the airline's 
annual pre-tax profits. In exchange, the employee groups 
agreed to a 15% reduction in compensation and an equal 
increase in productivity. The new contracts saved the 
organization an estimated $20 million a year in labor 
costs.
PSA took delivery in 1984 of its first six BAe 
146-200 jets, named "Smiliners," with the first revenue
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flight occurring on June 20 in Oakland. A 26th Super 80 
was also delivered which would substantially increase 
frequencies throughout the route system.
Eight Boeing 727s were sold or leased in 1984, with 
the last aircraft making its final flight in November. 
The workhorse of PSA for nearly 20 years, the 727s had 
logged in excess of 300 million miles and carried more 
than 92 million passengers.
Several new customer conveniences were introduced in 
1984. In January, operations at Los Angeles International 
Airport moved to the new PSA Terminal One, the first 
reached upon entering the busiest airport in the system. 
Automatic check-in machines were installed at many 
airports, reducing passenger congestion at the ticket 
counter, and the Executive Flyer Program was expanded to 
include affiliation with a worldwide carrier, TWA. In 
September, PSA reinstated nonstop service between Stockton 
and Los Angeles, offering the only all jet service between 
those cities.
Sadly, William Shimp, chief executive officer since 
1976, died of a heart attack in May. In addition to 
having served as chief pilot of the airline for a number 
of years, Shimp had guided PSA through some of its worst 
turbulence, facing economic realities with equanimity. 
Paul Barkley, formerly PSA's president, succeeded him.
The decade's midpoint was marked by an increased 
concentration on customer service as the 146s were
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reconfigured from 100 seats to a more spacious 85 seats. 
More of the British jets were delivered, allowing PSA to 
make the largest single day expansion of new routes in its 
history: seven more cities now welcomed the grinning
birds.
The lineup of the airline's top management also 
changed as Russell Ray was named president and chief 
operating officer of PSA. Paul Barkley was named chairman 
of the board in addition to chief executive officer.
With the addition of new destinations and an expanded 
fleet, PSA registered a marked increase in passenger 
volume in 1985.
PSA ended 1985 with the largest single day expansion 
in the airline's history, inaugurating service December 19 
at Eureka, California; Medford and Eugene, Oregon; 
Tri-Cities and Yakima, Washington; Boise, Idaho; and Cabo 
San Lucas, Baja California, Mexico. In October, PSA also 
became the first commercial jet carrier to begin service 
at Bellingham, Washington.
The expansion was possible with the addition in 1985 
of fourteen BAe 146s, completing the original order of 
twenty. Fleet additions, including two Super 80s, allowed 
PSA to substantially boost frequencies in existing 
markets. Most notably, the airline introduced the PSA 
Expressway, offering departures every half-hour between 
Los Angeles and San Francisco airports, and more than 
tripled the number of daily departures at Orange County
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Airport, where the exceptionally quiet BAe 146 had 
qualified for additional flights. To accommodate the 
growth, service to Albuquerque was discontinued.
A number of customer conveniences debuted in the 
year. All of the BAe 146s were reconfigured from 100 
seats per aircraft to 85, making PSA the only airline in 
the West with a three/two seating arrangement for its 
entire fleet. The long awaited, premier position Terminal 
A at San Francisco also opened as was a new curbside 
terminal at Oakland. A second reservations center, 
located in Reno, was opened to help reduce costs and 
call-waiting.
A record number of passengers were boarded in 1985, 
more than 9 million, but fare wars provoked by new 
entrant, low cost competitors in several markets led to a 
$648,000 loss. PSA, Inc., meanwhile, benefited from non 
airline activities and recorded a $26.8 million profit.
If PSA could be considered a person, and many 
employees did anthropomorphize it, 1986 was the year it 
was given in marriage. In December, PSA's parent company 
announced that Washington, D.C. based USAir Group, Inc., 
had come up with the bride price.
By 1986, as merger mania swept the airline industry, 
PSA's struggle to remain independent had grown more 
painful. As recently as 1984, Chief Executive Officer 
Barkley had sworn PSA could go it alone, "and I meant it."
The environment, however, changed with each merger.
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PSA's success had driven Republic Airlines out of the 
major Western markets, until Republic Airlines was 
acquired by Northwest Orient. Suddenly Republic/Northwest 
Orient had huge resources and moved to recapture the West. 
A similar scenario took place when Delta Airlines acquired 
Western Airlines, which had been edged out of the commuter 
territory PSA so prized. Delta was a short-haul 
specialist, just like PSA, and very strong; its clout 
encouraged Western to again challenge PSA. In a similar 
move, Frontier Airlines was bought by Continental 
Airlines, making Denver unfriendly to the grinning jets.
The final trauma was the purchase of Air Cal by 
American Airlines in November 1986. With the power of its 
computer reservations system, American/Air Cal was now 
able to fight PSA on its prized turf; the north-south 
commuter route along the coast.
By now, said Paul Barkley, "it was inevitable we 
would have survival problems and we would be bought." 
Other carriers, faced with a choice of either buying a 
billion dollars' worth of aircraft and heading for the 
already saturated West Coast, or, alternatively, buying 
the one remaining independent carrier, which already had a 
billion dollars' worth of equipment and a major piece of 
the market, naturally chose the latter.
Within one hour of the American/Air Cal merger 
announcement, recalls Barkley, the phone rang. It was the 
boss of USAir Group, Inc., wanting to know if the company
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that owns USAir could come courting PSA.
For most PSA loyalists, it was more of an arranged 
match than a love affair. The overriding emotion was one 
of sadness: sad that the fun was over, sad that the 
dreams, that inexplicable PSA mindset, would be over.
Rudy Pfeiffer, who retired that year after 22 years 
with the airline as an aircraft electrician, voiced the 
duality of emotion many long serving PSA personnel felt:
"I kind of hope the merger goes through for them, but I 
was also hoping PSA’s colors would be around for a long 
time.
I knew all the early guys, and that's partly why I 
retired: I didn't want to see it happen."
Bonnie Johnson, the twenty-seven-year accounting 
department veteran, was philosophical: "When the planes
are painted and the smile is no more, it will be a sad day 
for California and a sad day for me. But things go on. 
USAir is a good company."
Frequent flyer Scott Newhall, who never tired of 
lovingly razzing PSA, said he'll "go to pieces" after the 
merger. But he had some good advice for USAir: "If
they'll serve dry roasted peanuts and put their 
stewardesses in chocolate-colored banana skit outfits, I 
guess I'll fly with them."
Flight attendant Carol Austin is characteristically 
upbeat: "PSA won't die out. PSA will remain because the
people at PSA are PSA. Even though we may be wearing dark
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blue, we'll still be wearing hula orange lipstick."
For founder and former Chief Executive Officer 
Andrews, the merger/marriage of the airline he nurtured so 
lovingly was especially painful, "like pulling my arm out 
and beating me with the bloody stump." PSA, as he knew 
it, would be no more. If PSA were truly a person, then, 
what would Andrews say in her memory?
"She was a good lady: proud, exciting and full of
life. A little hard to manage at times, but always 
dependable. And at all times a people lover."
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CHAPTER V
THE ACQUISITION OF PSA BY USAIR: CHANGE IN ACTION
As the preceding chapter illustrates, the history of 
Pacific Southwest Airlines is rich and extensive. For 
decades, PSA was an innovator in beating the competition 
by offering its customers low fares, on time performance 
and a spirit of service which put the carrier on the map 
as an airline with tremendous personality. For a carrier 
that dominated the west, it is quite interesting that even 
the eastern part of the United States was well aware of 
this airline with the unique style. The growth and the 
consistent operating profits generated a feeling of 
dominance and energy which was reflected in the manner in 
which employees and customers alike viewed the company.
Long before December 8, 1986, however, there was 
considerable ambiguity among employees and it penetrated 
the entire organization. Every day there was news from 
the press about the airline merger mania. There were 
rumors everywhere regarding the potential of a purchase of 
Pacific Southwest Airlines from some other airline. 
Operating profits had ceased for several years and the 
corporate tax laws of 1986 made it somewhat obvious that 
PSA was vulnerable to being acquired.
85
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The full and rich history that PSA enjoyed made the 
speculation of a merger frightening. Employees were 
generally attached to the identity of the airline. Many 
employees had extensive time commitments to the 
organization as exemplified by the average seniority, 
companywide, being eight and one-half years. Attrition 
had always been low, well under single digit percentages, 
and supply for employees was high while demand was low. 
Employment selection in the flight attendant population, 
for example, was one selection for every six hundred 
applicants. Many other job classifications were similar.
Communication of the Change
On December 8, 1986 PSA's chairman wrote his letter 
to all employees (see Figure 2) announcing the approval 
agreement between the boards of directors of Pacific 
Southwest Airlines and the PSA Group, and the USAir Group, 
the holding company for USAir, to acquire PSA for $17.00 a 
common share. Employees were shocked.
The chairman, Paul Barkley, explained that during the 
recent airline consolidation movement, PSA had maintained 
its desire to remain an independent carrier, but that the 
boards of directors had a legal responsibility to 
represent the best interest of the shareholders. The 
USAir offer had been a substantial one which protected the 
best interests of shareholders and employees alike. The 
offer, which was $5.75 more than the closing price of
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PSA Perspectives
Oear Employ«•»,
As you are no* asset, the boards of dlrtctors of Pacific 
Southaest Alrllnat and of PS Group, Inc. nava approved an agreement ahareby USAir Group, the holding company for USAir, will purchase PSA for $17 a common share.
PSA, during tha recant airline consolidation movement, 
has maintained Its desire to raaaln an Independent carrier.The Boards of directors, hoaaver, navs a legal responsibility to represent the best Interest of their shareholders. The USAir Group offer Is substantial and an offer tha Boards 
believe Is In the Bast Interests of shareholders and employees 
alike. Therefore, tha offer *111 be put to the shareholders for approvsl.
r
As employees It Is good to know that USAir has a reputation for treating Its aorkforce fairly. Ed Coladny, chairman and president of USAir Group, has assured me there *111 be no reduction In aage rates and that PSA *111 becoae a part of a groalng USAir. In tha lnterla, PSA aanagsaant *111 
raaaln In place and operate the airline as a «holly osned subsidiary of USAir Group.
The ofrer, shlcn Is $3.7S more than the closing price of airline stock on Prldsy, *111 Increase tha value of the PSA employee truat to about $43 million. You *111 recall the 
original valuation of the trust conducted In lata 1984 sat SL1.4 million. In addition, seploysas have an option to 
purchase 1,843,100 shares at $8.33 par share; at $17 per share, this option has a value of $14.3 million. Thus, the total amount for all participating eaployaes is approximately $80 million, a gain of nearly 430 percent.
There are a number of hurdles to be cleared berore the agreement is consummated. In addition to sharaholder approval, various rederal agencies must approve the transaction and PSA must amend certain scope clause agreaaents slth Its bargaining 
units. Me *111 be discussing these issues vlth the unions, and 
I feel confident that they *111 see the agreement has the employees' best Interests In mind.
In accordance *itn the existing labor agrasmants, PSA 
employees have the right of first refusal to acquire the 
airline at tha same price offered by USAir Group. Information 
on this right is being sent to every PSA employee.
1 am proud of all PSA employees; you have helped to establish PSA as the east’s leading airline. And *nlle I am 
certain that you aould have preferred to see PSA remain an 
independent airline, the realities of tnls competitive and 
complex business are such that it sould have been a tremendous uphill battle for PSA —  one that could nava been financially dahabilitatlng -- against the giants of the Industry.
Instead, va no* have an opportunity to be a part of a 
vary financially sound and successful airline. USAir has one 
of the strongest balance sheets In the industry. It Is alto an airline that santa to gro* *ltn PSA. Our strong rest Coast 
route system complements USAir's extensive East Coast net*ork and gives the combined entity numerous opportunities.
Sincerely,
December 8, 1988
PAUL C. BARKLEY /
Chief Executive /Officer
Figure 2 . Letter from PSA's chairman, Paul Barkley, 
announcing the merger.
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airline stock the Friday before, increased the value of 
the PSA employee trust to about $45 million. The original 
value of the trust in late 1984 was $11.4 million. In
addition employees had an option to purchase 1,643,100
shares at $8.33 per share; at the going rate of $17.00 per 
share, this option had a significantly favorable valuation 
of $14.3 million.
Thus, the total amount for all participating 
employees was approximately $60 million, an amazing gain 
of nearly 4 50%! Clearly there were substantial financial 
advantages to all PSA employees from the merging as well 
as shareholders. Furthermore, the deal was being touted 
in the industry as a sweetheart deal for PSA.
In addition to the stock gain, USAir had a reputation 
of treating its employees fairly. Ed Colodny, chairman 
and president of USAir Group, had assured PSA that there 
would be no reduction in wage rates and that PSA would
become a part of a growing airline. The same assurances
could not have been made if PSA were to have remained 
independent; in fact, wage concessions and cutbacks had 
been discussed for several months prior to December 8,
1986.
As an added positive influence, USAir had one of the 
strongest balance sheets in the entire airline industry 
and the route systems of PSA and USAir would certainly 
complement one another.
Despite the significant financial stock and trust
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related advantages for every PSA employee, despite the 
fact that wage reductions would not occur with USAir as 
they would have with the struggling PSA, despite the 
growth opportunities that existed with a larger and 
stronger organization and despite the history of fair 
treatment for all individuals within the company, PSA 
employees experienced a loss that permeated the halls, 
offices, crew lounges, ramp areas and aircraft cockpits 
and gallies system wide.
The senior managers of the organization knew that 
tactics and strategies needed to be developed and 
implemented in order to better facilitate the change 
process that was now a reality.
The Change Strategy
Initiated by president Russell Ray, a change strategy 
was developed. This researcher was an integral part of 
the development and execution of the change plan.
Chapter V, then, is set up in five main categories. 
Each category is described now from a general overview 
perspective and then broken out independently in greater 
detail.
The first category has been labeled as "The Internal 
Mechanisms for Articulating Change." What this means is 
that there were specific communications vehicles 
established within the organization exclusively to keep 
employees informed about the merger. The directors 
believed that if information could continue to flow in a
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consistent fashion throughout the company, some of the 
uncertainty about the acquisition process would be 
removed, thereby allowing employees to focus on their jobs 
as opposed to rumors. The communications vehicles which 
were used internally to articulate the events related to 
the change were PSA News Update and the newly designed PSA 
USAir Merger Update. Each of these communications were 
released systemwide several times each week between 
December 8, 1986 and May 29, 1987. The communications 
will be described and analyzed as they flowed 
chronologically throughout the organization. How these 
communications related to some of the models of change 
will also be highlighted as appropriate.
The second category has been labeled "The External 
Mechanisms for Articulating Change." This category 
included a collection of articles that were published in a 
variety of newspapers between December 8, 1986 and May 29,
1987. These articles were also disseminated inside the 
organization so that employees would also have the view 
from the external environment as to how the merger was 
progressing. Called press packets, the articles from many 
different cities, but mostly in the PSA route system, were 
important since they offered views that were often 
different than that of the employees and managers. The 
news articles will be described and analyzed as they 
flowed chronologically, and they will be related to the 
specific models of change as applicable.
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The third category of change action has been called 
"Programmatic Processes." This action was simply a series 
of training workshops or interventions which were designed 
for the managers of PSA to help maximize understanding and 
to help minimize expected productivity declines. Because 
many managers in particular were having a difficult time 
shifting their loyalties from PSA to USAir and because 
their support and confidence were essential to the 
business, this intensive program was geared to the 
unfreezing process. This change category in particular 
was initiated, designed and implemented by the researcher 
and will be fully described, identifying the change models 
as warranted.
The fourth category has been titled "The Impacting 
Leader Actions." Some actions were taken by President 
Russell Ray so that he could assist in a smooth transition 
for employees and for the business. The deliberate and 
planned actions that were taken by Ray from December 8, 
1986 through May 29, 1987 will be described. The manner 
in which these actions intertwine with the five models of 
change will also be captured.
The last category is simply called "Employee Views." 
All of the computer communications among employees 
throughout the system had been collected. It was common 
for employees to communicate back and forth over a 
computer network called the SCS System. This is a 
computer system which means Stations Communications
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System. Commonly referred to as computer chatter, this 
grass-roots feedback is essential to describe as an 
integral part of the change process. The employee views 
provide the feedback loop that is so necessary in all 
change strategies. This category allows some measurement 
of the resistance and/or acceptance to the change and the 
strategic change actions. This descriptive analysis will 
also reveal the relationship of the employee feedback to 
the models of change.
This chapter, then, is a descriptive analysis of 
these significant elements or actions that occurred during 
the change cycle. The way in which these elements connect 
with the five primary models of change will also be 
analyzed. The approach will be to first describe fully 
the specific outputs which were paramount in each change 
action category and then determine which model of change 
best relates to that output.
A complete qualitative trend analysis of which change 
models appeared predominant, and why, will take place in 
Chapter VI.
Internal Mechanisms for Articulating Change 
There were two key internal mechanisms which were 
used to communicate the process of the acquisition. The 
first was a vehicle called PSA News Update. This 
communications vehicle had been in place at PSA for 
several years and was designed to quickly overview 
significant news items within the company and within the
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industry. The distribution of this document spanned the 
entire company. Hard copy or paper copy of this document 
went to all PSA locations, and the news was also delivered 
to employees via the computer communications system. 
Every employee had access to this information.
The second communications vehicle was specifically 
implemented to complement PSA News Update, but also to 
provide more responsive and detailed information regarding 
the merger. It was called PSA USAir Merger Update. A 
comprehensive collection of all these releases was 
captured from the time period of December 9, 1986 through 
May 29, 1987. This period of time represents the day 
after the agreement to acquire was reached through the day 
when the acquisition was legally and officially 
consummated.
Immediately after the December 8, 1986 announcement 
of the agreement to acquire PSA, an intervention was 
planned and communicated. The December 9, 1986 PSA News 
Update announced that USAir Group, Inc. Chairman Edwin 
Colodny would be at PSA headquarters in three days for a 
series of informal meetings with employees. As seen in 
Figure 3, the visits were planned to reach employees from 
seven different work groups in six separate interventions. 
This first step to meet the chairman of their new company 
was designed to establish comfort while in transition for 
PSA employees. This action specifically has a 
relationship to the systems-organic model of change,
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PSA News Update
December 9, 1986 
Volume 4, Number 94
USAIR CHAIRMAN MEETS USAir Group Inc. Chairman Edwin Colodny will be in
PSA EMPLOYEES THURS. San Diego Thursday for a series of informal
meetings with employees throughout the day. His 
schedule of department visits is as follows:
• Maintenance; in the shop; 7 a.m.
• Accounting; in the accounting dept.; 7:30 a.m.
• Flight and Inflight, flight crew lounge; 11 a.m.
• Res./Training Center; res. cafeteria; 2 p.m.
• Airmotive; in the shop; 3:15 p.m.
• AdrntfOslrative staff; SANMO atrium; 4:30 p.m.
PSA REPORTS RECORD 
NOVEMBER TRAFFIC
PSA reported record November scheduled traffic 
results. During November, PSA carried 836,000 
passengers, compared to 800,000 in November 1985. 
PSA carried 9.9 million passengers for the the 
first 11 months of the year, compared to 8.3 
million for the same period in 1985.
RPMs for November were 326 million, up 5 percent 
over the same month in 1985. RPMs for the 11 
months were 4 billion, up 23.6 percent. ASMs for 
November were 629.6 million, up 18.5 percent, while 
ASMs for the 11 months were up 23.2 percent over 
the first 11 months of 1985 to 7 billion. November 
load factor was 51.7 percent, compared to 58.4 
percent for November 1985, while the load factor 
for the first 11 months was 56.5 percent, up from 
56.3 percent for the first 11 months of last year.
ATC UPDATE Last week (Dec. 1-7) based on zero time, 35.9 
percent of PSA flights were affected by air traffic 
control delays.
Figure 3 . Announcement of the first intervention with 
USAir Chairman Ed Colodny. PSA News Update, December 9, 
1986.
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because the intervention was planned to both communicate 
to employees and to get their feedback.
The next day, December 10, 1986, the first PSA USAir 
Merger Update was released. Issue number one was symbolic 
of the company's continuing desire to communicate with the 
employees and the company's need to begin using the names 
PSA and USAir together. Additionally, the format of this 
communication, which was designed in question and answer 
style, stressed the company's focus on being responsive to 
individual concerns.
The types of questions that were dominant very early 
dealt with the purchase of stock options, the Profit 
Sharing Plan (PSP) and trust. Figure 4 exemplifies the 
style and format of this communications vehicle. From a 
framework of the personal therapeutic model of change and 
the systems organic model of change, this obvious 
conviction for the individual prevails when viewing the 
PSA USAir Merger Update. The question and answer format 
implies interaction, which has the intent of helping the 
people in the organization learn.
In fact, on December 12, 1986, employees were
informed that anyone with a questions should contact his 
or her immediate supervisor or the corporate 
communications department. Interaction, intervention and 
feedback were playing vital roles in the change action.
The commitment to communicate was an important symbol 
as well. Only four days after the announced agreement to
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usA ir.issue noj l date: December 10, 1986
MERGER UPDATE
The proposed merger between PSA and USAir has raised a number of 
questions from employees. Merger Update will be published as needed 
to answer these questions and to address related issues. These 
questions are answered by members of PSA management who have the 
knowledge or information to provide the answers.
Q: In the announcement to employees, we were told about an
"option." What option do employees have to buy 1,643,100 
shares at $8.33 per share?
A: At the time the PSP program was put into effect in December
1984, all employees were provided with a right to purchase 
additional airline shares. Various letter agreements with 
employee representatives and the statement of policy with the 
noncontract employees provided that the profit sharing plans - 
as directed by the PSP committees - could buy 547,700 shares of 
airline stock at $25 per share. Because of the three-for-one 
Airline stock split, that equates to 1,643,100 shares at $8.33 
per share. The various PSP agreements provided that the option 
be exercised by the plans (PSP committees) upon payment in cash 
of the purchase price - the total purchase price being $8.33 
times 1,643,100 or $13,687,023.
In our USAir agreement, we are to be paid $17 for each of these 
shares, or a total of $27,932,700. Rather than require us to 
raise the $13.6 million dollars to receive $27.9 million upon 
the merger with USAir, we have been promised that we will be 
paid the difference between $13.6 million and $27.9 million - 
the gain or profit - by way of a contribution to the PSP trust 
in the total amount of $14.3 million.
Q: Do I have to do anything to exercise this option?
A: No. When USAir completes the purchase of our stock, this
contribution of $14.3 million will be made without anything 
further required of us or our PSP committees.
Figure 4 . The first release of the new PSA USAir Merger 
Update, December 10, 1986.
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merge with PSA, the company had blitzed several 
communication media.
On December 16, 1986 the PSA News Update spotlighted 
a videotaped holiday message from PSA President Russell 
Ray. The tape was sent to all locations that same day and 
it addressed a number of important matters including Ray's 
support for the pending acquisition. Called a holiday 
message, this communication emphasized the symbolic and 
cultural aspects of the situation.
The questions from employees on the December 19, 1986 
PSA USAir Merger Update expressed concern about the status 
of their departments and jobs. Emotionalism was in the 
air. Ambiguity was getting high. It was important that 
the individual questions were answered factually and 
rationally. (See Figure 5.)
In the January 9, 1987 PSA USAir Merger Update the 
questions moved from emotionally passive to emotionally 
assertive (see Figure 6); doubt was expressed in a very 
subtle way as sensed in the following questions:
1. Is it possible for employees to review the 
PSA/USAir Group, Inc. Merger Agreement filed with the 
Department of Transportation? If so, how may we review 
it?
2. What steps are involved in the merger of PSA and 
USAir?
3. How can we get immediate answers to our 
questions about the merger?
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MERGER UPDATE
Q: When USAir huys PSA will w<» close any of our stations’
A - USAir has said that is is acquiring a going business and that, 
in fact, it intends to grow the combined carrier. It is not 
exoected that USAir will close any station by reason of the 
merger. An'' openings of new stations or any closing of existing 
ones will be based unon future cometitive factors - lust like 
they have been in the past - and not by reason of the merger.
Q* What about Alrmotive and our maintenance bases?
A: Last week Mr. Colodny visited San Dievo and met with employees
at Alrmotive and at our San Diego maintenance base. In 
resnonses to employee questions, he told us that USAir wanted 
to keen Alrmotive and our San Diego maintenance base. He 
confirmed this in a recent letter to Daul Barkley, which with 
his consent is available for reading.
Qt Will USAir maintain our reservation centers’
Ai Yes. In his letter to Mr. Barkley, Mr. Colodnv confirmed that 
both reservation centers will be maintained and hopefully 
expanded as the combined airline grows.
0: What about our other facilities?
A: It's too early to know exactly what changes, if anv, USAir
might want to make. As soon as decisions are made or positions 
known, we will communicate them to you. Again, USAir has said 
it wants to maintain and grow our existing business, so we 
should not expect major changes in facilities.
usAir. issu e  N &  
s Oecember 19, 1986
Figure 5 . Concerns expressed by employees regarding the 
status of their departments within the company. PSA USAir 
Merger Update, December 19, 1986.
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usA ir. ISSUE NO; DATE
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MERGER UPDATE







Is i t  p o ssib le  for employees to  review the PSA/USAir Group,
Inc. Merger Agreement f i le d  with the Department o f  
Transportation? I f  so , how may we review it?
As indicated in  the le t t e r  dated December 8 , 1986 which 
employees received a t th e ir  home addresses, the Merger 
Agreement was sent to  union representatives v ia  C ertified  Mail 
on December 11. For noncontract employees, each member o f the 
PSP noncontract committee has a lso  received a copy. In 
ad d ition , copies o f  the A pplication f i l e d  with the Department 
o f Transportation, which includes the Merger Agreement, are 
being sent today to loca tion s throughout the PSA system, making 
i t  more convenient for employees to review the documents.
These loca tion s are l is t e d  on the attached page.
What step s are involved in  the merger o f  PSA and USAir?
We are currently in  what we c a l l  "Stage I" o f  the merger.
Although the Merger Agreement has been signed and the 
announcement o f the proposed merger has been made, there are 
conditions which must be met before the sa le  to USAir Group,
In c. can be completed. As sta ted  in  the announcement o f  
December 8 , 1986, these conditions include stockholders' 
approval, government approvals, and union approvals to  amending 
certa in  merger and a cq u isit io n  provisions in  c o lle c t iv e  
bargaining agreements. Assuming these conditions are met, 
which we an tic ip a te  to be during the f i r s t  quarter o f th is  
year, we w i l l  enter "Stage 2."  In th is  s ta g e , USAir Group 
a c tu a lly  owns PSA but PSA w i l l  be operating under i t s  own name 
as a wholly-owned subsid iary o f  USAir Group. The PSA 
c o lle c t iv e  bargaining agreements now in  e f f e c t  w i l l  continue to - 
be applied and each PSA union w il l  continue i t s  
rep resen tation . The f in a l sta g e , "Stage 3,"  w i l l  occur when 
the operations o f  PSA and USAir are a c tu a lly  integrated in to  
one operation. The actual timing o f  th is  stage i s  not known, 
but w i l l  be a fte r  in tegration  plans have been fu l ly  developed 
and reviewed with each employee group or th e ir  union 
re p r esen ta tiv es .
How can we get immediate answers to  our questions about the 
merger?
There are many more questions a t th is  point than there are 
answers simply because i t  i s  s t i l l  too ear ly  in  the process to  
know exactly  how and when PSA and USAir operations w il l  be 
in teg ra ted . However, to  aid  in  the communications, the 
corporate communications department a t  SANMO w i l l  be in s ta llin g  by 
mid-January a two-way answering machine as part o f  the Employee News 
H otlin e. Employees may c a l l  SANMO extension 2126 and record any 
question they.may have. The questions w i l l  be monitored on a d a ily  
b a s is ,  and c a lle r s  may request a personal response by leaving th e ir  
name and phone number. More frequently asked questions w il l  
continue to be published in  Merger Update.
6 . More assertive questions from the employees of
PSA USAir Merger Update, January 9, 1987.
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The desire to communicate from a personal-therapeutic 
and systems-organic perspective gleans through from the 
following response from Figure 6:
There are many more questions at this point than 
there are answers simply because it is still too 
early in the process to know exactly how and when PSA 
and USAir operations will be integrated. However, to 
aid in the communications, the corporate 
communications department at SANMO will be installing 
by mid-January a two-way answering machine as part of 
the Employee News Hotline. Employees may call SANMO 
extension 2126 and record any question they may have. 
The questions will be monitored on a daily basis and 
callers may request a personal response by leaving 
their name and phone number.
The managers continued their efforts to demonstrate 
that the company was there to listen. PSA cared about 
what the employees needed to ask and that communication 
response would be accurate, honest and consistent.
A political view became evident in the January 13, 
1987 PSA USAir Merger Update (Figure 7) . A variety of 
different questions pertaining to special interest groups 
emerged. The different groups or people mentioned were 
the Department of Transportation, the Teamsters, PSA 
company officers and USAir Group Chairman and President Ed 
Colodny. Of particular interest is the slight appearance 
of union unrest as inferred in these two questions:
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _  MERGER
usAirl „ UPDATE
January 13, 1987
Q: To dace, what has happened In the proceedings before the
Department o f Transportation (DOT)?
A: Last week, DOT approved a voting tru st allow ing USAir Group to
gain a 51 percent in terest in the voting stock of PSA. This is  
a normal step in  the DOT process concerning acqu isition s of 
th is  type.
Q: In a le t t e r  to  employees, the Teamsters claim  PSA o f f ic e r s  have
been receiving bonuses while the PSA employees were taking pay 
c u ts . Is th is  true?
A: As agreed upon in 1984 c o llec tiv e  bargaining, there have been
no bonuses paid to  o f f ic e r s . The o f f ic e r s  o f PSA took a 15 
percent pay cut and have been subject to the same wage 
lim ita tio n s  as a l l  other PSA employees.
Q: Have the representatives o f the c o lle c t iv e  bargaining groups
been given the proposal for the amendments to the merger and 
successor provisions o f the PSA labor contracts required by 
USAir?
A: Yes. On Dec. 8 , meetings were held w ith representatives from
each bargaining unit to describe the terms o f  the proposed 
merger. During these meetings the proposed amendments to  the 
PSA labor agreements were described gen era lly . Since then, 
additional meetings have been held with the representatives o f  
each PSA labor group. At these meetings, PSA has submitted 
w ritten  proposals containing the language regarding the changes 
to  the merger and successor provisions in  the labor contracts  
required under the acquisition  agreement. The next step i s  to 
gain approval for these changes from each group.
Q: We understand Mr. Colodny was in  Northern C alifornia la s t
week. What was the purpose o f h is v is i t ?
A: USAir Group chairman and president Edwin Colodny was in  San
Francisco and Sacramento la s t  week on courtesy c a lls  to  a 
number of sta te  and lo ca l o f f ic ia ls .  In add ition , he paid a 
v i s i t  to  our San Francisco station  and maintenance base to  
Introduce him self and v i s i t  v ith  employees.
Figure 7 . Interest groups emerge. PSA USAir Merger 
Update, January 13, 1987.
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1. In a letter to employees, the Teamsters claim 
PSA officers were receiving bonuses while the PSA 
employees were taking pay cuts. Is this true?
2. Have the representatives of the collective 
bargaining groups been given the proposal for the 
amendments to the merger and successor provisions of the 
PSA labor contracts required by USAir?
Both of these questions addressed the Teamsters 
organization as an action channel. It was at this point 
that the weaving in of the political-economic model began.
On January 20, 1987, the two-way hotline
communication device was inaugurated. The PSA News Update 
of that same date said:
The PSA News Hotline is now set up to record employee 
questions regarding the pending merger with USAir. 
The Hotline's SANMO extension is still 2126. When 
employees call the Hotline, they will hear the 
regular recorded message, which is updated on 
Tuesdays and Fridays. Following the message, callers 
will hear a beep and will then have 30 seconds to 
record any merger questions they have. The Hotline 
will be monitored daily and employees seeking a 
personal response should leave their names and phone 
numbers. Frequently asked questions will continue to 
be answered in the PSA/USAir Merger Update.
Again, the managers' desire to give as much 
information to employees as possible and to get as many
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questions and concerns from employees as possible, was 
beginning to be a consistent theme during this change 
process.
On January 20, 1987 the senior managers communicated 
that the Board of Directors of both USAir Group Inc. and 
PSA set March 17, 1987 as the date for holding a special 
meeting of stockholders at which the acquisition of PSA by 
USAir Group would be presented for approval. Employees 
were advised that if they were current participants in the 
Profit Sharing Plan and Trust (PSP) that they would be 
entitled to vote their shares in the PSP Trust by proxy. 
Further, employees were informed that this would be the 
only guaranteed opportunity provided to employees to vote 
on the pending acquisition of PSA by USAir Group. This 
advance notice was not necessary, yet senior managers 
thought that employees needed to know in advance of their 
right to vote.
On January 22, 1987, in a politically symbolic move, 
PSA and the Master Executive Council of the PSA pilots 
represented by the Airline Pilots Association announced 
that an agreement modifying the Pilots' Stock and Profit 
Sharing Plan Agreement and the merger and successor 
provisions of their collective bargaining agreement had 
been reached. The key aspects of the agreement are 
indicated in Figure 8.
Pilots by tradition tend to be viewed within the 
airline industry as the leaders and policy setters.
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usAirc ISSUE NO: 8
NXWS BOllfZXV 
PSA PILOTS APPSOVX MKRffltk
DATEJanuary 22, 1987
MERGERUPDATE
Today PSA and tha Maatar Executive Council of tha PSA pilots 
rapraaantad by tha Alrllna Pilots Asaoolatlon announcadi an agraaaant modifying tha Pilots' Stock and Profit Sharing Plan Agraaaant and tha acrgar and succassor provisions of tha Collactiva Bargaining 
Agraaaant batvaan PSA and tha pilots. OSAir has advlsad PSA that tha agraaaant with tha pilots aaats. tha conditions of tha PSA-USAir agraaaant to closing tha acquisition of- PSA' by USAir-Croup-, inc.
Following ars key aspacts of tha PSA-ALPA lattar of agraaaant:
1. Agraaaant to racaiva cash aquai to $17 par shara for all 
raaaining company contributions, and to racaiva cash in tha 
amount of $8.67 par shara (tha spraad batvaan tha option prica of $8.33 and $17) upon exercise of tha ALFA portion of tha 
"option sharas." (All sharas alraady hald in tha pilots' PSP will bs convartad to cash at $17 par shara pursuant to tha PSA-USAir agraamant.)
2 . waiver of tha right of first rafusal to purchasa PSA as it 
ralatas to tha USAir offar.
3. Agraamant to sattla tha disput'd ovar tha original 15% 
contribution by racaipt of $17 par shara for aach of tha 
"disputad sharas" and valvar of any claims associated with contributions of sharas to tha PSP.
4. Agraamant providas for saniority integration bafora USAir 
Group affacts an integration of the operations, facilities and 
employees of PSA and USAir, Inc., provided the saniority 
integration process is completed bafora July 1, 1987..
s. Agraaaant to waive application of certain merger and 
succassor language in thair contract as thay apply to the USAir 
transaction.
6. Agraaaant that tha pilots will racaiva labor protective 
provisions (LPP's) equivalent to Alleghany/Mohawk LPP's.
7. Agraaaant that the tans of tha lattar of agraaaant satisfy 
PSA's duty to negotiate with the PSA pilots nlativa to the proposed merger.
PSA is continuing to negotiate similar agraaaants with tha Southwest 
Dispatchers Association, and tha Southeast Craw Controllers 
Association, and PSA is continuing to mast with tha Non-contract 
Committee. PSA expects to commence similar discussions in tha naar 
future with tha Taaastars.
Figure 8 . Pilot union approves merger. PSA USAir Merger 
Update, January 22, 1987.
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Typically, their way of thinking and acting sets the stage 
as to how other groups typically think and act. It is no 
surprise, then, that this announcement, which came so 
quickly, was intended to shift any anti-agreement thinking 
and any tactical delays in negotiating. In fact, this 
Merger Update ends with a statement of hope.
PSA is continuing to negotiate similar agreements 
with the Southwest Dispatchers Associates and the 
Southwest Crew Controllers Association, and PSA is 
continuing to meet with the non-contract committee. 
PSA expects to commence similar discussions in the 
near future with the Teamsters.
On January 23, 1987, the PSA News Update reported 
that the USAir Group posted a net income of $1.8 billion 
and operating income of $169.4 million for the year 1986. 
Although factual, this type of information startled 
employees who were not used to being associated with a 
company with net income figures in the billions.
In that same update employees were informed that the 
PSA News Hotline was available with information and for 
individual questions. This constant and consistent 
message of PSA wanting to communicate with employees is 
once again noteworthy.
The January 26, 1987 Merger Update tended to be more 
philosophical in nature (see Figure 9) . It almost 
appeared as if there was a need to sell the merger 
to employees, stressing that the acquisition was very




11 January 26, 1987
Q: Why does USAir Group b e lie v e  chat the combination o f PSA
and USAir w il l  be able to compete e ffe c t iv e ly  with the  
mega-carriers?
A: I t  i s  important to remember that USAir Group has been
p ro fitab le  for 10 years and has one o f the strongest 
balance sheets in the a ir l in e  industry. I t  has already 
demonstrated on i t s  own, a capacity to  compete with the 
mega-carriers in the e a s t .  Based on i t s  experience and 
firm fin an cia l foundation, a combination with PSA, a 
dominant carrier  on the West Coast, and USAir, a dominant 
carrier on the East Coast, provides the merged a ir lin e  an 
obvious opportunity for additional growth and b etter  f le e t  
u t i l i iz a t io n .  USAir Chairman and President Edwin Colodny, 
during h is Dec. 11 v i s i t  to  PSA, re iterated  to PSA 
employees that USAir Group intends to continue expanding 
the a ir lin e  a fte r  the merger. R elative to the other merger 
candidates in  the in d u stry , PSA's board of directors  
b e liev es  that the combined carrier  w il l  be a dominant 
player in  the industry and w i l l  be much more capable o f  
fending o f f  unfriendly com petitors than PSA would be on i t s  
own.
Q: What have the independent fin an cia l analysts who follow  the
a ir lin e  industry said  about the merger?
A: The follow ing are printed quotations from noted analysts
commenting about the USAir-PSA merger.
Louis Marckesano, Janney, Montgomery, Scott: "If I was an
employee at PSA, I 'd  be dancing. USAir i s  one o f the 
highest paid a ir l in e s  in  the country and now (the employees 
are) in  an organization with a l i t t l e  more financial 
s ta b ility "  (Sacramento Bee. 12 /9 /8 6 ).
Mike Derchin, F ir s t  Boston S ecu r ities: The merger "gives
both a ir lin e s  the opportunity to  become east-w est carriers"  
(New York Times, 1 2 /9 /8 7 ) .
George James, Air Line Economics In c .: "For long-term
su rv iv a l, they've got to  do th is"  (USA Today. 12 /9 /86 ).
Bob Joedicke, Shearson Lehman Brothers: The merger
"develops a larger c r i t i c a l  mass and achieves a certa in  
amount o f what i s  c a lle d  the barbell e ffec t"  (Washington 
P ost. 1 2 /9 /86 ).
Figure 9 . Persuasive communication based on the belief 
that the merger was positive. PSA USAir Merger Update, 
January 26, 1987.
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positive. The first question in that update dealt with 
why USAir believed that the combination of PSA and USAir 
would result in the ability to compete effectively with 
the mega-carriers. The response to this question was 
answered in a fashion that reflects beliefs and ideals. 
This persuasive language hits at the cultural symbolic 
model of change.
The question was answered a second time by giving 
favorable reviews of the merger from the financial pages 
of several important newspapers. This entire 
communication was editorial in scope and was essentially 
persuasive in tone. The message was clear: The merger
was a positive event; it was good news!
The next day, January 27, there was more positive 
news in the PSA News Update. This document announced that 
USAir had committed itself to an extension of the labor 
protective provisions that the employees of PSA and USAir 
enjoyed should the merger be consummated. Labor 
protective provisions are the practices and policies that 
are in place to protect employees through compensation 
should their jobs be lost or displaced in the event of a 
merger.
That same day, the PSA USAir Merger Update reiterated 
the fact that President Ed Colodny had delivered to USAir 
employees a written commitment to extend to all USAir and 
PSA nonofficer personnel the standard Allegheny/Mohawk 
labor protective provisions (LPPs). In the letter,
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Colodny noted that standard LPPs provide for economic 
benefits to those employees adversely affected by the 
merger and include relocation assistance for all employees 
who may be required to relocate their residences as a 
result of the merger (see Figure 10).
On January 30, the PSA News Update announced that 
nine meetings would be set up during the next week in a 
variety of locations so that employees could get answers 
to their questions regarding the profit sharing plan and 
the labor protective provisions. These interventions 
reflect the systems-organic model of change. The meetings 
were intended to be open forums where employees could 
express their views as well as request information that 
they may need in order to properly vote for or against the 
merger.
February 10, 1987 was a day of mixed communication 
messages. The first message advised employees that a 
letter had been mailed to the homes of all employees which 
provided an estimate of the profit sharing plan account 
value of each employee. This would give the employee a 
baseline as to how much money he or she would personally 
receive after the merger.
The next message that day was one which promoted the 
cultural-symbolic model of change. Buttons were released 
to all employees in all locations which read "USAir-PSA 
Smiles Coast to Coast." These buttons were intended to 
be symbols of the transition from PSA to USAir for both
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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usAir.
1M1 JimnOM 0«ni NHNMMT*
January 27, 1987
To th e  USAir Employee*t
D u rin g  eha  p a t e  m o n th , Z h av a  h ad  e o n v a ra a t io n a  w ith  many o f  you aboue 
th a  p ro p o a e d  a e q u i a l e i o n  o f  PSA b y  USAir C ro u p , tfa  h a v a  d i a e u i a a d  th a  
e x c i t i n g  p ro tp a e c t  w hich a  aubaaquane m erger o f  USAir and PSA would b r in g . At 
la  n a tu r a l  i n  any m arg a r, aach  o f you w i l l  hava q u a a tlo n a  aboue  jo b  a a c u r i e y .  
T h i t  l a t t a r  i t  in ten d ed  to  add raaa  aueh eoncarna.
Many o f  o u r  am p lo y aaa  v a ra  in v o lv ad  in  a a r i i a r  m argar*  w ith  ta k a  C aneral 
A i r l in a t  and Mohawk A ir l in a a .  B oth m a rg a ra  w ara  im p o r ta n t  t o  th a  g ro w th  of 
o u r  com pany an d  t o  th a  tu e e a a a  wa hava en joyed . Zn b o th  th a  Mohawk and tak a  
C anera l t r a n a a e e io n a ,  la b o r  p r o ta e t iv a  p re v ia  io n *  ( " I P P 'a " )  w a r t  e x te n d e d  to  
eha amployaaa o f  th a  two c a r r i a r a .
U 8A ir b a l i a v a a  i t  l a  a p p r o p r i a t a  t o  maka a  commitment to  ex tend  to  a l l  
n o n -o f f ie a r  am ployaaa o f  U6Air and PSA th e  a ta n d a rd  "A llaghany /M ohaw k" L P P 't 
a t  tu c h  tim a  aa  e h a ra  ia  a m argar o f USAir and PSA. Zn fu tu ra  com m unication*, 
wa w i l l . b e  p ro v id in g  more d a ta i l a d  e x p la n a tio n  a o f  e h aae  L P P 'a .  Zn •umm ary, 
th e y  p ro v id e  econom ic b e n a f i ta  to  amployaaa who may b e  ad v e raa ly  e f f e c te d  by a 
m erg e r, p ro v id e  f o r  r e l o c a t i o n  a a a l a t a n e a  to  am p loyaaa  who a r e  r e q u i r e d  to  
c h an g e  t h e i r  p la c a  o f ra a id a n c a  aa  a ra a u le  of a m e rg e r-re q u ire d  t r a n a f e r ,  and 
e c e a b lia h  p ro c e d u r e a  f o r  th e  f a i r  an d  e q u i t a b l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  e e n i o r i t y .  
T hay  a l a o  p r o v id e  t h a t  a l l  d ieag raam an ta  over th a  a p p l i c a t i o n o f  the**  bene­
f i t *  w i l l  b a  f a i r l y  re ao lv ad  by b in d in g  a r b i t r a t i o n .
Aa you h a v a  a l l  r e a d ,  c e r t a i n  m at t a r  a hava  t o  b a  reao lv ad  b e fo re  USAir 
Group can  a c q u i r e  PSA and  p ro c e e d  w i th  p la n a  t o  com bin* th e  two a i r l i n e * .  
R e g u la to ry  a p p ro v a l ia  n a e a a a a ry , a t  w e ll aa th a  eu c e e a a fu l outcome o f d i* c u a -  
a io n a  betw een PSA and  eha la b o r  o rg a n isa tio n *  r e p re s e n tin g  i t a  a m p lo y a a a . Wa 
a r e  o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  C roup  w i l l  ba a b le  to  go forw ard  w ith  th a  a e q u ia le io n  of 
PSA, aa w a l l  a a  th a  u l t im a ta  m argar o f  th a  two a i r l i n a a .  The L P P 'a  w i l l  b* 
Implemented whan USAir and PSA e ra  mar gad in to  one c a r r i e r .
Figure 10. Ed Colodny's letter to USAir employees. 
January 27, 1987.
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employees and customers. A symbol of two airlines coming 
together by way of a button-wearing ritual focuses on the 
cultural implications of this change action.
Later that same day the news was released in the PSA 
USAir Merger Update that noncontract employees had voted 
to approve the merger. Now two groups were officially in 
favor of the acquisition, the pilot group and all 
noncontract employees. The special interest groups in 
favor of the merger were growing, but there were still 
opposing coalitions with which the managers had to deal.
A political focus was emerging as the voting groups 
aligned in favor of the merger. There was concern over 
whether or not the Teamster group would come to an 
agreement. In the February 11 issue of PSA USAir Merger 
Update, employee questions were directed at this concern. 
Examples of some of the questions asked were:
1. What is the status of meetings between PSA and 
the Teamsters regarding modification to the labor 
contracts?
2. The February 6 Teamster Hotline said they will 
be meeting with company officials. Since USAir has 
authority for final approval, will they be attending these 
meetings?
3. What happens if all bargaining groups do not 
agree to the modifications to the labor contracts? The 
answers to these questions and others are given in 
Figure 11.




February 11, 1987 
Number 18
Q: What i s  the sta tu s o f meetings between PSA and the
Teamsters regarding the required m odifications to the labor 
contracts?
A: Meetings between PSA and the Teamsters have been scheduled
for Feb. 16, 17 and 19 in Washington.
Q: The Feb. 6 Teamster H otline said  they w il l  be meeting with
company o f f i c ia l s ,  "since USAir has authority  for fin a l  
approval, i t  makes sense to have the p rincipa ls ava ilab le  
to make the necessary d ec is io n s."  W ill USAir be attending  
these meetings?
A: No, there are no plans, nor any reason, for USAir o f f ic ia l s
to attend the February m eetings. The meetings are being 
held in Washington at the request o f  the Teamsters. These 
meetings w ill  include PSA o f f i c ia l s  and attorneys, Teamster 
representatives and Teamster attorneys (who are located in  
Washington). PSA and the Teamsters must negotiate the 
contract m odifications, not USAir and the Teamsters.
Q: What i s  the sta tu s of negotia tion s with other bargaining
groups?
A: Talks are continuing with the Southwest Crew Controllers
A ssociation and the Southwest Dispatchers A ssociation .
Q: What happens i f  a l l  bargaining groups do not agree to the
m odifications to the labor contracts?
A: The merger agreement between PSA and USAir Group is
contingent upon PSA's meeting a l l  USAir Group's 
requirements for c losin g  the d ea l, which includes the 
m odifications to the labor con tracts. Obviously, a l l  
requirements must be met.
Q: What is  the sta tu s o f  the in tegration  o f  the sen io r ity
l i s t s  for the p ilo ts?
A: ALPA meetings between PSA and USAir are currently underway
to in tegrate the se n io r ity  l i s t s ,  follow ing ALPA s standard 
procedures to arrive at a merged se n io r ity  l i s t .  According 
to ALPA rep resen ta tives, they expect to  have a f in a l  
integrated se n io r ity  l i s t  prior to June 14.
Figure 11. An emerging political focus as voting groups 
align in favor of the merger. PSA USAir Merger Update, 
February 11, 1987.
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The meetings between PSA and Teamsters officials were 
scheduled for the following week. The talks were to be 
held in Washington, D.C., which is the corporate 
headquarters of USAir.
On February 17, both PSA News Update and PSA USAir 
Merger Update released information that still another 
group had joined the pro merger coalition. The PSA 
dispatchers who were represented by the Southwest 
Dispatchers Association had announced an agreement. USAir 
had advised PSA that the agreement with the dispatchers 
met the conditions of the USAir PSA agreement for closing 
the acquisition of PSA by USAir Group, Inc. (see Figure 
12). This action was significant since now three groups 
had approved the merger.
Meetings continued during the week between PSA and 
the Teamsters and discussions also continued with the 
Southwest Crew Controllers Association. Simultaneously, 
news was published which reported that PSA losses in 1986 
were $5.1 million for the fourth quarter and $3 million 
for the year. PS Group Inc., the holding company of PSA, 
also reported net losses of $4.8 million for the fourth 
quarter of the previous year and $13.9 million for 1986.
As March of 198 7 began the question and answer format 
of the PSA USAir Merger Update subsided. Instead, a more 
narrative style was used which seemed to focus on what 
groups approved the merger. Certainly, that change 
reflected that a more political lens was viewing the





February 17, 1987 
Number 20
PSA DISPATCHERS APPROVE MERGER
Today PSA and the PSA dispatchers represented by the Southwest 
Dispatchers A ssociation  announced an agreement modifying the 
D ispatchers' Stock and P r o fit  Sharing Plan Agreement and the merger 
and successor provisions o f the C o llec tiv e  Bargaining Agreement 
between PSA and the d isp atch ers. USAir has advised PSA that the 
agreement with the dispatchers meets the conditions o f  the PSA-USAir 
agreement to c lo sin g  the a cq u is it io n  o f PSA by USAir Group, Inc.
Following are key aspects o f the PSA - d ispatchers le t t e r  o f  
agreement:
1. Agreement to receive cash equal to  $17 per share for a l l  
remaining company con tr ib u tio n s, and to -r e c e iv e  cash in the  
amount o f  $8.67 per share (the spread between the option price  
o f $8.33 and $17) upon ex e rc ise  o f the d ispatchers' portion of  
the "option shares."  (A ll shares already held in  the 
dispatchers' PSP w il l  be converted to  cash at $17 per share 
pursuant to the PSA -  USAir agreement.)
2. Agreement to s e t t l e  the d ispute over the o r ig in a l 15 percent 
contribution  by r e ce ip t o f  $17 per share for each o f  the 
"disputed shares" and waiver o f  any claims associa ted  with 
contributions o f shares to the PSP.
3. Agreement provides for se n io r ity  in tegration  before USAir Group 
e f f e c t s  an in tegra tion  o f the operations, f a c i l i t i e s  and 
employees o f  PSA and USAir, I n c . ,  provided the se n io r ity  
in tegra tion  process is  completed before July 1, 1987.
4 . Agreement to  waive a p p lica tio n  o f  certa in  merger and successor  
language in  the d isp atch ers' contract as such language applies  
to the USAir tran saction .
5 . Agreement that the d ispatchers w il l  rece ive  labor p ro tective  
provisions (LPPs) equ ivalen t to  Allegheny/Mohawk LPPs
6. Agreement that the terms o f  the le t t e r  o f agreement s a t i s i f y  
PSA'8 duty to n ego tia te  w ith the PSA dispatchers r e la t iv e  to 
the proposed merger.
ALPA and the PSP Non-Contract Committee have previously  reached 
agreement with PSA on s im ilar  is s u e s .  PSA i s  continuing to  
negotia te  sim ilar  agreements with the Southwest Crew Controllers  
A ssocia tion , and PSA commenced s im ila r  d iscu ssion s with the 
Teamsters on February 16, 1987.
Figure 12. Another work group joins the pro merger
coalition. PSA USAir Merger Update, February 17, 1987.
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world and that the merger was moving forward.
On March 5 the United States Department of 
Transportation approved the merger, and this news was 
communicated to all employees. That approval completed 
all necessary government agency reviews.
In related developments, the USAir Group had made an 
offer to acquire Piedmont Aviation, while almost 
simultaneously Trans World Airlines had put its bid in for 
USAir. PSA President Russell Ray said, "Neither TWA's 
offer to buy USAir Group, nor USAir Group's plans to 
acquire Piedmont, alters PSA's intent to proceed with the 
sale to USAir Group. However, these events emphasize the 
need to obtain agreements with the two remaining 
[employee] groups as soon as possible in order to close 
the transactions."
So in the midst of the high ambiguity already 
affecting the employees of PSA, the TWA and Piedmont news 
further disrupted the workforce. During early March news 
and communication focused on USAir's rejection of TWA's 
acquisition bid and the agreement reached by USAir Group 
to acquire Piedmont. In fact, on March 10, PSA News 
Update communicated that Piedmont had agreed to be 
acquired by USAir Group for $69 a share in cash, or 
approximately $1.59 billion. The combination of USAir, 
Piedmont and PSA would create the nation's fifth largest 
carrier.
The following day, March 11, PSA crew controllers
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represented by the Southwest Crew Controllers Association 
approved the merger. The only groups that had not reached 
agreement were the Teamsters and the shareholders of PSA 
and PS Group.
Five days later, on March 16, the shareholders of 
Pacific Southwest Airlines voted to approve the 
acquisition, with 91.1% of the eligible shareholders 
voting in favor of the merger. Of the employee votes, 98% 
of the shares voting were in favor of the acquisition. In 
addition, the PS Group shareholders approved the 
acquisition with 65.3% of the stockholders voting in favor 
of the merger.
Like any other organization, PSA was political in 
nature. All work groups, shareholders, and government 
agencies had approved the merger with the exception of the 
Teamsters. A pro merger coalition was forming and 
growing.
The Teamsters had been holding out on any approval 
and during the holding out period they had initiated a 
lawsuit against PSA. In the lawsuit, the Teamsters sought 
an order to force PSA to arbitrate four grievances 
concerning PSA1s failure to force USAir Group to assume 
the obligations contained in the "Mergers, Consolidations 
and Acquisitions" articles of the PSA-Teamsters collective 
bargaining agreement. This tactic by the Teamsters was 
designed to put pressure on PSA and USAir and to stall the 
agreement process in the hope of gaining more power.
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PSA had declined to arbitrate the grievances on the 
grounds that the obligations contained in the merger 
articles involved issues of representation after the 
merger took place. This dispute raised post merger 
representation issues which PSA felt should be dealt with 
at the National Mediation Board and which the Teamsters 
felt should be dealt with in federal courts.
The federal court ruled in favor of PSA and dismissed 
the teamster lawsuit. Communication of this significant 
action was captured in the March 24 Merger Update (see 
Figure 13) .
In an effort to speed up the approval process by the 
Teamsters, the senior officers communicated on March 24, 
that the boards of directors of the USAir Group, PS Group, 
and Pacific Southwest Airlines agreed to move forward the 
date for the acquisition to be completed. This tactical 
move put pressure back on the Teamsters as the union 
engaged in stalling strategies. A push and pull political 
relationship had evolved between PSA and the Teamster 
organization. Conflict was high and many employees were 
anxious. In the event the acquisition did not take place 
on April 30, 1987, either party would have the right to 
terminate the agreement. Paul Barkley, Chairman of PSA 
said, "The move of the deadline should not prevent the 
Teamsters from reaching a final decision on the proposed 
modifications and should give all parties sufficient time 
to consummate the acquisition without diverting attention
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MERGER UPDATEusAir.
March 24, 1987 
Number 28
EEDERAL. .COURT DISMISSES TEAMSTER IAWSPIT
A U.S. District Court in San Francisco has issusd a 
written ordsr dismissing ths complaint against PSA by th« 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
In tha lawsuit, the Teamsters sought an order to force PSA 
to arbitrate the four "grievances" filed concerning PSA's 
failure to force USAir Group to assume tha obligations contained 
in the "Mergers, Consolidations and Acquisitions" artidss of 
each FSA-Teamstar collective bargaining agreement.
PSA had declined to arbitrate those "grievances" on the 
grounds that the obligations contained in the merger articles 
involved clear issues of employee representation after the 
merger and were, therefore, not issues that an arbitrator had 
authority to address. PSA's position was that ths issue of 
representation was a matter for the National Mediation Board. 
PSA's legal position relative to the enforcement of the merger 
articles, as communicated to the court, was consistent with the 
position it outlined to the Teamsters when the language of these 
articles were being negotiated in 1984. In this regard, the 
preamble in each of the Teamster merger articles states: "The 
obligations contained herein are subject to the acts and 
obligations not being in violation of the labor law..."
"Thera is no question that this dispute raises post-merger 
representation issues over which tha court has no 
jurisdiction..." stated the court, agreeing with PSA's position 
that the dispute is a matter for the National Mediation Board.
Tha court's ruling means that tha Teamsters are free to 
seek an election of USAir employees after the merger, supervised 
by the National Mediation Board. USAir Group has stated it does 
not object to Teamster representation of its employees as long 
as employees have the opportunity to vote in a fair election.
It is anticipated that ths Teamstsrs will appeal the 
District Court's decision. Howsver, USAir Group's position 
regarding the necessary modifications to the PSA-Teamster 
collective bargaining agreements is not affected by the court's 
ruling since the appeal process could taka months or years to
completa. Even if the District Court had ruled in favor or cne 
Teamsters, USAir Group has made it a condition of the 
acquisition of PSA that the language be modified. If they are 
forced by a court to accept the language and the Teamsters 
refuse to modify it, USAir Group simply will not acquire PSA.
Figure 13. Federal court dismisses Teamster lawsuit. PSA 
USAir Merger Update, March 24, 1987.
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from day-to-day business."
On April 1, 1987, confusion was everywhere over the 
action of United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O'Conner regarding the Delta Air Lines - Western Airlines 
merger and the impact those decisions would have on the 
pending acquisition of PSA by the USAir Group. That 
morning, Justice O'Conner vacated a ruling by the appeals 
court that would have blocked the completion of the 
Delta-Western merger until an arbitrator could rule on the 
successor clauses within the Teamster and Air Transport 
Workers contracts with Western. O'Conner's ruling allowed 
the two carriers to merge that day.
How did this ruling affect the USAir-PSA agreement? 
The senior officers of PSA communicated on April 1 that 
the ruling should have no effect because the USAir Group 
had made it clear in the December 8, 1986 merger agreement 
that the merger and successor language in the PSA labor 
contracts MUST be modified before USAir would acquire PSA. 
If the Teamsters did not agree to modify the contract 
language as required by USAir to allow the acquisition to 
be consummated by April 30, 1987, then the USAir Group was 
free to terminate the agreement. The special interests of 
the Teamsters were gaining power and influence as the 
feasibility of the acquisition occurring as planned became 
more and more vulnerable.
In the PSA USAir Merger Update of April 8, 1987 (see 
Figure 14) the employees read that the Teamsters had filed
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MERGERUPDATEusAir. April 8, 1987 
Number 33
IEAMSTSRS-EIIiS. -APPEAL
PSA received notice yesterday that the Teamsters have filed 
an appeal to the court's order handed down on March 24 which 
dismissed the Teamsters' complaint against PSA. Ths Teamsters 
sought an order from the federal district court in San Francisco 
which would force PSA to arbitrate the four "grievances" 
concerning PSA's failure to force USAir Group to assume the 
obligations contained in the "Mergers, Consolidations and 
Acquisitions” articles of each PSA - Teamster collective 
bargaining agreement.
The district court agreed with PSA's position that the 
obligations in the merger articles contained issues of 
post-merger representation, and therefore were not issues for 
arbitration, but issues for the National Mediation Board to 
decide. "There is no question that this dispute raises 
post-merger representation issues over which the court has no 
jurisdiction," stated tha court in its March order.
Despite the outcome of this court case. USAir Group has 
made it clear that the mercer and successor language in all PSAlabor.sgntragta .muat.bg ,n pfllClcfl .bergjrt-USAlr .vilL.agquirt .p s a ,The fact remains that if the Teamsters do not agree to modify 
the contract language as required bv USAir and allow, tha 
acquisition to be .consummated bv April 30. 198J._USAir.Group is free to terminate the acquisition agreement.
In a case similar to that between PSA and the Teamsters, 
the Air Transport Employees Union and the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters had tried to force Delta to honor 
collective bargaining agreement's between Western and its 
employees that would give the unions continued representation 
after the merger. Last Wednesday, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
overruled an order of the appeals court which would have blocked 
the merger on March 31. Yesterday, according to the Wall Street 
Journal. the full Supreme Court refused to overturn Justice 
O'Connor's order.
In O'Connor's written opinion stating the reasons for her 
ruling, she said that, "...I doubt that respondents' (IBT and 
Air Transport Employees Union) claims would ultimately 
prevail...and tha applicants (Western, et al) are likely to 
prevail on the merits..."
Figure 14. The Teamsters appealed the lawsuit and 
continued the dispute with PSA. PSA USAir Merger Update,
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an appeal. They also read in an underlined paragraph that 
the Teamsters' delay in agreeing could make the merger 
vanish. More statements from Justice O'Conner were 
highlighted as if to bring to light that the Teamsters' 
move to appeal was indeed a moot point. Reaching 
consensus was now beginning to be a highly political 
activity as bargaining continued. There was a reliance 
upon the Teamsters to use their organizational position as 
a power tactic, viewed by some as power wielding. At this 
point, whether one spoke to flight attendants, pilots, 
dispatchers, mechanics or any other employee of PSA, there 
was a feeling of frustration as the Teamsters appeared to 
be stalling and holding out for agreement. Many employees 
did not entrust the Teamsters with the power and authority 
to make decisions on their behalf at this point. They 
felt betrayed by this labor organization.
The Teamsters, on the other hand, were very good at 
mobilizing resources, and they were gaining the kind of 
publicity they wanted by resisting USAir's demands for 
immediate concurrence.
On April 17, 1987, thirteen days before the agreement 
deadline imposed by the USAir Group, PSA announced in both 
the PSA News Update and PSA USAir Merger Update that 
negotiations with Teamsters Local 2707 had recessed 
without agreement on the required modifications to certain 
provisions of the PSA-Teamsters collective bargaining 
agreement.
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At issue were three demands made by the Teamsters 
that remained unresolved: that PSA "snap back" certain
benefits and work rules that were in effect prior to the 
1984 contract; that PSA Teamster employees achieve 
immediate wage parity with USAir employees on the date of 
the merger; and that PSA establish a $5 million trust fund 
to be administered by the Teamsters.
PSA rejected the Teamster demands, saying that the 
"snap back" demand was unrealistic and unfair in light of 
all the stock and employee protection provisions already 
contained in the PSA proposals, and that raising the "snap 
back" issue this late in the negotiations was 
counterproductive. PSA, using its action channels, quoted 
USAir spokesperson Gene Anderson as saying, "USAir will 
walk away from the proposed merger if it is not completed 
by April 30."
A summary of PSA proposals presented during 
negotiations during March 17 through April 10 was 
communicated to all employees by senior managers on April 
17 (see Figure 15).
Then, the April 20 in the PSA USAir Merger Update 
stated that the Teamster Local 2707 had announced that it 
would not submit PSA's final contract proposal to its 
members for a ratification vote.
Between April 20 and April 28, employees began to 
manifest their anger at the Teamsters. Questions were 
being raised in the communication chronicle that reflected
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SUMMARY OF PSA PROPOSALS 
(March 17 through April 10, 1987)
The following is a summary of the employee protection proposals 
PSA has made to the Teamsters during negotiations that took 
place between March 17 and April 10. It is being made 
available due to the fact that the negotiations have recessed 
over the Teamster's demands for wage, benefit and work rule "snap backs".
As soon as possible, the Company will provide all Teamster 
represented employees with more detailed information regarding 
the history of tha negotiations and the Company's latest 
proposal.
As is clear from the summary, the Company's latest proposal is 
one of the best employee-protective packages ever offered in 
the airline industry.
o $3 6 million Teamster-employee stock plan based on $17 per 
share offer. Represents an $18 million increase in the 
value of the employees* stock plan over pre-USAir value. 
(Includes cash payment for "disputed shares" and option shares.)
Alleqhenv-Mohawk LPP's to Teamster-represented employees 
for PSA-USAir and USAir-Piedmont mergers. LPP's include:
(1) "fair and equitable" seniority list integration;
(2) severance pay for employees who are 
jobs; not offered USAir
(3) moving expenses; and
(4) displacement allowances.
o A "no wage rate reduction" guarantee.
o Pay and benefit protection for Teamster-represented
employees engaged in seniority list integration activities.
o "Mo furlough" protection through December 31, 1987.
o Base, domicile or station closure protection through
December 31, 1987.
o Agreement not to merge PSA and USAir before December 31,
1987 in order to provide time for the integration of
seniority lists.
o $1.6 million Supplemental Severance and Outplacement Trust
Fund to be administered by tha Teamsters and supervised by 
three (3) independent trustees. Supplemental severance pay 
to be available to Teamster-represented PSA employees who 
do not accept USAir job offers requiring relocation to 
cities outside of PSA's current system. (Provides
severance benefit not otherwise available under LPP's.)
o USAir will agree in writing to assume PSA's liability for
the employee benefits and protections that have been
negotiated. (This does not apply to Trust Fund which is PS 
Group's responsibility.)
Figure 15. Summary of PSA proposals from March 17 through 
April 10, 1987.
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anger, frustration and confusion. Some of the questions 
were:
1. Who set the April 30, 1987 deadline, and why was 
it moved up from September 30, 1987?
2. Does the Agreement and Plan of Merger between 
USAir Group, PS Group and PSA contain any optional 
deadline date after April 30 in case negotiations with the 
Teamsters or the ratification process are not completed by 
April 30?
3. How much money have the Teamsters demanded be 
placed in the Trust Fund?
These questions and their answers continued to be 
communicated to all PSA employees on a daily basis. 
Tension remained high and political activity was enormous.
In the midst of all this political behavior, 
surprisingly, on April 29, 1987, PSA USAir Merger Update 
announced that PSA and Teamsters Local 2707 had reached a 
merger agreement subject only to its ratification by the 
Teamster membership. Pressure from the employee groups 
that were represented by the Teamsters had stirred the 
local Teamster coalition into action that resulted in the 
agreement.
Three critical questions were asked on May 5, 1987 in 
the PSA USAir Merger Update with three meaningful answers. 
Employees of PSA wanted to know if they would be voting on 
a signed agreement or merely a proposal. It was clarified 
that a signed agreement was up for ratification.
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Employees wanted to know what would happen if one Teamster 
group did not ratify the agreement, and the answer given 
stated that there would be no merger with USAir if that 
occurred. Finally, employees of PSA wanted to know when 
the ratification process would occur, and they were told 
that May 17, 1987 was the deadline.
A summary of the PSA-Teamster Agreement was 
disseminated on May 7, 1987 (see Figure 16).
As the Teamsters voting took place, there continued 
to be tension in the air. Some employees believed that a 
majority of the Teamsters would vote against the agreement 
in the hopes that USAir would extend its deadline, thereby 
allowing the Teamsters to negotiate even a more favorable 
agreement.
On May 18, 1987, the day after voting, the PSA USAir 
Merger Update announced that PSA Teamster-represented 
employees ratified the contract modifications. The 
ratification of the agreed modifications to the collective 
bargaining agreement was the last major step needed to 
allow the acquisition of PSA by USAir Group to be 
consummated. The official and legal closing of the 
acquisition was expected to take place on May 29.
Chairman Paul Barkley said, "We are very pleased with 
the support shown by our employees and this acquisition of 
PSA by USAir Group is a tremendous opportunity for PSA and 
its employees to be a vital part of a major carrier in 
this industry."
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SUMMARY OF PSA - TEAMSTER AGREEMENT
As is clear from the following summary, the Agreement is one 
of the best employee-protection packages ever provided in the 
airline industry.
o $36 million Teamster-employee stock plan based on the $17 
per share sale price which USAir is willing to pay.
Represents an $18 million increase in the value of the 
employees' stock plan over pre-USAir value, including 
payment for "disputed shares" and option shares.
Employees with one or more years of service at closing of 
the sale to USAir Group, Inc. will share in the 
distribution from the PSP of the $36 million.
o Allechenv-Mohawk LPP's to Teamster-represented employees 
for PSA-USAir and USAir-Piedmont mergers. .............
o A "no wage rate reduction" guarantee.
o Pay and benefit protection for Teamster-represented
employees engaged in seniority list integration 
activities.
o "No furlough" protection through December 31, 1987,
except in special circumstances.
o Base, domicile or station closure protection through
December 31, 1987, except in special circumstances.
o Agreement not to merge operations of PSA and USAir before
December 31, 1987 in order to provide time for the 
integration of seniority lists.
o $3.2 million Supplemental Severance and Outplacement
Trust Fund to be administered by the Teamsters and 
supervised by two independent trustees. Supplemental 
severance pay to be available to Teamster-represented PSA 
employees who do not accept USAir job offers requiring 
relocation to cities more than 200 miles from their work 
location. (Provides severance benefit not otherwise 
available under LPP's.)
o A written guarantee from USAir that the employee
protection provisions and benefits contained in the 
agreement will be honored by USAir (this will be provided 
in the form of a signed adoption by USAir of those 
protection provisions).
Figure 16. Summary of the PSA-Teamster Agreement. PSA 
USAir Merger Update, May 7, 1987.
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Chairman of the USAir Group Ed Colodny expressed his 
welcome to all PSA employees in a PSA USAir Merger Update 
released on May 20 (see Figure 17). In the short message, 
Colodny expressed his concern for the personal lives of 
employees and he introduced an ideal of pride to the new 
USAir employees.
On May 29, 1987, the sale of Pacific Southwest
Airlines to USAir Group was completed. As a result of 
this transaction, PS Group's interest in PSA was converted 
into approximately $279 million. The majority of these 
funds would be used to repay certain debts of the PS Group 
and its subsidiaries, taxes and expenses. The remainder 
would be added to the PS Group's working capital.
The PS Group would continue its remaining lines of 
business in energy sales and production, aircraft leasing, 
and related air transportation support services and would 
consider expansion of these areas as well as additional 
lines of business. The PS Group would remain listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.
Figure 18 gives the letter from Chairman Paul Barkley 
to the past employees of PSA and current employees of 
USAir. This letter captured the essence of the 
transition of PSA to USAir, with all its benefits.
Due to the special interest groups and coalition 
building activity that prevailed during this slice of 
time, and due to the perceived need to communicate and 
intervene with employees about these activities, the
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MERGER UPDATEusA ir.
May 20, 1987 
Number 43
To All PSA Employees:
I am extremely pleased with the news that the IBT 
ratification has been completed with a favorable vote.
To all of you at PSA, I extend a warm welcome. We are 
finally nearing completion of the acquisition process. Formal 
closing will occur on May 29, at which time shareholders will 
receive $17 per share, and PSA will become a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of USAir Group.
In the months ahead I hope to be able to greet many of you 
personally. In the meantime, I re-affirm our commitment to a 
smooth transition with as little disruption as possible to your 
personal lives.
Later thi3 year we will be joined by Piedmont and together we 
will form an airline able to compete more effectively with the 
giants of our industry. Challenges are not new to us. I am 
confident that together we will be able to shape an airline which 
will reflect our collective pride - and an airline good for our 
customers, shareholders, and employees.
Welcome to USAir Group!
Figure 17., Letter from Ed Colodny to PSA employees 








Today the acquisition of PSA by USAir Group was officially 
consummated and with that, PSA is now a wholly owned subsidiary of USAir 
Group. In spite of the many ups and downs we've all experienced in the 
last few months, our efforts are now being rewarded with the reality of 
new opportunities as part of a larger and highly profitable carrier.
When the board of directors considered the USAir Group offer last 
December, we felt that of all the merger possibilities, USAir had the 
most to offer the employees of PSA. Following are some of the many 
benefits that have been given to PSA employees:
e  You are joining a profitable carrier with a history of integrity
and fairness with its employees. If you have any doubt, ask a
USAir employee.
e  You have the most extensive labor protections ever offered to 
employees in an airline merger. USAir has offered these 
extensive protections not because it had to, but because it chose 
to.
e  The PSP, in which PSA employees share in the value of $65 million
- a substantial increase in the value of the employee stock plan
over pre-USAir value. This includes payment for "disputed 
shares" and option shares. The PSP committees are now seeking 
the quickest way to terminate the Plan in order to distribute the 
funds to each participant as soon as possible.
e  Agreement not to merge PSA with USAir before December 31, 1987 in 
order to allow ample time to integrate seniority lists in a "fair 
and equitable" manner.
e A $3.2 million Supplemental Severance and Outplacement Trust Fund 
for Teamster-represented employees who choose not to accept jobs 
with USAir that requires relocation outside the present PSA 
system.
As part of USAir, I congratulate each of you on a very promising 
future ahead.
Figure 18. Letter from PSA Chairman Paul Barkley to new 
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internal mechanisms for articulating change have been 
seen from primarily a political and system-organic lens. 
The shape of this change evolving out of the special 
interests of a variety of different groups itself suggests 
a political model of change. Furthermore, the mere fact 
that the internal mechanisms for articulating the change 
were created, implemented and supported suggests a systems 
organic model of change.
External Mechanisms for Articulating Change 
The data that were utilized to investigate the 
external mechanisms for articulating change were newspaper 
articles from a variety of different newspapers, 
predominantly from Southern California, but others from 
different cities around the United States. The way in 
which the press viewed the merger process of Pacific 
Southwest Airlines by USAir is quite significant in that 
it provides us with another lens through which we can view 
the change event. This external view of the change event 
was perceived to be an important one; so much so that PSA 
reproduced batches of newspaper articles each week and 
distributed them to all employees within the organization. 
The point was to help the employees of PSA see the change 
from as many views as possible so as to broaden their 
knowledge base and their thinking about the event which 
impacted them so much. If the employees encountered only 
the view of the change that was given in the internal 
mechanisms instituted by PSA (PSA News Update and PSA
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USAir Merger Update) , they would have had a myopic or 
singular perspective of the merger.
A comprehensive collection of newspaper clippings 
were captured specifically from the time period of 
December 9, 1986 and May 29, 1987.
Geography plays a significant role in how the press 
sees a particular event. For instance, the press tended 
to view the merger from the point of view of PSA in 
articles that were extracted from California newspapers. 
Due to the fact that PSA was known as a California 
airline, this is not surprising.
Conversely, the press tended to view the merger from 
the point of view of USAir in articles that were extracted 
from eastern newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal 
and USA Today. Since USAir is headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., and has its major operating hub in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, this too is not surprising.
Although a representative sample of clippings is used 
in this section of the study, the majority of articles 
came from the San Diego Union and Tribune, the Los Angeles 
Times, the Wall Street Journal and USA Today.
On the morning of December 8, 1986, in the hometown 
of Pacific Southwest Airlines, the front page of both 
newspapers featured the story that PSA and USAir had 
entered into a merger agreement. The language used was 
emotional and symbolic. Specific examples of how this 
highly emotionalized language was projected are worthy of
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a closer and deeper look.
The San Diego Tribune stated that "under the proposed 
agreement, USAir would become the surviving carrier, 
ending the 37 year existence of San Diego based PSA" 
(December 8, 1986, p. IA).
On December 9, 1986, the San Diego Union said that 
"Pacific Southwest Airlines Inc. has agreed to be acquired 
by USAir Group Inc. of Arlington, Virginia for $400 
million in cash, a merger that would create the nation's 
sixth-largest airline but eventually deprive San Diego of 
its homegrown, locally based airline" (p. IA) .
From a personal-therapeutic lens, the San Diego Union 
(see Figure 19) wrote:
Assuming it would be just another day in her 19-year 
career with the airline, Lou Lehner reported for work 
in the accounting department at PSA headquarters on 
Harbor Drive at 7 a.m. yesterday. Barely inside the 
building, she spotted some mechanics that she knows. 
They said, 'Well, Lou, welcome to the wonderful world 
of USAir.' . . . Lehner is one of about 2,500 PSA
employees in San Diego who found out yesterday that 
the airlines management has agreed to a $400 million 
merger with USAir.
The Los Angeles Times of December 9, 1986 began its 
description of the story by saying, "California air mass 
transit pioneer Pacific Southwest Airlines fell victim 
Monday to airline takeover mania agreeing to be bought for
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S u f i  W riter!
Assuming it would'be just anoth­
er day in her 19-year career with 
the airline, Lou Lehner reported ■ 
(or work in the accounting depart­
ment at PSA headquarters on Har­
bor Drive at 7 am, yesterday. ;
Barely inside the building, she 
spotted some mechanics that she 
knows.. . y
“They said to me; 'Well, Lou, 
welcome to the wonderful world of 
USAir,’” said Lehner. "1 said, 
'Vfhatnt was a little shocking."
/  Lehner is one of about 2,500 PSA 
; employees in Sah'DTegb.whoJouod 
out yesterday that the airline’s 
management has agreed to a $400 
million merger with USAir, based 
in Washington, D.C.
News o( the merger elicited a 
roller coaster of thoughts and 
emotions from PSA workers at the 
Harbor Drive headquarters and at 
Lindbergh Field.
Some- feared they might lose 
their jobs or be transferred to the 
East Coast. Others were enthusias- 
■ tic about joining up with a finan­
cially stable USAir. The most com­
mon response was uncertainty.
“There are a lot of questions,” 
said PSA spokeswoman Margery 
Craig. “And frankly, there are a lot 
of questions that we don’t have an­
swers for right now. There's a lot 
to be worked ouL”
A bill collector for PSA, Lehner 
is not ready to retire. She is pre­
pared to move if that is necessary 
to keep her job. ”1 feel like I have a 
lot to offer,” she said. “It won't be 
- the same, but it’s still the airline 
business.”
Behind a ticket counter at Lind­
bergh Field, Larry Calpito was in 
good spirits. Calpito, a PSA pas­
senger service agent for six years, 
explained; “Both airlines are very
; aircraft to service some of PSA's 
! smaller markets, he said.
Colodny ruled out the possibility 
(jhat USAir would move its headquar­
ters from Arlington, Vt, to San 
Diego, saying “it's a move we proba­
bly can't afford.”
The merger is not likely to result 
in the relocation of PSA employees 
. to the east coast, but it could prompt 
-some layoffs, said Colodny.
“There will ultimately be some 
dislocation." he sa il “I think it’s 
hard to say there will be no job sur­
pluses. But with the base workload 
■remaining stable, 1 see no reason 
wby the place should be turned up­
side down.”
■ The merger will not result in wage 
'.reductions for PSA or USAir employ- 
lees, said Colodny. However, it is un- 
: likely that the wages of PSA employ­
ees — which are 14 percent to 30 
percent lower for various job classi­
fications than those paid to USAir 
employees -  will increase in the 
oear future. ' .
PSA employees have-contracts 
with the company that will expire at 
the end of 1987.
“As long as the two airlines are 
operating separately, the collective 
bargaining agreements of the two re­
main in place,” said Colodny.
The question of whether the PSA 
name will remain will be “studied 
very carefully” by USAir officials, he 
said.
Figure 19. An example of the emotional language used by 
the San Diego press. San Diego Union, December 9, 1986, 
p. IA.
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$400 million by USAir" (p. 3A).
In another article the San Diego Union chose to 
present the story as good news for PSA employees. The 
reporter wrote:
The merger is positioned for PSA employees because of 
USAir's financial strength and because PSA employees 
stand a good chance of having their wages elevated to 
the higher scales enjoyed by most USAir employees. 
PSA workers stand to make a windfall from the 
employee stock trust set up by the parent company. .
. . In essence, employees took 15 percent wage cuts 
in exchange for nearly 15 percent ownership stake in 
the airline.
On the front page of the business section of the 
December 9, 1986 issue of USA Today, the headlines read, 
"USAir Lands PSA Deal, $400 Million Merger Would Help It 
Stay Number 8." The opening sentence was positioned from 
USAir's point of view: "USAir Group Inc. announced plans
Monday to buy San Diego-based Pacific Southwest Airlines 
for $400 million, joining the rush to buy West Coast 
airlines" (p. 2D).
Featured in the same issue, USA Today portrayed 
USAir's chairman and chief executive officer, Edwin 
Colodny, as a hero. The article, entitled "Agony Over for 
USAir Chief," touted Colodny as the Harvard University Law 
School graduate, as outspoken and as a person who enjoys 
classical music and boating on Chesapeake Bay. As a
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hands-on manager, the reporter wrote, Colodny's airline 
since 1975 had been the most consistent profit performer 
of any airline (p. ID).
The California press viewed the agreement 
announcement from PSA's point of view, as if PSA had been 
victimized, as if San Diego would now be deprived of its 
homegrown company, and as if the employees of PSA were, in 
a way, bought. The East Coast press viewed USAir as 
having made a strategic move to expand into the western 
United States and that USAir1s leader was bright, human 
and successful.
The senior managers of PSA intentionally wanted all 
these views to be examined by the employees. The news 
clippings were disseminated via company mail to all 
employees to help broaden thinking. The avoidance of 
information deprivation was a deliberate tactic which is 
the reason why this change action was a part of the 
overall communication plan.
The following week, the San Diego Union featured an 
article that positioned USAir as the savior coming in to 
scoop up the ailing PSA. Language was used such as, 
"USAir aims to brighten Pacific Southwest Airlines' 
troubled smile," ". . . the proposed acquisition of debt
ridden PSA by USAir Group Inc. for $400 million will 
enhance the ability of PSA to improve its revenue base," 
"PSA's string of losses will not adversely affect USAir" 
and "USAir wrote the Bible on frequency of flights in its
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market, a feature for which PSA is known." The picture 
used in this article (see Figure 20) features Edwin 
Colodny as the central actor with PSA chairman Paul 
Barkley looking on (December 12, 1986, p. 3A) .
Around the same time period, the cultural symbolic 
save-the-smile movement began. All of PSA's aircraft were 
well known for the smile that was painted on the nose of 
each aircraft. All through the years, PSA's advertising 
campaigns capitalized on this logo. Marketing slogans 
such as "Our smiles are not just painted on," ''We've got 
to be tough to make you smile," and "Catch our smile" were 
all an integral part of the culture of PSA. Employees 
internalized the smile logo as a value of a positive, up, 
happy and enthusiastic personality of the organization. 
Over the years, PSA executives encouraged this value by 
allowing employees, particularly front line customer 
contact employees, to have fun. Like Mickey Mouse is to 
Disneyland, the smile of PSA became a primary cultural 
value within the organization. So strong was its 
manifestation to the public, the PSA smile became the 
trademark of how customers viewed the organization.
The press captured and sensationalized the smile of 
PSA as a major story. The question, of course, was would 
the PSA smile stay and be painted on all USAir airplanes 
too, or would it be painted over and die some culturally 
agonizing death? So the various reporters probed into 
every aspect of the life or death of the PSA smile.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
136
yff.r5 J
W  tf:;-; ,\-* W ;
The S u  Ditto Union/BoO Rtddisf
USAir chairman anjj'president Edwin Colodny, left; 
speaks during a wide-ranging interview with reporters
yesterday at Pacific Southwest Airlines headquarters 
while PSA chairman Paul Barkley looks on.
USAir head says merger to help PSA
By S. Lynne Walker, surf whm
USAir aims to brighten Pacific Southwest 
Airline's troubled smile by capitalizing oo the 
San Diego-based airline’s aggressive schedu­
ling tactics and its new fleet of aircraft the 
chairman and president of USAir said yester­
day.
The proposed acquisition of debt-ridden PSA 
by USAir Group Inc. for 1400 million "will en­
hance the ability of PSA to improve its revenue 
base," U$Air chairman and president Edwin 
Colodny said during a wide-ranging interview 
with reporters in San Diego.
Colodny said PSA’s string of losses will not 
adversely affect USAir, which has been the 
most consistently profitable airline for the past 
10 yean.
“If you're going to do acquisitions, you have
to decide it’s going to be profitable,” he said. 
"The interest we have now is in making this 
one work."
The stock market apparently is skeptical 
about USAir’s ability to continue to be profita­
ble after the merger. USAir’s stock, which is 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, has 
fallen points since Monday, when it closed 
at 31th.
Standard k Poor’s yesterday placed USAir 
on a creditwatch and downgraded its outstand­
ing debt "with negative implications.”
"It is unclear if additional revenues generat­
ed by the combination will offset added inter­
est, labor and non-cash expenses," the debt rat­
ing service sa il 
USAir and PSA have management styles ss 
similar that there will be little noticeable
change when the two airlines are merged, said 
Colodny. “Of all the mergers, I think this will 
be the least disruptive.”
USAir "wrote the Bible oo frequency" of 
flights in its market, a feature for which PSA is 
known, Colodny said.
“What has made PSA successful in California 
is that it has provided good, efficient service" 
with economical aircraft, he said. “That's ex­
actly what we da”
USAir, which uses Pittsburgh and Philadel­
phia as hubs, plans to use PSA’s aircraft and 
route network to expand its presence in the 
Western United States, said Colodny.
Figure 20; Article featuring an interview with USAir's 
Edwin Colodny. San Diego Union, December 12, 1986, p. 3A.
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In the San Diego Tribune of December 11, 1986, an 
editorial appeared entitled, "Please Don't Stop Smiling, 
PSA" (see Figure 21) . The editor gave the opinion that 
California skies just would not be the same without those 
PSA smiles.
Even travel agents began speaking up. In an article 
from Travel Weekly of December 15, 1986, travel agents in 
PSA's home territory had one major concern about the 
takeover. Would PSA be allowed to maintain its own 
identity? The agents felt that the disappearance of the 
PSA name would be a major drawback because the people in 
the Southern California area would not recognize USAir to 
the same extent that they do PSA. One agent even said, 
"PSA and San Diego are synonymous. They have grown 
together over the years. USAir simply doesn't have the 
same recognition" (p. 1 2).
In another Travel Weekly article of December 15, 
1986, the headline read, "USAir Says It May Retain PSA 
Name Under Merged Operations." USAir's Colodny was quoted 
as saying, "I would not foreclose the possibility that the 
PSA name will remain in some fashion, particularly in 
California" (p. 18) . The remainder of this lengthy
article reviewed USAir's plans for aircraft usage and 
merger hurdles yet to be overcome. Only one sentence of 
the article dealt with the caption, which suggests that 
the caption was used to captivate the readers.
On December 22, 1986 the Los Angeles Times featured
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Please don’t stop smiling, PSA
IS IT OUR IMAGINATION, or have the smiles on 
the Pacific Southwest Airlines fleet grown broader 
since USAir Group made its $400-million offer to 
purchase San Diego’s hometown airline?
Although the proposed sale would mark the end of 
an era for PSA, the West Coast’s first and most 
innovative no-frills, low-cost airline, it should bene­
fit PSA employees and stockholders and ensure that 
the planes and crews continue flying.
PSA was founded in 1949 and began weekly ser­
vice from San Diego to Burbank and Oakland with a 
leased DC-3. The painted smiles were years away, 
but the innovative approach of its founders was
evident immediately. Throughout its corporate his­
tory, PSA remained a trend-setter, most recently 
with the purchase of quieter, more fuel-efficient 
British Aerospace 146 aircraft
USAir officials have said they initially will oper­
ate PSA as a separate airline and won’t lay off any 
of its 5,000 employees. That’s good news for San 
Diego and more than 2,000 PSA employees here. We 
hope USAir will permit PSA to retain its identity 
after the merger and maintain its San Diego head­
quarters.
California skies just wouldn’t be the same without 
those PSA smiles.
Figure 21: The cultural-symbolic power of the PSA smile.
San Diego Tribune, December 11, 1986, p. 2E.
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an article called "USAir May Catch PSA's Smile and Keep 
It." The article revealed that PSA's smile painted 
airplanes had lots of flier recognition. Additionally, 
the creator of the smile was identified. The article 
stated, "Despite early indications that USAir would 
wipe the famous smiles off PSA's airliners to better match 
its own, more somberly painted fleet, USAir Chairman Edwin 
Colodny recently promised PSA employees that he will think 
long and hard before abandoning PSA's self-proclaimed 
'smile that won the West'" (p. 6A ) .
The staff writer then stated, "Marketing experts 
suggest that Colodny has reason to move cautiously before 
doing away with the smile that has been painted beneath 
the noses of PSA's planes since 1969. PSA maintains that 
its 'smileliners' were not the product of an ad agency 
. . . but the creation of a mischievous maintenance man 
which a paint brush."
A marketing study had been conducted for PSA which 
concluded that only United Airlines' "Fly the friendly 
skies" slogan commanded more recognition among West Coast 
travelers than PSA's "Catch our smile."
In the same article (see Figure 22) President Russell 
Ray advised Colodny to give serious thought to retaining 
the PSA name "because there's a hell of a lot of equity 
tied up in that name."
Even the Yakima Herald Republic newspaper ran an 
article called "Don't Stop Smiling," suggesting that
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USAir May Catch PSA’s Smile and Keep It
Ad and Painted Planes Have Lots of Flier Recognition, Survey Shows
By GREG JOHNSON. Timet Staf Writer
SAN DIEGO—When Jane Fonda scram* 
bles to get out of town fast in "The Morning 
After." a murder mystery movie that 
premieres on Christmas Day. she rushes to 
a Pacific Southwest Airlines ticket counter 
at Los Angeles International Airport.
PSA—which in real life carries about 
half of the 8 million paasengers who travel 
the "California corridor" between Los 
Angeles and San Francisco each 
year—evidently comes through in ths 
clutch for Fonda.
However, assuming USAir Group's 
1400-million bid for PSA is success* 
ful—and if a future movie sequel 
requires a similarly quick trip back to 
LAX—Fonda could end up booking a 
seat on a USAir flight.
Despite early indications that 
t'SAir would wipe the famous 
smiles" off PSA's airliners to better 
match its own. more somberly painted 
fleet. USAir Chairman Edwin Colodny 
recently promised PSA employees 
that he will think " la n ^ k d  hard” 
before abandoning PS£s Jelf-pro- 
claimed "smile that won tn S f e s i”
Marketing experts suggest that 
Colodny has reason to move cautious* 
ly before doing away with the smile 
That has been painted beneath the 
noses of PSA's planes since 1980. PSA 
maintains that its "smileliners” were 
the product of an ad agency—not. as 
legend has it. the creation of a mischievous 
maintenance man with a paint brush.
A recent marketing study conducted for 
PSA suggested that only United Air Lines' 
"Fly the Friendly Skies” slogan commands 
more recognition among West Coast trav* 
elers than PSA's "Catch Our Smile.”
In that study. 35% of West Coast 
respondents correctly identified the PSA 
slogan. In 'fibs Angeles. 72% of those
responding made the association.
United's "Friendly Skies” was correctly 
identified by 93% of West Coast respon­
dents and by 81% of Angelenos.
That kind of consumer awareness con­
trasted with Alaska Air Lines' "Fly With 
the Happy Face" slogan, which was cor­
rectly identified by only 5% of West Coast
respondents in the PSA-sponsored surrey. 
And. in a finding that brought smiles to 
PSA faces, 38% of the respondents thought 
that the “happy face” belonged to PSA.
USAir. which has not conducted a  recent 
marketing survey in the W est is "ex- 
tremely well known” in the eastern United 
Statas. according to spokesman David H. 
Shipley. He acknowledged that name rec­
ognition "drops off" in the West, where
USAir has relatively few flights. USAir 
wants to "enhance that awareness." Shi­
pley said.
The airline successfully played the 
name-change game in 1974. It dropped the 
longtime designation Allegheny Airlines 
and became USAir. a name chosen because 
it seemed more likely to be perceived as 
that of a "big airline." The new name 
also had the advantage of distancing 
the earner from the unwanted "Ago­
ny Airlines" nickname that might suit 
be buned in the minds of Easterners 
who since have migrated to Califor­
nia. one airline marketing expert said.
Marketing sources agree that the 
relatively unknown USAir might cap- - 
italiie on PSA's image as a well-cs 
tablished. low-cost, high-frequonc. 
flier that boasts a spanking new fleet.
PSA President Russell Ray be­
lieves Colodny should give serious 
thought to retaining the PSA name 
"because there's a hell of a lot of 
equity Ued up in that name."
T’d go very slowly if I were 
running the show at USAir." said 
Arizona State University marketing 
Prof. Jeff Bracker. who suggested 
that it would be “a mistake to auto­
matically change the name."
But Jim Sowers, a University of 
Houston marketing professor who 
studies airline mergers, said: “The 
keys are price and service and. if USAir can 
provide them, then there's no problem" 
with eliminating the PSA name, slogan and 
smite.
"Taking their ume is the best thing they 
could do right now," one marketing expert 
suggested. "You don't want to push too 
hard on the travel agents or the public. It 
takes a long time to get the right feeling 
with a new name.”
Figure 22. Will USAir keep PSA's identity? Los Angeles 
Times, December 22, 1986, p. 6A.
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Yakima Valley skies would not be the same without PSA 
smiles (December 23, 1986, p. 7B).
For the remainder of December 1986, news media 
covered the merger agreement story and more on the smile 
controversy.
In late December, the San Diego Tribune broke the 
story about the potential conflict between PSA and the 
Teamsters’ Local 2707 (December 28, 1986, p. 2A) . The 
reporter correctly revealed that the Teamsters had filed 
grievances with Pacific Southwest Airlines, protesting the 
airline's intended merger with USAir. The Teamsters had 
asked, it was reported, for the grievances to be submitted 
to arbitration. PSA had informed the Teamsters that the 
grievances were not subject to arbitration.
The news coverage in January of 1987 regarding the 
merger of PSA and USAir focused on the pilots union's 
agreement to the merger provisions, the Department of 
Transportation's approval to merge, and the Teamsters' 
opposition to the merger. But the saga of the disposition
of the PSA smile, still dominated the media coverage.
Both the San Diego Union and the Los Angeles Times of
January 23, 1987 announced that PSA and the Air Line
Pilots Association had reached an agreement to modify 
the contract language that could have blocked the proposed 
merger of the San Diego based carrier and USAir. ALPA, 
which represented 700 PSA pilots, had received assurances 
from both airlines that key provisions of the contract,
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such as the seniority list, wage scale and severance pay, 
would be maintained after the merger. ALPA, in turn, 
agreed to waive its right to initiate an employee buyout 
of the airline.
Thus, a major success had been realized. The pilots' 
agreement represented the first consensus in favor the 
merger. So many more approvals were to come, but PSA and 
USAir executives thought that the credible pilot group 
might create a domino effect which would influence other 
groups to accept the proposed merger. More details on the 
pilots' agreement are in Figure 23.
In late January, the United States Department of 
Transportation gave tentative approval to USAir Group's 
$400 million bid for PSA and suggested that the proposed 
merger would not reduce competition on the three routes 
where the two airlines compete. The Justice Department, 
which makes recommendations but does not have final power 
of approval on such mergers, concluded that the USAir-PSA 
deal would not lessen airline competition. The three 
routes that both PSA and USAir served were Los Angeles to 
and from Phoenix, San Francisco and San Diego. The Wall 
Street Journal carried an article on the approval (see 
Figure 24) as did other major newspapers.
On the political issue of the Teamsters, the Los 
Angeles Times of January 25, 1987 reported that there 
could be some "mid-merger turbulence" as PSA employees who 
belong to the Teamsters union found themselves in
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PSA pilots OK merger provisions
By S. Lynne Walker
SuflWiMr
Pacific Southwari AirliMi tod tbe 
Air Um  Pilots Association yesterday announced they have reached *n agreement to modify contract lan­guage tbit could hava blockod tbo projxaed merger of tbe Saa Diego- 
baaadairliMaad USAir.ALPA. which represents TOO PSA pilots received asannces from both airlines tbat kty provisions of tbo contract - such u tba Moiortty list, wage scale and severance pay - would bo maiataiaad after tba merg- ». said PSA apokaaaromao Margin Craig. Relocation beoeflta for pilots requited to mova a* a raaott of tba merger were also a part of tba agrsamaat. tba said.ALPA. in tuns. agreed to wait* its 
right to initiate an employee boyout of tba airline. Tba uaioa alio relin­quished itt rigbt to apply tba PSA cootract to working conditions at USAir ooce tba merger takas place.Tba uoioo said tba contract changes wen "to tbs baft interest of both carries ud tbair respective workforces."
"The combined forces of a strong Vest Coast canter and a strong East Coast carrier will provide a feraidh* ble competitor ia the drllaa indan* try," ALPA spokesman Pole Patti* grew said ia a statement raiaaaad yesterday. "Job opportarttfm and advancement will moat Italy ra* 
suit"
ALPA is tba flnt of fow enioas representing PSA employees to agree to contract modifications that USAir said were a ascamary pracv* sor to tbs merger.USAir Groap lac. ia Oaeember an- 
nooacad plans to acquire PSA far S4M million. Tbe airliM said at the 
thna the merger was contingent on 
the modification of PSA't labor eon* 
tracts.
PSA Is attempting to negotiats tiffiUf nodifltttiOQi vttl tbs Southwest Dispatchers Aaeoda- tM and tbe Soathwam Chaw Coa- MUan, which represent abort M employees responsible for flight crow piaaniag and arhsrtsHng, said CraigThe airline aspects to begin meet- 
iag soon with Teamsters Local 77*7,: 
which represents aboat U M  PSA flight attendants, reservation darts, 
tickat handlers, baggage haadian and aircraft maintenance crews, she said.
lbs Teamstsn etdaa has filed grievances alleging tbs acqdsittoa will thrastan its tljpt to rtpnstnt ■nployaesaf the merged airllns.
The dispels canton an USAlr's in-
callyallswaPSAIabaraaiaetoiâ  reseat a peep of ampleyaaa at 
UlAlrwtihsM an election*
Only a "handful" of USAir’s em­ployees, primarily tbe ground ser­vice crew in the airline's Pittsburgh hah, are represented by tbe Team­sters. Reservation clerks, ticket agents sad other employees are not represented by nation.
Teamstars rspraeaetatiiat in Saa Diego would not tespoad to phona calls ysstarriay, referring them in­stead to a union oOee ia Los Ange­las. Representatives ia the Los Aago- ias office ware oat of tows.
However, Oil Oakes, business agent for Local 7797, said in an earli­er interview thatthe union it “not going to be stampeded by a 'quota' 
good deal''
“We>e bssn through a few more' mergan than PSA,” be said, "so I think we can spot a good deal when we tee it."
In a relatsd matter, PSA and its parent company, PS Group Inc, have 
sdtofclai ipicUl AmboMffv ml* lags on March 17 to consider USAir’s merger prepasaL 
The compmtiaa‘tape to have all the contractual lamas ironed out by tbe and of the flnt quarter,” Craig said. Bowsrar, shareholders ate oot barred from voting on tbe matter 
even if the airline is still negotiating with the wtions.
Figure 23. Pilots Association reaches agreement to accept 
the merger. San Diego Union, January 2 3 ,  1987, p. 6A.
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USAir Plan to Bhy 
PSA Gets Approval 
From Regulators
By Lai'hik Mi Ginuysialf Reportert*l Thk W  \ i . i . S t h » > . i  J o i h n a l
WASHINGTON -  The Transportation 
Department tentatively approved L'SAir 
Group Inc.'s proposed i-WO million acquisi­
tion of Pacific Southwest Airlines, saying 
that competition wouldn't be reduced.
The combination of Washington-based 
I'SAir Group and San Diego-based PSA. a 
unit of PS Group Inc.. would create the 
seventh-largest domestic carrier, with a 
4.90 market share in revenue-passenger 
miles, the department said.
In giving its tentative go-ahead, the 
transportation agency said that L'SAir and 
PSA operate largely in different regions of 
the country. I'SAir's principal hub is Pitts­
burgh. and of the 13 airports the airline 
serves, only about a dozen are west of St. 
Lmns. PSA serves 29 airports, mostly on 
the West Coast.
The airlines do compete on three non­
stop routes: Los Angeles-Phoenix: Los An- 
geles-San Francisco and Los Angeles-San 
Diego. But because other carriers also 
serve these markets and because L'SAir is 
a "relatively minor participant" along 
these routes, the merger wouldn't substan­
tially decrease competition, the depart­
ment argued.
The department turned down the a ir  
lines' request to bypass the customary ac- 
quisition-review procedures, saying that a 
"transaction of this significance" dictated 
adhering to the normal rules. It also said 
that interested parties should file com­
ments or objections within 13 days.
The acquisition represents the third 
such transaction in recent months of a 
West Coast regional airline by a  larger 
carrier. AirCai. PSA's main competitor 
on the Los Angeles-San Francisco route, 
was acquired by American Airlines, a unit 
of AMR Corp., while Western Airlines 
was bought by Delta .Air Lines.
Department officials also decided 
against imposing certain conditions in the 
L’SAir-PSA acquisition designed to protect 
employees who may be hurt by the 
merger.
A spokesman for PS Group said the company wu "delighted'' with the agency’s tentative approval: USAir offi­cials couldn't be reached.
Figure 24. Government regulators approve merger plan. 
Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1987, p. 2A.
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the powerful position of being able to stall or possibly 
block the proposed acquisition. The Teamsters argued that 
PSA had contracted with the unions to do certain things, 
and PSA contracted with USAir to change those things. The 
turbulence initiated by the Teamsters (detailed in Figure 
25) was viewed by PSA senior managers as a stall tactic. 
It was a coalition against the proposed agreement 
parameters and they were anxious the press coverage added 
greater visibility to the opposition.
Of greater magnitude than the first three issues 
(pilots' agreement, Department of Transportation agreement 
and Teamsters turbulence) the smile issue continued to be 
the dominating news story. The January 25, 1987 San
Francisco Examiner headlined proclaimed "PSA's Smile Draws 
a Suitor." The writer opined: "We look forward to a new
era in which another upstart airline such as PSA can take 
to the air. Meanwhile, we're not smiling" (p. 3B).
The Grass Valley Union and the Oxnard Press Courier 
each ran articles titled "Keep on Smiling PSA" and 
"Smiling Skies," respectively. Each article expressed 
the view that California and the PSA smile go together 
(January 25, 1987).
The San Diego Tribune printed the picture and caption 
given in Figure 26 as part of an article on the PSA smile. 
A marketing study suggested that USAir which was in the 
west should capitalize on PSA's image as a 
well-established, low cost, high frequency flier that
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By GREG JOHNSON.Times Staf Writer
SAN DIEGO—There could be 
some mid-merger turbulence in' 
USAir Group’! tWO-mtllion bid (or 
Pacific Southweit Airline*, as PSA 
employees who belong to the 
Teamsters union find themselves in 
the powerful position of being able 
to stall or possibly block the pro­
posed acquisition.
Despite last week's 
quick approval of con­
tract modifications by 
PSA pilots, the San 
Diego-based airline 
h u  yet to obtain changes in the 
Teamsters’ contracts that are nec­
essary before USAir can complete 
its pending acquisition of PS A.
The Teamsters, who have not 
begun bargaining with PSA. are ' 
likely to seek a court order that 
would force PSA into binding arbi­
tration over the contract modi­
fications being demanded by USAir 
as part of its proposed acquisition, 
according to Marvin L. Griswold, 
secretary • treasurer of Teamsters 
Local 2707.
Pilots Were Pleased
That is in contrast with the 
attitude of the Air Line Pilots 
Assn.’s 600 members at PSA. They 
were "extremely pleased’’ with the 
job security guarantees negotiated 
in return for contract modifications 
demanded by PSA and USAir. 
according to ALPA spokesman. 
Pete Pettigrew.
PSA's 3200 Teamsters are “op­
posing anything that takes away 
the protection we’ve negotiated on 
behalf of employees," Griswold 
said during a telephone interview. 
The Teamsters have separate con­
tracts with PSA coyertng mainte­
nance workers, flight attendants, 
reservations agents and operations 
Pleas* see PSA. Pag* IS
Ceitiaoed fraai Pag* IS
personnel.
PSA and ALPA reached a quick 
.agreement because ALPA’s con­
tract “didn't have the very, very 
involved (merger and acquisition] 
language that we have," Griswold 
said, “if they had the protective 
language, they might be taking 
another look.”
PSA. which earlier this month 
gave the union "32 pages of pro­
posed (contract] modifications.. . . 
is reneging on a commitment they 
made to employees in  exchange for 
concessions." Griswold said. Ac­
cording to a recent Teamster 
newsletter, PSA proposes, among 
other things, to altar seniority 
benefits and the so-called labor 
protective provisions.
Unlike ALPA. the Teamsters 
union holds contracts that guaran­
tee financial protection to its mem­
bers if they lose their Jobs because 
of a merger. The contracts would 
force USAir to Incorporate the 
protective provisions into contracts 
covering employees represented 
by the Teamsters after the airlines 
are merged.
And. the contracts would allow 
the union to continue representing 
its PSA members until after senior­
ity issues generated by the merger 
with USAir are sorted out.
PSA officials would not comment 
on the negotiations, but one airline 
source said PSA believes that major 
sections of tbe Teamsters' con­
tracts "are simply unenforceable" 
because they run counter to estab­
lished labor law.
• In Department of Transportation 
filings. USAir has tndlcatsd that it 
vtUl grant the protective provisions ’ 
tp former PSA employees, but the 
airline has refused to incorporate 
them into its labor contracts. Gris­
wold said.
• The Teamsters won the unusual 
merger and acquisition contract 
clause from PSA in 1964 u  part of a 
package that cut wages and bene­
fits by 15%. eased work rules and 
gave stock to PSA employees.
1 According to Griswold. PSA 
Chairman Paul Barkley one* de­
scribed the Teamsters' protective 
provisions as “the finest protective 
language in the industry."
• If the contracts prove to be 
binding, the Teamsters "hold the 
key to this merger.'* said Charles 
Achmus, a r\..*mc-.' ueaa 2  .r.-
Cornell University School of In­
dustrial Relations who arbitrates 
airline and railroad labor disputes.
USAir has charged PSA with 
negotiating the changes but "the 
contracts seem to be USAir's prob­
lem.” Rahmus said. "If they don't 
like the contract, they don’t have to 
acquire PSA."
"I think (USAir Chairman Ed- 
wtn| Colodny holds the key to this 
merger," Griswold said. "We do not 
have the ability to . . . make n fly 
or stop i t ”
The legality of the merger and 
acquisition clause "is up in the air” 
according to one airline industry 
source familiar with the contracts. 
"It's not a cut-and-dried issue 
(because] there’s case law on both 
sides of the fence."
The Teamsters are arguing that 
"PSA lus contracted with the 
unions and employees to do certain 
things and they've contracted with 
USAir to change those things." 
according to the attorney who 
wrote Um Teamster contracts. "If 
(USAir wants) the merger to go 
though, then this dispute has to be 
resolved."
PSA's Teamsters members 
"could find themselves on the bot­
tom of another carrier's seniority 
list in a subsequent merger" if the 
language is dropped, Griswold said. 
"Or, even worse, (employees) could 
find themselves without jobs and 
without any. ■ . protective provi­
sions."
According to airline sources. 
PSA has maintained that its con­
tractual obligation to provide the 
protective provisions to Teamster 
employee* would not be binding in 
the event that the merged PSA/- 
USAir carrier were subsequently 
acquired by still another airline.
Figure 25. Mid-merger turbulence initiated by Teamsters 
Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1987, p. 12A.
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PSA Jet* ihaw • »  Iketr w ile* . A m r tr ilH  il*t)> n | |h M  U m  *oly U ilM  Air Um *’ “Fly the FrtcaUly 
SUe*’* itogM  cw w w h  M r* recogaMiaa m  the Wcat Caatt Ik *  PSA't "Catch Oar SatUe."
Figure 26. The PSA smile. San Diego Tribune, January 29, 
1987, p. 6B.
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boosted a brand new fleet. Now that was something to 
smile about.
The importance of the organizational symbolism of the 
PSA smile continued both in the press and among PSA 
employees. This aspect of the PSA organization, that its 
members used to reveal the values that were inherent in 
the organization, maximized the desire of the press to 
write about it. The symbol of the smile at PSA was not 
only an object but an act, an event, a quality that served 
as a vehicle to convey meaning.
In February of 1987, the thrust of the news focused 
around two primary issues. The first was the continued 
resistance on the part of the Teamsters coalition to reach 
an agreement regarding the contract provisions for the 
proposed merger. The second was the fact that another 
group, the PSA dispatchers, had reached agreement on 
contract changes. By far, the former issue was paramount.
Figure 25 shows a significant release from the press 
as it relates to conflict, interest groups, the powerful 
and the powerless, coalition building and more. The 
response was a letter from a PSA employee published in the 
San Diego Union on March 5, 1987.
I am a PSA employee of 8h years in the reservations 
group who would like to respond to your article 
headlined, "PSA/USAir merger pivots on Teamsters." 
Your wording needs a correction. We employees who 
are Teamsters are not in a powerful position of being
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able to stall or block the proposed acquisition. The 
leaders of the union may be in a powerful position, 
but we, the dues paying members who they are supposed 
to represent feel that we are powerless. We are 
frustrated that our so-called representatives may 
ignore our wishes and prevent the acquisition. It is 
apparent that the Teamsters have not read all the 
letters sent to them asking that they not oppose the 
merger and the contractual language changes requested 
by USAir. Angry sentiment toward the Teamsters is 
pervasive at work because we fear they could be 
damaging our future. Many, if not most of us, have 
signed petitions asking that the Teamsters not 
interfere. Our voices are not being heard (p. 2A). 
Pressure opposing the Teamsters' position was 
building. A headline in the Los Angeles Times of February 
3, 1987 stated "PSA Attendants Urge Teamsters to Agree to 
Contract Changes." A large percentage of PSA's near one 
thousand flight attendants had signed petitions demanding 
that the Teamsters nion agree to the labor contract 
provisions that had been requested by PSA and USAir 
(Figure 27). The petitions had drawn support from about 
80% of PSA's flight attendants and about 50% of PSA's 
station agents. The Teamsters responded by telling the 
Los Angeles Times that the petitions were based on 
"erroneous" assumptions about USAir's proposed acquisition 
of PSA (p. 12A) .
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PSA Attendants Urge Teamsters 
to Agree to Contract Changes
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GrtnraM ckeraeteriaed Um cnMtotee a  “ . .  . a 
m hpm tm m m U  vekkia IfeM n *  |M  la McUao| 
ManlydlarUM m o m ■wcaawaaU. . andgetar 
loelidlkelecteMngouL* 
la a i ~
tank (M
MMd Um patUiam during DeaHkor. Ike pedttaoo
Committee members ‘are acting on 
blind faith (in management 
promises] and nothing more—
The whole idea of giving up 
hard-fought language for nothing in 
return is appalling.'
‘MWMttMr d  VRAM m  tar PSA. eeordUg M 
O M M ta liM lll b f . . .  tkeTbauMUnMV net 
cppctangUM— m m “
Coptae d  t o  paUttane wore m M  la  (MmnM a d  
oUmt Tm o m i leaden PSA OMnaaa MU SMktay 
end USAirQwiupflMMM BtartaCdataiy.
U m  T w a in  rcpr u wil 3JOO PSA ttgkt clUnd- 
i «M fraud perooanrL
USAir'e aeqUM to d  PSA b b a d  ip a  Um airline 
Maalat IMar aaiiaei MadSaUaaa M i  the Tom - 
cun «aU Um Ale Um Pilau Amo .
PSA’e SOO pad*  rapraoanud by tke Air UnePllou 
A m . led naaik n m U  a a in c t  ckMCM demand • 
M by USAir end PSA. la  that egraeMenl. PSA tad 
USA* pfaarieadpUouikattkatr M oon and eeniarily 
wedA ba p eU dM  U Um a u r i*  I* a e v ta u d .
OUaMy Ian omwUi aneadeA Ike peaMtae d  Incoew 
proucltaa M d l  d  PSA’e a a -o M a r  anployea If the 
b h a aairacu are ckcafiA end ike aNtgw u
PSA tad  analk  turned over 33 pega  d  contract 
andUlattaaa M T ta n d e n  etlaneyc la Waakingto. 
according Uauatanaw aletur.ltaoM Odlflaitoe d a l  
wtlk caepareU caA leb a  lev a  well a  Um w-cclled 
“lakarpraucuve practataaT tkat Gdodny proaleed u•Udfni'iBOi-ifflnrMBlovMg
QrtaweM tad  weM mM ihd Um T a n a  era review 
d  the rnaipcay'e requeeud ch u fee  a  peoceedtng 
“very cerdully eo eapiny ewf righUara protected."
Figure 27. Teamster opposition builds. Los Angeles 
Times, February 3, 1987, p. 12A.
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Clearly, a division between groups had resulted. 
Employees were shocked and frustrated. As a result of 
that frustration, they initiated on their own several 
action groups which were designed to publicly pronounce 
their collective views against the opinions of the 
Teamsters.
The Teamsters took action too. That same week the 
union sued PSA in an attempt to force arbitration. They 
asked the federal court in San Francisco to force PSA to 
arbitrate the dispute over contract language. PSA 
contended that the questions raised by the Teamsters were 
representational issues, not contractual issues. The 
essence of the Teamsters' view was that PSA should be 
bound to carry out the provisions of the labor contract 
that USAir had previously described as unacceptable if 
USAir was to conclude its bid for buying PSA.
The Teamsters felt that their position had power 
because of the similar court challenge generated by a 
contract dispute with Western Airlines which had been 
acquired by Delta Airlines. That suit, too, had yet to be 
settled.
The San Diego Tribune summarized this struggle for 
power and influence in its article entitled "Teamsters 
Suit Could Peril PSA Merger, Company Says" (see Figure
2 8) .
The members of the Southwest Dispatchers Association 
had only twelve members; however, their agreement to
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Teamsters suit could peril 
PSA merger, company says
By Carl Larsen
Tnbaat AMatiMt Fiuacul Editor
A suit filed by tbe Teamsters seekiflf to force Pacific 
Southwest Airlioee into binding arbitration with the 
union could jeopardize tbe carrier’s plans to merge with 
USAir Group Ik , a PSA spokesman said yesterday.
Tbe suit, filed Tueeday ia UfiL District Court in San 
Frandaco, contends that PSA is violating terms of labor 
agreements with four Teamster bargaining units that 
cover procedures to be followed if PSA merges with 
another carrier.
“Certainly it presents coocem that it could Jeopardise 
the proposed merger,” said PSA spokesman Bill Bast* 
ings.
Ibe action was filed by Teamstan Local 2707, which 
represents 1 4 a  employees who are PSA flight attend* 
ants, reservations and station agents and mechanics. Tbe 
airline has approximataly ION employees.
Each of tbs four agreements between tbs union and 
PSA ‘'contains protective provisions applicable to marg* 
ers, consolidations and acquisitions of PSA oparatioai
and thcee of another carter,” the suit said.
At issue is tbe sum s of the present Teamster bargain* 
ing units once the merger is carried out For the merger 
to proceed. USAir has sttted that existing contract lan­
guage giving Teamsters tbe right to representation after 
a merger must be changed.
USAir has a Bmitad Teamster membership represent 
ing ground handlers while USAir’s flight attendant and 
maintenance personnel are represented by other unions. 
The carrier's station and reservations agents are ooo* 
union employees.
USAir spokesman Dave Shipley said tbe airline would 
have oo comment oo tbe complaint, which names USAir 
as a defendant
Hastings said PSA believes tbs dispute is one of union 
representation n d sr the tbs domain of the National Me­
diation Board uand not subject to arbitration” under ex­
isting labor agreements. Tbe Teamstan claim the pres­
ent ayeemmts are enforceable under terms of the Rail* 
way Labor Act
Marvin L  Griswold, secretary* 
treasurer of the Teamstan local, 
was unavailable for comment 
Existing contract language the 
union says is tbs suit provides that 
PSA’s employees “shall not be into* 
grated with employees of tbe other 
carrier involved ia the
without agreement of the Team­
sters” or through arbitxatiota 
The Teamstan have asksd the 
court to farce the time into binding 
arbitration.
USAir has said that for tbs merger 
to proceed, existing contract lan­
guage must be modified.
Tbe sirlioe last weak said it would 
grant PSA employees enhanced ben­
efits to any personnel who were 
adversely affected by tbs merger
through Job layoffs or forced reloca- 
tioasL
Hastings said the airline was 
surprised by the salt since it has yet 
to sit down with the union to discuss 
tbe merger indctaiL 
"Tbe Teamstan have told compa­
ny officials that they haven’t met 
with us because its  a issue 
and they're stadytng the changes. 
Now we fiad they're filing a lawsuit” 
Hastings said 
However, a source said the carrier 
and the union were scheduled to 
meet today to discuss terms of the
Resistaace by the Teamstan to ac­
cept tanns of the merger has result­
ed in some members of the union at 
PSA to circulate petitions asking tbe 
union officers to accept terms of the 
t4QS million buyout of PSA by USAir.
Figure 28. Teamsters sue PSA in U.S. District Court. San 
Diego Tribune, February 6 , 1987, p. 10A.
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contract changes was critical. In mid February, the press 
reported in many newspapers that this union had reached 
agreement to modify merger and acquisition language. The 
union had received assurances from both airlines that key 
provisions of the contract, such as integration of the 
seniority list, maintaining the wage scale and severance 
pay, would be maintained after the merger. The union, in 
turn, had agreed to waive its right to represent PSA 
employees once the merger of operations was completed.
The Southwest Dispatchers Association was the second 
of four major unions representing PSA employees to agree 
to contract modifications which USAir had said were a 
necessary precursor to the merger.
The four dominant news issues in the month of March, 
1987 were TWA's play for USAir and USAir's bid for 
Piedmont, the PSA Crew Controllers contract agreement, the 
shareholders approval of the merger and more unrest 
between the Teamsters union and its membership.
In the middle of an already confusing and anxious 
time, the Wall Street Journal stated on March 5 that TWA 
had proposed to buy USAir for $52.00 a share (see Figure
29). This move was highly political in that it was a ploy 
to have USAir turn around and buy TWA and as a result drop 
its bids for both Pacific Southwest Airlines and Piedmont. 
This change event was filled with complexity and it caused 
a significant reaction in the mega structure of the entire 
airline industry.
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TWA Proposes 
To Buy USAir 
For $52 a Share
Carrier Led by Icahn Is Said 
To Boost Stake to 9.9%: 
Analysts Call Bid a Ploy
By Test agins and L a - t i t  P. Co h o
S t a f f  H tp o r ta e n  o / T h k  W a u .  S t h s c T  J o c r n a l
SEW YORK-Trans World Airline*, as- 
serttng that it had become USAir Group 
Inc.'s largest single holder, made a sur­
prise proposal to buy tl» rest of the airline 
(or S33 a share.
USAir had no immediate response. 
Some Wall Street sources viewed the pro­
posal skeptically, seeing in it a ploy to 
pressure USAir into buying TWA.
The SS-a-sharo price values all o( 
USAir at more than Sl.t billion, based on 
the 31.T million shares that would be out­
standing after conversion of certain securi­
ties.
TWA's proposal, and its disclosure that 
it had acquired a large block of USAir 
stock, caught Wall Street speculators off 
guard. As word of the proposal spread.
The Two Airlines





L u e e ________ ___________
Num ber of a irc raft 2u7 ____
iTubcitie*.'St. Louis. New York
I M S billion 
SlOti.3 million
USAir Oram  Inc.
; 119861 





I Net income 1953 million
Numbe r  e l  a irc ra ft 204 
HubcMaas Pittsburgh. Philadelphia. 
Lot A rm  lea. San F ranc-ico
NtiTX: Includes PactfleSa .t«*k
I Airlines resell* due la penu ne merier.
they quickly sent USAir's share price soar­
ing on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
shares closed in composite trading at 
449.125. up SS.373.
TWA Chairman Carl C. Icahn. in a let­
ter to USAir. raised the possibility of a 
three-way merger of TWA. USAir and 
Piedmont Aviation inc., which USAir has 
made a bid to acquire.
'Piedmont Aviation's board learned of 
TWA's action as directors were meeting to 
consider competing takeover offers from 
Norfolk Southern Corp. and USAir. Pied­
mont’s board had been expected to reluc­
tantly accept USAir's proposal, but Instead 
directors recessed the meeting without ac­
tion and without comment on yesterday's 
activityj
However this latest development plays 
itself out. it probably will represent an­
other major milestone in this industry’s 
consolidation. "If it becomes that three- 
way combination 'TWA, USAir and Pied­
mont I. you're down to seven major car­
riers." said Lee Howard, executive vice 
president of Airtlne Economics Inc.. a 
Washington avtatlon consulting firm.
Mr. Icahn said that "we have not yet 
had an opportunity to obtain commit­
ments'' for financing to complete the 
transaction with USAir. But he added that 
"we are confident that TWA will be able to 
obtain the necessary financing."
USAir hag offered to buy Piedmont for 
cash and stock in a transaction valued at 
as much as Sl.t billion. Mr. tcahn. in tbe 
letter to USAir. said that "we believe that 
your other shareholders would prefer our 
cash merger proposal for USAir over 
USAir's proposed acquisition of Pied­
mont." But he also said. "Alternatively, 
we would be interested In discussing a 
three-way combination among USAir, 
Piedmont and TWA."
Julius MaWutis, an analyst at Salomon 
Brothers Inc.. said "TWA’s proposal is a 
ploy to have USAir turn around and buy 
TWA and to have USAir drop Its bids for 
both Pacific Southwest Airlines and Pied­
mont.” USAir's plan to buy Pacific South­
west Airlines awaits Tnnsporutioo De­
partment clearance.
Other Wall Street sources said much the 
same. Indeed. TWA's shares rose 025 to 
close u  OUR on tbe Big Board, instead 
of failing u  an acquirer's shares often 
do.
In an interview yesterday, Mr. Icahn 
declined to disclose how many USAir 
shares TWA has bought He said he would 
do so In a Securities and Exchange Com- 
mlsstoo filing to be made in a "timely 
fashion."
Wall Street sources said they under­
stood that TWA now MMs 9.9% o( USAir1! 
stock outstanding. They said the airline 
has held 4.9% for nearly a year and bought 
the rest ut the past few days. Securities 
law requires a buyer of 5*1 or more of a 
publicly held company's stock to report the 
holding to the SBC within 10 days.
Mr. tcahn's proposal to L'SAir came in 
a letter addressed 'o its chairman and 
president. Edwtn t. Cilodny. Mr. Icahn 
said that if a "negotiated transaction is 
not acceptable to you. we may make an 
offer directly to USAir's shareholders for 
up to 51% of USAir's outstanding stock to 
be purchased in a voting trust at a price 
lower than the S52 per share that w* are 
proposing today."
In any case, the tetter sud. TWA was 
asking that the Transportation Department 
clear both its acquisition of USAir and its 
purchase of 51% of the company's stock.
The Transportation Department has 
cleared every major airline merger pro­
posed In the past 14 years-somettmes af­
ter ordering changes. Yesterday, depart­
ment officials declined comment on TWA's 
proposal, as is customary.
In the past. Mr. Icahn has retied on 
Dresel Burnham Lambert Inc.. a New 
York investment banker, for financing 
commitments for his takeover attempts, 
including tits purchase of TWA. But a se­
nior Orexel official said yesterday that Mr. 
Icahn hadn't discussed financing (or a 
USAir takeover with Orexel. Another 
source said TWA had access to some 5900 
million in cash. But the airline would need 
more to take over USAir.
Besides controlling TWA, Mr. Icahn re­
tains an u.4% stake in USX Corp. He ac­
quired the holding with borrowing on 
which he is understood to be paying hefty 
carrying costs; TWA owns a small part of 
the interest in USX directly.
A combination of TWA. Washington- 
based USAir. and Pacific Southwest. San 
Diego, probably would create the nation s 
third-largest carrier. According to figures 
compiled by Avlatlao Dally, a trade puoli- 
cation, the market share of the merged 
airlines would amount to about 12% In rev­
enue passenger miles, slightly ahead of the 
cambtaed share of Tern Air Corp.'s Conti­
nental Airlines and Eastern Airlines. A 
revenue passenger mile is one paying pas­
senger carried one mile.
The sound regional systems of USAir 
and Piedmont, together with TWA’s inter­
national routes, "would be a terribly pow­
erful combinadoe." said Mr. Howard of 
Airline Economics. “That looks very much 
Ilka a stand-alone survivor."
The TWA group could fly 411 aircraft on 
routes that ertaeran the U.S. to and from 
hubs in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Los An­
geles. San Francisco, St. Louis and New 
York, making It a formidable compeutor.
"If the airlines could be put together 
with the employees under TWA's labor 
contracts-wMeh would be easy to postu­
late but difficult to accomplish-they could 
be a big force In the marketplace." said 
Paul Sehleslnier. a securities analyst at 
DU Securities. But he said. "I don't think 
that It will happen."
Figure 29. TWA proposed to buy USAir. Wall Street 
Journal, March 5, 1987, p. IA.
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PSA employees were in a daze. Not knowing who they 
belonged to, who to identify with, what happened to their 
identity to PSA, what would be in store for them in the 
future was puzzling and difficult. There had been no time 
to even experience the loss of PSA, let alone develop a 
new identity with USAir, or Piedmont or TWA.
What was reported in the Los Angeles Times added to 
the confusion of identity when it published later that 
week that USAir Group and Piedmont Aviation had agreed to 
proceed with a merger in which USAir would pay $1.59 
billion in cash for Piedmont.
The article went on to suggest that the transition 
was the latest and highest priced consolidation in the 
airline frenzy of the post deregulation era. Airline 
industry observers viewed the blending of the carriers, 
however, as an excellent fit because Piedmont operated 
mainly in the southeast while USAir's routes were 
primarily in the midwest and northeast (see Figure 30).
The proposed USAir-Piedmont marriage, which would 
create the nation's seventh largest airline company, had 
been approved by the directors of both firms but still had 
to be approved by stockholders and federal regulators. 
This ended several weeks of competition between USAir and 
Norfolk Southern, a giant railroad company, for the right 
to purchase Piedmont, which was based in Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina.
On March 18, 1987, another interest group approved
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USAir, Piedmont 
Agree to Proceed 
With Takeover
By ROBERT E.DAU.OS.Time* Staf Writer
NEW YORK—USAir Group and Pied­mont Aviation, two profitable airline com­panies. said Monday they have agreed to proceed with a merger in which USAir will pay $1.59 billion cash for Piedmont.The transaction ia the latest and high­est-priced consolidation in the airline merger frenzy of the post-deregulation era. The meshing of the two domestic earners la viewed by airline industry observers u an excellent fit because piedmont opera tee mainly in the Southeast while USAir's routes are primarily in the Midwest and Northeast 
The price that USAir. of Arlington. Vs.. hu agreed to pay for Piedmont is nesrly double the $860 million that Northwest Airlines paid tor Republic Airlines last year, the most costly airline industry merger to have been completed so far.The proposed USAir-Piedmont mar­riage, which will create the nation’s sev­enth-largest airline company, has been approved by directors of both firms but must be blessed by stockholders and federal regulators. It appears to end several weeks of competition between USAir and Norfolk Southern, a giant railroad compa­ny. for the right to buy Piedmont, based in Winston-Salem. N.G And while that fight for control was nearing its resolution last week. Trans World Airlines Chairman Cart C. Icahn, in a surprise move, confused matters by offer­ing to buy USAir.
Monday's announcement appears to thwart Icahn's Uth-hour attempt to merge
USAir. with its strong domestic route system, into his carrier, the bulk of whose business is on over­seas routes. But some analysta maintained that Icahn's efforts to acquire USAir. with or without Piedmont, may not be at an end. TWA, they contend, will have difficulty surviving alone and must find a merger partner.
Mark Buckstein. general counsel for TWA. declined to comment Monday on the airline's plans. But TWA on Monday did file with the Department of Transportation an amended and more detailed appli­cation to acquire USAir. An earlier application was denied late Friday because It contained too little infor­mation.“We're all waiting to see if Icahn has another strategy, another move in mind." said Paul Karos, an airline analyst wtth tbe New York brokerage house of L.F. Roth­schild. Unterbsrg. Towbin. "Well have to see if Icahn wants to battle it out.”Icahn. who said last week that he had already acquired 15% of the stock of USAir. was temporarily restrained Monday by a U.S. Dis­trict Court Ur Pittsburgh from ac­quiring any more.
Under the terms of the USAir- Piedmont merger agreement, which the companies said they agreed on Friday night. USAir began a $69-a-ehare cash tender offer for all of Piedmont's 23.1 million shares of common stock outstanding.The USAir offer Is a sweetened version of Its earlier proposals, which were combinations of cash and stock.In the pending merger, each share of Piedmont common stock not purchased in the under offer, will be converted into the right to receive $69 per share in cash. USAir’s offer is conditioned upon the tendering of 50.1% of the shares.
Figure 30. USAir, Piedmont agreed to merge. Los Angeles 
Times, March 17, 1987, p. 10A.
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the sale of PSA to USAir and the story was covered in a 
variety of newspapers. The San Diego Union pictured the 
voting meeting at the Westgate Hotel in San Diego, 
California (see Figure 31). The shareholders of PS Group 
Inc. and Pacific Southwest Airlines overwhelmingly 
approved the pending merger. PS Group Inc. shareholders 
voted 63.3% in support of the proposal to sell the airline 
to USAir Group. Shareholders of Pacific Southwest 
Airlines voted 91% for the merger. Approval by USAir 
shareholders was not required to complete the deal.
The reporter also noted that company employees who 
owned 8% of PSA through the employee stock ownership plan 
had voted overwhelmingly in favor of the merger. PSA 
Teamster employees voted 96% in favor while PSA pilots 
backed the plan 1 0 0%.
Later in the month of March, 1987, the headlines 
captured the political fervor that was taking place in the 
Teamsters organization as it related to the employees they 
represented. The news stories indicated that more than 
80% of PSA's 800 flight attendants having called for an 
election to replace the Teamsters union with the 
Association of Flight Attendants when the merger was 
completed. The National Mediation Board had certified 
that a majority of the airline's flight attendants signed 
cards requesting that an election be held to determine 
which union would represent the group.
Additionally a large number of PSA employees had
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Stockholders approve sale of PSA
  Ti*SuDU*U«lM/J«T7McCUrt
PS Group Inc. and Pacific Southwaat Airllnaa axacu* matting at tha Wattgata Hotai wttara tna acquisition or
vas shara tha rostrum during yestarday’s sharahddars tha San Dlago*baaad airllna by USAir was approv'd.
Figure 31. Shareholder's meeting at the Westgate Hotel in 
San Diego, California. San Diego Union, March 18, 1987, 
p. 7B.
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requested that the company stop withholding Teamsters 
union dues from their paychecks.
The Teamsters were being ousted! A grass roots 
effort to replace the Teamsters had begun when PSA 
employees were unable to get detailed information about 
the negotiations to modify the labor contracts. From the 
employees' perspective, the negotiations represented the 
most important talks of their careers and they were being 
locked out. In fact, employees had expressed their 
opinions to the union on several occasions since the 
merger was announced but had yet to receive a response.
A group of reservation agents, flight attendants, 
baggage handlers and ticket agents known as the "Committee 
for Fair Representation" had circulated a petition in 
January demanding that the Teamsters agree to the contract 
modification. The petition garnered the support of about 
one-third of the Teamster members at PSA.
Approximately 20% of the airline's flight attendants 
signed another petition in January demanding, under the 
Teamsters' bylaws, that a union meeting be held with the 
group. No meeting was held.
Furthermore, a group of 13 employees had sent a 
letter to the Teamsters' representatives demanding that 
the Teamster members be informed as to the issues agreed 
upon and unresolved. They threatened that the lack of 
immediate action on the part of the Teamsters union would 
give them no alternative but to consult with legal counsel
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in order to secure their rights under the law.
This unrest, which was felt and manifested by PSA 
employees, was realized by many special interest groups 
including, of course, the Association of Flight Attendants 
(see Figure 32). The AFA was, at the time, the majority 
union for the nation's flight attendants, representing 
some 23,000 workers on 14 airlines, including USAir. The 
AFA began gathering union election cards from a group of 
obviously disgruntled and confused employees. This was a 
time in which a new coalition could easily enter into an 
arena filled with emotionalism and possibly win the right 
to represent.
During the month of April, 1987, the press presented 
the PSA-USAir merger from a political lens. Like a 
suspense movie, the events that were published in April 
were highly climactic.
As the news was released about PSA's and PS Group's 
financial losses for the first quarter of 1987, and with 
the tension extremely high among interest groups, PSA 
employees were distracted.
Pacific Southwest Airlines had reported a $6.5 
million net loss and PS Group had reported a $7.3 million 
net loss for the first quarter of the year. During the 
same quarter the year before, PSA had lost $10.9 million 
and PS Group had lost $9.9 million. Even with lower fuel 
costs in January, February and March of 1987, and even 
with increased passenger traffic created by discount fare
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Assn. of Flight 
Attendants Seeks 
Election at PSA
By CROC JOHNSON. 
T im a S u tfW riU r
SAN DUDGO-The AMR. of Flight At­
tendant* union has aakod tho National 
Mediation Board to hold an election that 
could turn out Teamaters Union Local 2707 
aa the bargaining agent for Pacific South- 
weet Airlinee Inc.'* 935in-flight poraonneL 
The Taamatan local, which 
haa repreaemad the flight at- 
StM L. tendanta nnce 1990, would 
loao about 23% of P9A rank- 
—" and-fUe membership ahould 
AFA win the representation election. la 
addition to the flight attendants. Local 3T07 
alao represents 3JOOO PSA reoerrationa 
agent*, maintenance and operation* per­
sonnel.
The representation bid cornea juat aa 
USAir is trying to conclude iu  MOO-million 
acquisition of PSA. Disgruntled PSA flight 
attendants have been pushing their Team­
sters leader* to approve contract modifica­
tions being demanded by USAir u  part of 
its bid for PSA. according to union mem­
bers who ashed not to be named.
The contract sections USAir wants mod-
■firdiprotect employee income and 
grants unions extended represents- 
ix-tut rights should PSA be ac­
quired by another airline. PSA’s 
fiCO-plots, who are represented by 
the Mr Line Pilots Assa. and about 
50 employees represented by two 
.mahnr unions nave agreed to 
moddr their union contracts as 
iemarded by USAir.
•StaAar. PSA has been unable to 
negotiate contract modifications 
with the Teamsters, which repre- 
semgthe 929 flight attandanta. 931 
maintenance staff members, 1,04 
operation* staff mamban and 934 
reseerattonaagmta.
The failure to negotiate aa
agreement prompted a majority of 
PSA’s flight ■ « » * * to Ago 
petitions in January demanding 
that the Tetmetara agree to the
labor contract modiflcatione de­
manded by USAir. A group of PSA 
employs** calling thenueives the 
Committee for Fag Ppresentation 
circulated the petitions. which 
were mailed toTesrasute leaden.
The AFA is the majority union 
for the nation's flight attandantai it 
represents 23.000 workers on 14 
airlinee. including USAir. The AFA 
began gathering election cards af­
ter a group of disgruntled flight 
attendant* represented by the 
Teamsters "came to us and said 
they wanted to be onaidasd by
AFA." said AFA spokeswoman 
Judy Stack.
Perhaps 13% of PSA flight at­
tendants algned the carda. accord­
ing to an employoe who aakod not 
u> be identified.
A simple maiority vote would bo 
required to call aa election, and it 
would take a atmpto majority vote 
to turn out tho Teamsters, accord­
ing to an NMB spokesman. The 
NMB is inm cdng the election 
cards the AFA collected, but an 
election date will not be set until 
after the board datarminas wheth­
er the algnKurea on them are 
legitimate, the spokesman said 
Wednesday.
Figure 32. Association of Flight Attendants seeks 
election at PSA. Los Angeles Times/ March 23, 1987, p. 
10A.
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programs, operating costs were still high. PSA was 
weakening.
If the USAir takeover did not occur, PSA would be 
forced to substantially alter the course and scope of its 
business. A down sizing contingency plan was being
structured in the event that the deal went sour. PSA
would never be the same as it once was.
USAir and PSA had agreed that either party could
abandon the relationship if the merger was not concluded 
by April 30, 1987.
Time was running out. Although PSA had negotiated 
labor contract changes with its pilots and two smaller 
unions, negotiations with the Teamsters had broken off.
On Friday, April 17, 1987, the Pittsburgh Press headlined 
that the talks between PSA and the union had been stalled 
and that the merger was now in doubt (see Figure 33). The 
talks had collapsed essentially because the Teamsters had 
demanded that PSA set up a $5 million trust fund under 
the Teamsters' administration to provide severance 
benefits to employees who might not want to relocate after 
the merger. PSA offered to place $1.6 million into a fund 
that would be administered by independent trustees. 
Additionally, the Teamsters demanded that wages of PSA 
employees be increased to those of USAir employees in 
comparable positions. PSA executives concluded that the 
new demand was inappropriate.
Teamsters represented employees of PSA wanted to vote
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Union-PSA talks stalled; 
USAir merger in doubt
B y  B w n i n  K a h n
T h e  P i t t s b u r g h  f r n i
The chances of the USAir-Pacific 
Southwest Airlines merger falling 
through have increased because of a 
breakdown in negotiations between 
PSA management and its Teamsters 
union on contract changes mandated 
by USAir.
Talks stalled yesterday when PSA 
management rejected two condi­
tions set by Teamsters Local 2707 -  
-  which represents about 3.300 of 
PSA's 3.230 employees — for giving 
up its contrahtual right to represent 
PSA employees after the merger. No 
r.ew talks have been scheduled, and 
each side yesterdky called on the 
other to make a conciliatory move.
The Teamsters demanded that 
PSA set up a IS million trust fund,, 
under Teamsters’ administration, to 
provide severance benefits to em­
ployees wbo decide not to relocate 
alter the merger. PSA offered to put 
s l.o million into the fund, and insist­
ed that it be administered by three 
independent trustees.
Also, the Teamsters demanded 
that wages of PSA employees be 
increased to thoiafor USAir employ­
ees in comparable positions. A union 
spokesman yesterday said that was 
intended u  a "compromise" to its 
earlier demand'that PSA retroac­
tively restore the IS percent wage 
cuts that employees agreed to in 
1934 to make the airline more 
competitive.
Biit the company; which says the 
lower wages are vital to keeping 
PSA. competitive in the saturated 
West Coast market maintained that 
the new demand was more costly 
than the first one. “Our people called 
(talks) off when it became apparent 
we were getting nowhere on the
wage issue;” company spokesman 
Bill Haitinp said. .
I USAir has vowed to ealf off the 
1400 million PSA acquisition' if an 
: agreement with thaTeamstars is not 
reached by April 30. The merger 
already has been approved, by the 
federal government and PSA stock­
holders, aodPSA's other unions pre­
viously agreed to coatract changes 
requested by USAir.'
"We have met their demand." said 
Marvin Griswold, secretary-treasur- 
or of Local 2707; "to turn, what 
we’re saying is, Treat the PSA 
cmployeas the same as USAir em­
ployees.' All we're looking for is 
equality."
“We’ve given up some pretty sub­
stantial provisions to this Mint to 
make this deal happen," Griswold 
addad."We've beat over backwards 
to get to this point"
Griswold insisted he wants to see 
the merger completed, and denied 
accusations by some dissident Team- 
staisthat local officars were inter­
ested only in protecting their 
positions; “We're interested in seeing 
employeea treated fairly. There's 
nothing in it for us.” be said.
The dissident Teamsters, who call, 
themselves the Committee for Fair 
Representation, stepped up their op­
position yesterday after hearing 
about the breakdown la talks.
Group members, led by flight 
attendants, collected signatures 
from co-wornrs at several Califor­
nia airports on a petition demanding 
that union leaders drop their com­
pensation demands. Tha group 
claims a similar petition last month 
was sined by l.Sfld members; near­
ly half the union membership;
Figure 33. Union-PSA talks stalled. Pittsburgh Press, 
April 17, 1987, p. 6D.
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on the contract proposal as it stood from PSA's point of 
view. The union officials said that if the two provisions 
set down by the union were not met, then a vote could not 
be held. Furthermore, the union's proposal, inclusive of 
the two provisions, could delay the merger for at least 30 
days, putting the April 30 deadline to test.
In San Diego, the headlines stated that unhappy union 
members wanted the PSA contract offer put to a vote (see 
Figure 34). The union members and officials of the union 
were in enormous conflict. It was becoming crystal clear 
that the wants and needs of the followers were not being 
met; in fact, those wants and needs were being ignored. 
The Teamsters union was under severe pressure from its 
members to conclude the negotiations which were essential 
to the company's merger with USAir.
Finally, the Teamsters officials said that they would 
submit the company's final offer to a membership vote. 
The union's announcement, however, came as over fifty PSA 
Teamster represented employees picketed the Los Angeles, 
California office of Teamsters Local 2707 while 
simultaneously threatening to take legal action if the 
union continued to block the merger (see Figure 35). This 
was the first time in history that union represented 
employees picketed their own union!
With only one week left until the April 30 deadline, 
employees of PSA were in a turmoil that moved them to 
anger over the Teamsters' actions. The union members
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Unhappy Union Members Want 
PSA Contract Offer Put to Vote
By GREG JOHNSON. ll 'n ter
SAN DtEGO—a  group of dissident union 
members wants Teamsters L'non General 
President Jackie Presser to force Local 
2707 to submit Pacific Southwell Airlinee' 
latest contract proposal to a ratification 
election by PSA's 3.000 Teamaters-repre* 
sented employees.
The disgruntled Teamsters, 
some of whom on Tuesday 
picketed the Teamsters’ Los 
Angeles office building, "want 
the international leadership to 
be held accountable for what is happening” 
at PSA. according to Craig Schlose. an 
attorney who represents the group.
The call for a  special election followed 
Local 2707*1 decision not to submit PSA’s 
latest contract offer to a ratification else* 
uon unless PSA modifiss two ssctions that 
deal with a proposed severance pay and 
outplacement trust fund.
In a related development Wednesday 
n igh t PSA said it had received a counter* 
proposal from Local 2707. However. PSA 
spokesman Bill Hastings and Local 2707
Secretary*Treasurer Marvm L. Gnswold 
declined to comment on the contents of the 
Teamsters’offer.
The contract modifications being sought 
by PSA are important because USAir has 
pledged to abandon its S400*million bid for 
the San Oiego*based airline if PSA fails to 
negotiate the contract modificationa by 
Thursday.
The modified Teamsters contracts, cav. 
enng 3.000 PSA flight attendants, mcchan* 
ice. ground personnel and reservations 
agents, are the only remaining ban ter to 
the merger, according to Hastings:
Three other unions representing PSA 
employees earlier approved the needed' 
contract modificationa. Shareholders of 
PSA and PS Group, the airline's parent 
company, have voted to sell the airline. 
Federal and state regulators have given 
the merger the green light 
Earlier this week. Griswold said the local 
would need about a  menth to stage an 
al sat ian  * once PSA makes an "acceptable"
offer. Consequently. Gnswold raid 
Local 2707 has asked USAir and 
PSA to extend their merger agree* 
ment to make a vote possible.
PSA maintains that the Team* 
sters can complete an election 
during the seven days remaining 
before the deadline. Hastings said 
Thursday.
The disgruntled Teamsters are 
petitioning Presser because ” . . .  
he has the authority to call for an 
election." said Schlosa. who added 
that international unions have in 
the past tossed out local leadership 
"when it  aided the welfare of the 
membership."
Earlier on Thursday, a group of 
Teamstete picketed in front of the 
PSA ticket counter at Lindbergh 
Field in a show of support for Local 
2707*s leadership.
The Teamsters demonstrated for 
about half an hour because "we re 
tired of the flight attendants’ say­
ing that they're our spokesmen." 
according to one of the Teamsters.
Figure 34. Unhappy union members want PSA contract offer 
put to vote. San Diego Union. April 1987, p. 14A.




Ajsocuied P re u
Pacific Southwest Airlines Teamster* Los Angeles office to protest lack of prog-
represented employees picket the union's ress in contract negotiations.
Figure 35. PSA Teamster-represented employees protest 
latk of progress in contract negotiations. San Diego 
Union, April 1987, p. 9D.
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were placing constant pressure upon the Teamsters through 
aggressive communication and picketing.
Just one day before the deadline set by USAir, a 
tentative agreement had been reached between the Teamsters 
and PSA. As such, USAir group had agreed to push back the 
April 30 deadline to May 17, 1987 to allow for
ratification of the last minute agreement.
The stalemate was broken when the union removed from 
the bargaining table the request that PSA employees be 
given immediate wage parity with their counterparts at 
USAir. PSA employees earned 14% to 30% less for various 
jobs than workers at USAir. Comparable salaries, however, 
would be reached over a three year period. The April 30, 
1987 article of the Los Angeles Times (see Figure 36) 
details the events described.
Between May 1 - 1 7 ,  1987, while secret ballot voting 
was taking place by the 3,800 Teamster represented 
employees, a calm was in the air and a hopeful attitude 
prevailed among PSA employees. The anticipation was high 
since most employees felt that the voting process would be 
in favor of the contract changes.
The press waited. News tended to focus on the status 
of PS Group, particularly since the sale of the airline to 
USAir for $400 million would bring $280 million in cash to 
PS Group. Essentially, the PS Group would be a $594 
million company after the merger, involved in gas and oil 
exploration, airplane leasing and jet fuel sales.
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Union Accord 
Clears Way for 
Purchase of PSA
USAir Extends Deadline to 
Allow Teamsters Members 
to Ratify Contract Changes
By GREG JOHNSON.Timn Staf Writtr
SAN DIEGO—Pacific Southwcat Air­
line* and Teamsters Union Local 2707. 
which repnwnta 3.800 PSA employee*, 
reached tentative agreement Wednesday 
on tabor contract changes that clear the 
way for USAir Group to conclude ita 
*400-mUlion purchase at PSA.
The tentative agreement 
SflflL* cam* just one day before a 
COUMTY deadline set by USAir. which 1 had threatened to abandon the
deal if San Diego-baaed PSA faded to 
negotiate modificationa in labor contracts 
with union* representing 4800 of ita em­
ployees. USAir on Wednesday extended 
that deadline until May 17. USAir spokes­
man .David Shipley said, to allow time for 
Teamsters members to vote on the agree­
ment.
The contract changes were agreed to by 
the leaders of Local 2707 and now must be 
ratified by 3.800 Teamstsrs-represented 
PSA employees at 28 locationa in aix eta tee. 
The union is likely to hold the vote by 
eiephone in order to meet the May 17 
leadline. Local 2707 Secretary-Treasurer 
Marvin L. Griswold said Wednesday.
Pinal agreement by PSA and '.he Team- 
jters is the only possible roadblock :n the 
path of '.he merger. Three other unions 
representing PSA employees have already 
agreed to USAir's demands and airline 
shareholders and federal regulators have 
approved the sale.
The Teamsters have tentatively agreed 
to drop so-called “successor clauses” in 
four contracts covering PSA's flight at­
tendants. mechanics, station agents and 
reservations agents. The contracts had 
guaranteed that the union would continue 
to represent its members after a merger 
with USAir.
The Teamsters represent just 1.500 of 
USAir's 13.700 employees and it is now 
unlikely that the union will represent 
present PSA employees after they join 
USAir when the two carriers merge.
USAir's flight attendants are represent­
ed by the Assn. of Flight Attendants and its 
mechanics by the International Assn. of 
Machinists. USAir's baggage handlers, res­
ervations agents and ground personnel are 
not represented by unions.
In return for their agreement, the Team­
sters said they negotiated a 13.2-million 
trust fund that will make severance pay­
ments to employees of both PSA and USAir 
who do not accept out-of-town transfers 
brought about by the merger. The fund will 
also help pay for out-placement services.
‘SlghefleH sf
PSA employees were “breathing a col­
lective sigh of relief’ when word of the 
tentative agreement went out shortly after 1 p.m. Wednesday, according to Robi 
McCord, a ticket counter employee at John 
Wtyne Airport in Orange County. "This 
was the last major hurdle, the last monkey 
on our back, u  far aa this deal going 
through,” she said.
Figure 36. Union accord clears way for purchase of PSA. 
Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1987, p. 9A.
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As voting continued, the emotional drain upon PSA 
employees from three months of highly political 
negotiations carried forward. There were 92 meetings of 
union members held in 28 cities. The meetings were held 
to answer questions and to vote on the issue. Dialogue 
between the union and its members almost did not exist, 
especially since under the agreement the Teamsters 
relinquished contractual rights to represent PSA employees 
at USAir. This issue was the most hotly contested 
concession sought by the airline becuase it made the 
Teamsters a moot point, even though PSA employees would 
continue to be represented by the union until the two 
airlines were completely merged.
On the morning of May 18, 1987, the news revealed 
that the Teamsters voted in favor of merging with USAir. 
As outlined in Figure 37, the voting results showed that 
reservation agents had voted 350 to 67, flight attendants 
621 to 10 and station agents 934 to 155 to support the 
plan. A bit more surprising were PSA mechanics who voted 
388 to 377 for the merger, a difference of only 11 votes. 
Nonetheless, the PSA-USAir merger was supported.
The party had begun the night before at 10:45 p.m. 
when the results of the Teamsters' vote of the PSA-USAir 
merger were shouted out a hotel door. PSA employees 
waiting outside embraced each other and rushed to tell 
coworkers that the once shaky merger with USAir would fly 
after all.
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PSA Teamsters 
vote to support 
USAir merger
By Carl Larsen
Tribuat Aaisuat Firunail Editor
LOS ANGELES — Teamster employees of Pacific Southwest Airlines have 
cleared the way for PSA's 1400 million merger with USAir Group Inc, 
officials of the union said here this morning.
“It’s on,” said Marvin Griswold, secretary>treasurer of Local 2707 of the 
Teamsters Union, which represents 
PSA's flight attendants, mechanics, 
statioo and reservations agents.
Approval by the union removed 
the last hurdle to the merger, which 
is expected to be completed on May 
29.
A vote count on the merger tallied 
here lata last night showed union 
members overwhelmingly in support 
of the deal which w u  first an­
nounced last Dec. 9.
The Teamster balloting, conducted 
at union meetings beginning May 4, 
showed a vote UM in favor of the 
merger agreement and 109 against, a 
spokesman for the union sail
PSA has 3,400 Teamster employ* 
ees out of a work force of 5.700.
Victory, however, was not as easi­
ly gained as final vote tallies indi­
cate.
While the cumulative Teamster 
vote was strongly in support of the 
merger, balloting by PSA mechanics 
nearly threatened to put the deal in 
jeopardy.
The mechanics voted 380-377 for 
the merger, a difference of 11 votes 
that couid have denied approval to 
the deal since support was needed 
from each of the four Teamster bar­
gaining groups.
Other groups represented by the 
Teamsters voted solidly for the 
merger. The results showed reserva­
tion agents voted 330-67. flight attendants 621-10 and station agents 934-133 to 
support the plan.
' We're very pleased by the support shown by our employees for this 
acquisition.’’ said Paul C. Barkley. PSA chairman. “The acquisition of PSA by 
USAir Group is a tremendous opportunity for PSA and its employees to be a 
vital part of a major carrier in this industry."
The merger of San Diego-based PSA and USAir of Arlington, Va, earlier 
had won quick approval from the federal Department of Transportation and 
from PSA's three other unions.
Word of the Teamsters approval quickly passed outside from the room in 
the Hyatt Hotel near Los Angeles International Airport where the ballots 
were counted.
“We got it!” yelled ooe jubilant PSA employee who had been awaiting the 
outcome.
Figure 37. PSA Teamsters vote to support USAir merger.
San Diego Tribune, May 18, 1987, p. 7B.
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First on someone's list was USAir Chairman Edwin 
Colodny. One flight attendant asked for his phone number 
so that she could be one of the first to inform her new 
boss that Colodny had just bought an airline.
As the champagne flowed in the hotel room set aside 
for the occasion, PSA employees on the Committee for Fair 
Representation reflected on their effort to push through 
the USAir merger in the union vote. Much of the 
admiration and credit went to Carol Austin, an up until 
then unnoticed leader of the group and a PSA flight 
attendant. Shouts came from across the room to include, 
"You saved by job," and, "We're employed because of you." 
Austin was the initiator of forming the Committee for Fair 
Representation.
After May 18, 1987, news articles regarding PSA
dramatically subsided. San Diego's hometown airline was 
merged with USAir Group, Inc. It was suddenly business as 
usual.
The San Diego Union of May 29, 1987 pictured PSA 
ticket agents at work at the counter they then shared with 
USAir at Lindbergh Field (see Figure 38).
One more story was written about the PSA smile on 
June 17, 1987 in the San Francisco Chronicle (see Figure 
39) . This article summarized that PSA would lose its 
corporate identity in January of 1988, but that the grin 
would remain for awhile.
Once the highly political activities of the change
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PSA ticket agents Paul Barden, left, and Terry Lewis Lindbergh Reid. PSA employees are responsible for pro­
work the new counter they now share with USAir at cessing passengers on USAir's two daily (lights.
Figure 38. PSA ticket agents share counter with USAir. 
San Diego Union, May 29, 1987, p. 9B.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
173
PSA Planes May 
Keep on Smiling
PSA will I os# its identity next January, 
but the airline’s planes will probably keep 
on smiling.
According to an executive of PSA's new 
parent, USAir, the familiar grin wtil remain on 
all the plana even after they are repainted with 
USAir's logo.
The word coma u  USAir prepara to begin 
running ads tomorrow boosting Its recent pur 
chaie of the San Otegobaeod. airline with the 
slogan, "Introducing the sta ta  of our union." 
PSA will be operated as an Independent subsid­
iary of USAir until yearead.
Brian Dwyer, USAir's vice president of sala 
and advertising, also said USAir won't reduce
the frequent schedules operated by 
PSA.
Analysu say USAir is smart not 
to tinker with PSA's established 
trademarks — its smile and fre­
quency of flights.
USAir still faces plenty of chal­
lenges, though. Its mam one Is to 
find a  way to compete with the  
huge automated reservations sys­
tems of United and American, its 
archrivals on Bay Area-to-Loc Ange­
l a  flights.
USAir is studying options that 
include crating its own computer 
system to tam ing up with an air­
line that airetdy owns one, such as 
Trans World Airlines. It will be Itn 
years before a dochion Is made-'  'S- 
Alrsald.
Figure 39. PSA planes may keep on smiling. San Francisco 
Chronicle, June 17, 1987, p. 6A.
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event curtailed, so did the press coverage. The press 
viewed the change event predominantly from a political 
lens. The dramatic halting of news coverage after the 
political fervor stopped would suggest that the external 
mechanisms for articulating this change provided primarily 
political snapshots of the event.
The Programmatic Processes 
This researcher was the primary initiator, designer 
and implementer of this third leg in the overall five 
legged change strategy. The researcher believed that 
some intervention would be absolutely vital with the 
managers of PSA so that development, knowledge, education, 
skill building, technique building and understanding of 
the change could take place. Without this education and 
understanding the running of the business during the six 
month transition period would be in jeopardy, productivity 
would plummet, and the possibility of the merger not 
taking place at all could result.
As a member of the change strategy planning team, 
this researcher presented and persuaded all other members 
of the team that it was in all our best interests to 
invest in a custom designed program for all PSA's 
managemers and leaders. The program was geared toward how 
to lead in changing times; as such, the program was 
called "Leading in Changing Times."
The program was written and designed exclusively by 
the researcher. The one day workshops were facilitated
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solely by the researcher during March, April and May of 
1987. A total of 16 one day sessions were conducted with 
at least 30 to 35 participants in each class. Classes 
were held in hotel meeting rooms in San Diego, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco, California. Essentially, all 
PSA exempt managers attended.
The objective of this intervention was to help PSA 
managers not only so the business would continue to run, 
but so that managers would not feel the stresses, 
pressures, and frustrations that are associated with the 
type of change that a merger process inevitably causes. 
Furthermore, this type of forum could greatly assist the 
managers in seeing the change from a broader perspective. 
To spend a full eight hour day with colleagues in a 
structured intervention was a time out from the day-to-day 
uncertainty at work which would encourage managers to help 
themselves and their employees to see the change from as 
many lenses as possible. It was an attempt to broaden 
their knowledge base and their thinking about the event 
that impacted them so much. Due to the fact that PSA 
truly cared about its people and its business, the program 
was unanimously approved.
The overall change strategy was building multiple 
lenses. This intervention had value especially when it is 
viewed collectively with the other interventions 
instituted at PSA to help its employees. A building block 
approach to broadening views was shaping.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
176
This section of the qualitative case study describes 
the basic beliefs of this researcher as it relates to the 
programmatic process, the needs analysis which was 
conducted in order to design the programmatic process, and 
the content of the programmatic process itself.
The Basic Beliefs
Several basic beliefs on the part of this researcher 
prevailed in this change category. At a time when change 
was becoming a way of corporate life, human resource 
executives must learn to support their clients in 
understanding the dynamics of change. While there are 
many well-developed approaches to managing complex change 
such as a merger or acquisition on a rational or systems 
level, what was missing were equivalent actions from 
other change models that help affected individuals stay on 
track in an efficient and productive way.
In response to this perceived need, a collection of 
ideas had been formulated which could be used to help 
individuals as well as organizational systems cope with 
changes as they take place and recover from major changes 
more quickly once the changes are in place. If human 
resource approaches can help make change more 
understandable and less fearful, employees may in turn 
have more incentive to focus on the opportunities that the 
change offers rather than on the resistance uncertainty 
often engenders.
One of the basic beliefs that this researcher holds
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is that any change experience has elements of 
predictability. From day to day, individuals may find 
themselves oscillating between positive and optimistic 
views of the change to views that lead to feeling 
overwhelmed, helpless and unproductive. This period of 
passive or aggressive acceptance or resistance depends 
upon numerous factors including (1) the degree to which 
the change takes a person by surprise or places one in an 
uncertain or unfamiliar situation, (2) the degree to which 
the clarity of expectations about the outcome of the 
change are expressed, and (3) the degree to which data and 
information about the change is made available. In any 
event, one can easily predict that most people will 
naturally need to flow through some transition period.
Another basic belief was that when strategies are 
implemented which broaden the understanding of those being 
impacted by the change, then the time of resistance, 
uncertainty and unproductiveness can be shortened.
Lastly, and very specifically, this researcher 
believed that if eight distinct ideas come together in a 
structured intervention, a person can lead other people 
and the organization more effectively through change. 
Those eight ideas are:
1. Managers and leaders must fully grasp that 
change is an integral and significant part of the way they 
manage and lead.
2. Often, organizational changes are triggered by
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
178
some event or action and can therefore be predicted.
3. There are natural human resisters to change, 
which if understood could be instrumental in helping 
managers through change and in helping managers help their 
subordinates through change.
4. There are so many change events in our lives
that we must learn to prioritize them.
5. Managers need to learn not only how people will
react to change, but also to learn how to recognize
reactions of people having difficulty going through 
change.
6 . Managers and leaders can increase their
effectiveness if they know how to overcome resistance to 
change.
7. If managers have clarity as to what their 
company expects from them in times of change, uncertainty 
will be significantly diminished.
8 . There are change implementing actions that can 
be taken during changing times which can favorably 
influence productivity.
Each one of the previous eight ideas alone or 
separately do not necessarily have overwhelming merit. 
All of the eight ideas interrelated to one another, 
collectively, presents a powerful framework from which to 
design a programmatic process. The programmatic process 
also, however, needs to encompass the perceived needs of 
the learner.
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The Needs Analysis
There were approximately 500 supervisors, managers 
and directors at PSA during the time of this case study. 
In general, a supervisor is defined as someone whose staff 
members are primarily front line, contract or nonexempt, a 
manager is someone whose staff members are primarily 
supervisory or exempt, and a director's staff consists of 
managers. This population of PSA's managers and leaders 
was the target audience for the programmatic process being 
discussed.
The researcher determined that it would be very 
helpful to the design of the program if some feedback 
could be collected about what concerns the managers were 
having with the change, what difficulties they were 
experiencing while adjusting to the change, what 
difficulties their people were having and what resources 
and information might be valuable to them.
A series of informal discussion groups were formed so 
that some feedback could be received and ultimately 
incorporated into the design of the workshop. The purpose 
of the discussion groups was not intended to have been 
quantitative in nature nor highly scientific in scope. 
Rather, the discussion groups were intended to provide a 
feedback loop and an input opportunity so that the design 
of the course would be on track to the learners' needs as 
much as possible.
Three discussion groups were scheduled with eight,
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seven and ten members, respectively. The researcher was 
the group facilitator.
The meetings started with an objective which was 
simply to gain insight into how the change process was 
being viewed. Specifically, the managers were asked to 
respond to four open ended, discussion questions:
1. What concerns do you have as managers and 
leaders of PSA about the merger?
2. What difficulties are you experiencing while 
adapting to the change?
3. What difficulties are your people having while 
adapting to the change?
4. What resources and information might be valuable 
to you and your people to better adapt to the change?
Functioning in an advisory group role, the group 
members openly expressed their views regarding these 
questions while the researcher recorded responses on a 
flip chart and in field notes. Each meeting lasted 
approximately two hours. Comments were extracted from the 
flip charts and field notes which reflected common theme 
responses.
With respect to the concerns the manager had about 
the merger, a common response was: "What concerns me most
about the merger is that we were not prepared enough in 
order to help our employees overcome the resistance to the 
change. It is our role to assist our employees in 
accepting this shocking reality that PSA will no longer
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exist. It concerns me that there was no plan, or no 
training to allow us to function better as change agents. 
There was no attempt made to prepare a plan. Without a 
plan, it's difficult to see the steps that will be taken 
to get us to the end result. We need that preparation."
Another common response was: "What concerns me is
that I don't know what I'm supposed to do, what 
expectations the senior management of PSA and USAir have 
for me. I don't understand my role in the change. I know 
my job and what's expected of me there, but I don't know 
my job as it relates to the merger."
As to the question related to the difficulties the 
managers were experiencing while adapting to the change, 
the following comments are representative of collective 
feedback: "The difficulty I am having is the culture
shock. I am saddened that PSA, my company, will be gone. 
All of my career I have worked hard for PSA and now PSA 
will be gone, melted into some entity called USAir which I 
know nothing about. I am emotionally upset that PSA, the 
smile, the personality, the family will be no more." 
Other managers said: "The difficulty I am having is my
own resistance to the change. I am resisting the 
unfamiliar and trying to hang on to what I know. USAir is 
unfamiliar."
When asked about the perceived difficulty that the 
manager's staff people were having with the change, 
comments centered around: "My people don't know who is
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telling the truth about the change. The company has 
started an aggressive communication plan and the union is 
saying other things. Rumors are rampant and no one knows 
what to believe or who to believe in. Their difficulty is 
with sorting out all that is said from the PSA USAir 
Merger Update, to conversations in crew lounges, to 
remarks from union representatives. When anyone gets 
opposing information, it causes mistrust. I really don't 
think our employees know who to trust. That alone causes 
discomfort and confusion."
Other significant feedback focused once again on the 
identity issues associated with PSA becoming USAir. "My 
employees are unplugged. Their identity is so wrapped up 
in this airline that not being tied to PSA is frightening 
for them. Most of my people have been here for a long 
time. Their difficulty rests with the fact that it feels 
like a death or a divorce or something. They are 
mourning; yet there is an anxious curiosity formulating as 
to USAir."
The discussion which took place as to what resources 
or information would be most helpful to managers and 
subordinates alike was overwhelmingly consistent, and the 
remarks went like this: "We need some training to learn
how to deal with all of this. We don't have any 
experience with mergers so we can't wing it on past 
experience. We need help in understanding the how tos of 
this type of circumstance. We want to act and feel in
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charge, not act and feel like we've been betrayed. With 
so many mergers and acquisitions taking place in the 
United States today, it would seek like there would be 
something out there to help us. We need tools!"
Other common responses about resources can be 
summarized in this remark: "We need information on the
whys. Why are we reacting this way? What is it about the
nature of the change which makes us feel so lost for
awhile? Why do we naturally try to blame everyone else for
what we think is an unfortunate thing. We need to
understand how other people in similar situations 
reacted. If I understood why I am feeling so 
uncomfortable, I could help myself and my staff. If we 
don't get these answers, we'll remain frustrated."
In addition to these sample responses, many other 
views were expressed which had a tendency to duplicate 
the remarks presented here. From a program design point 
of view, this researcher gleaned that managers needed to 
feel more prepared, they needed to have a better 
understanding of what was expected of them during this 
change cycle, they needed to experience the loss, learn 
how to overcome resistance to change, help employees 
evaluate contradictory or conflicting information, and 
basically understand the reason why people react to change 
the way that they do. Furthermore, they wanted and needed 
training which focused exclusively around the issues of 
change.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
184
The last part of the needs analysis was to get some 
brief feedback from senior vice presidents about what they 
expected from the management team during the transition 
period acquisition. Phone calls were made to five senior 
vice presidents of PSA. The researcher advised these 
people that a program was being developed and requested 
that they give their thoughts, from their point of view, 
as to what they expected from middle management during 
this turbulent time. The feedback received centered 
around expected behaviors dealing with cooperativeness, 
open mindedness, competence, teamwork and aggressively 
selling the benefits of the change.
The senior vice president of operations felt that: 
"Cooperation is critical in times like this. You can 
agree and cooperate or you can disagree and cooperate. 
You can't not cooperate. Especially when the change is of 
such magnitude, you have to have cooperation."
The vice president of inflight services stated: 
"Along with having an open mind about all that is 
changing, the employees still must do their job and be 
competent. It's hard not to presuppose what will or will 
not happen, but it's a waste of time. I expect my 
managers to be open minded and competent. They need to 
focus on doing their jobs."
Feedback received from the vice president of customer 
services centered around teamwork: "We're all in this
together. We have to pull together as a team, working
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together to keep the airline running. Meanwhile, we have 
to enthusiastically sell the deal. Our employees need to 
see us supporting this merger, not just supporting but 
energetically supporting! That will advocate teamwork."
This feedback was integrated into the design of the 
"Leading in Changing Times" program, particularly since it 
was an expressed need from the management discussion 
groups that expectations be presented and discussed.
This needs analysis was extremely beneficial from two 
perspectives. First, the researcher met her objectives of 
getting input and feedback about the perceptions of the 
change to incorporate into the intervention, and second, 
the process of obtaining the input and feedback itself 
demonstrated a desire to listen and expressed concern and 
care about the point of view of PSA's managers.
The feedback, coupled with the basic beliefs 
previously discussed, established a solid framework from 
which to design and implement a programmatic process 
dealing with how to manage and lead in times of change.
The Programmatic Process Content
The program entitled "Leading in Changing Times" was 
a specific action which PSA executives took to help 
facilitate the change event at PSA. The program included 
introductory components, eight key subjects and extensive 
summary remarks and debriefing dialogue. Additionally, 
each participant was encouraged to build an action plan 
surrounding the material they had learned during the day.
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In the introduction to the program, the issue of 
studying change was addressed. In other words, the 
basic purpose of the program, besides the obvious purpose, 
to help PSA employees handle the merger better, was to 
clarify the significance of studying change in the 
business arena. From a more global perspective, change 
should be studied for three reasons. First, the magnitude 
and amount of change that managers experience in their 
personal and professional lives are overwhelming. The 
rate at which change influences us is far greater and 
faster than ever before.
Second, the price tag associated with ineffectively 
managing change is significant. Loss of productivity is 
inevitable during transition, and loss of productivity has 
a price.
Lastly, a key purpose for studying change is so 
managers can better prepare themselves for change, so that 
managers can be in a position of choice, not chance. A 
strategic business philosophy of choice not chance, or 
proactivity not reactivity, is often more productive for 
the organization as well as its members.
Then the objectives of the program were reviewed. 
These objectives reflected both the basic beliefs of the 
researcher as well as the input from the managers' 
discussion groups. The objectives were:
1. To realize that managers and leaders must 
recognize change as a part of how they manage and lead.
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2. To understand that change events are triggered 
and are therefore, predictable.
3. To identify four natural human resisters to
change.
4. To know that change events must be prioritized.
5. To learn how the manager's will react in times
of change.
6 . To learn skills associated with overcoming
resistance to change.
7. To understand what PSA expects from managers in 
changing times.
8 . To review a change implementation planning
guide.
As a warm up activity, managers were asked to break 
into small groups of 4 or 5 members each. A discussion 
took place which focused on such questions as: "How did
you and your employees find out about the merger of USAir 
and PSA?" "How did your employees react?" "How could 
this change event been handled more smoothly?" and, "What 
do you intend to do to ensure that the transition goes 
well?"
Heated discussion typically ensued wherein venting of 
emotions and frustration came out. The discussions were 
debriefed and the key points were recorded on flip charts. 
Having frustrated feelings surface at the beginning of the 
session helped to diffuse the need to do so all throughout 
the day. Attention could now be directed more positively
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to the content of the course and the information it 
provided.
Next, the point was made that oftentimes we view 
change as something that happens to us or something that 
is put upon us. This is the kind of change that can leave 
us feeling helpless or victimized. Change, however, can 
be viewed from more than just one dimension. Change can 
be viewed from four dimensions. As indicated in Figure 
40, there are four change quadrants.
Quadrant 1 represents those change events internal to 
you. You, or someone else, have identified a behavior 
which you would like to change, for instance, stopping the 
habit of smoking cigarettes, losing weight, being more 
positive, improving your coaching skills, making an effort 
to delegate more, or deciding to become more educated 
about an important issue.
Quadrant 2 represents those change events that happen 
externally but impact you. The person has identified 
something that is changing in one's environment which 
influences the person. Examples of these types of changes 
include getting a new boss, your house burns down, you 
experience a death of a loved one, a good friend moves 
away to another city, a new community leader is appointed, 
or your company gets acquired. Quadrant 2 is the most 
common perspective of change.
Quadrant 3 represents those change events that are 
internal to others. The person has identified a behavior












You have identified a 
behavior you would 
like to change.
Someone else has 
identified a behavior 
in you that you 
would like to 
change.
You have identified a behavior 
in a significant other that you 
would like for them to change.
You have identified something 
that is changing in your 
environment that will impact you.
You have instigated a change in 
an environment that will impact 
other(s).
Figure 40. The four change quadrants.












in a significant other that needs changing. Examples of 
these types of changes include, helping a child improve 
study habits, encouraging a spouse to control his temper, 
assisting a subordinate to develop a new skill, counseling 
a colleague about his or her writing skills, or supporting 
employees in the transition phase of a merger or 
acquisition.
Quadrant 4 represents those change events that occur 
externally, initiated by you and which have an influence 
on others. An individual instigates a change in the 
environment which impacts others. For instance, you 
design and implement a new policy or procedure, you 
initiate a new work flow to improve productivity, you 
start a remodeling project on your home which impacts your 
family, you make a decision to cut costs by letting staff 
members go, or you make a new revenue goal for your sales 
team.
Not all change occurs from the perspective of 
Quadrant 2. In fact, every change that happens has a 
requirement for a multidimensional view.
Participants were then asked to think about the 
acquisition of PSA by USAir and create a personal, 
practical application to each quadrant of change (Figure 
41) . The questions the managers were asked to answer 
were:
1. Quadrant 1: What two behaviors related to the
merger do you want to change?
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Figure 41. Practical application questions as they relate 
to the quadrants of change.
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2. Quadrant 2: What two changes are happening in
your life/environment that impact you as a result of the 
merger?
3. Quadrant 3: What behaviors related to the
merger would you like a significant other to change?
4. Quadrant 4: What decisions have you recently
made concerning the merger which have impacted others?
Now that participants had a better understanding of 
the dimensions of change, the researcher felt it was 
important that they also understand that leaders must 
recognize change as a part of how they lead. A discussion 
was initiated to have the group differentiate between 
management and leadership. A group list was built with 
words describing management and another list was built 
with words describing leadership. This stimulating 
discussion led to the conclusion that leaders are 
initiators of change. Leaders tend to operate very easily 
in Quadrant 4, where initiation is commonplace. This 
conclusion led to a broader understanding of the role of a 
change agent and its relationship to leadership.
Typically, change action occurs as a result of some 
other action that occurred in the internal or external 
environment. Not all change happens just for the sake of 
changing. Particularly in the business community, there 
are so many existing, influencing factors that require an 
organization to change, to shift or to renew itself. This 
is an important point to understand so that people do not
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have the tendency to think that someone is "doing change 
on them or to them." For example, the external
environment in the airline industry had an immense impact 
on the fact that PSA was purchased. The profit picture 
for the company was dismal, competitive pressures were 
increasingly strong and even customer needs influenced the
purchase of PSA by USAir. Most significantly, the
acquisition mania wherein many of the mega carriers were 
buying up the smaller carriers made PSA an ant in an 
elephant field. The elephants, because of their 
vast resources, could simply take a step and crush an ant 
such as PSA. Smaller carriers were getting strength by 
becoming parts of the larger giants. Most notable was the 
acquisition of AirCal by American Airlines. This move was 
a crucial one in that it left PSA alone in a marketplace 
consumed by elephants such as American and United
airlines. The ability for PSA to continue to compete in 
an arena were giants existed was very slim. All one would 
have to do would be to compare the advertising budgets of 
each of these carriers to realize that PSA could not reach 
its customer base in the same way that the mega carriers 
could. Getting a larger market share would be next to 
impossible for PSA, let alone trying to retain existing 
market share.
It is valuable to spend time looking at the factors 
that existed within the external environment so that a 
more educated vision could be developed as to why this
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change was happening and, in a sense, why it was bound to 
happen.
Equally important, it is valuable to look at the 
changes that can take place internally in an organization 
that can often trigger more change. For instance, factors 
such as staff people changes, product changes, 
technological changes and more are quite often triggers 
that more change is in the wind.
A full analysis and discussion took place as a group 
where the identification of both external and internal 
factors were listed which may have had influence on the 
fact that PSA was ultimately purchased. Examples of 
factors that were listed under the heading of "External" 
were changes in government, regulations, competition, 
economic conditions, laws and more. Examples of factors 
that were listed under the heading of "Internal" were 
changes in profit and loss, product, technology, people, 
pricing and more.
So far, a kind of unfreezing process had taken place 
in the classroom. The intervention was designed to start 
out with time for expressing views, venting, acknowledging 
feelings and simply talking about what was on the minds of 
the managers. This unfreezing was structured to focus on 
building an understanding of the merger and about the 
subject of organizational change itself.
The next segment of the program delved into a 
description and discussion of some of the natural human
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resisters to change. Two of these ideas will now be 
presented as examples of human resisters to change, 
although several were actually presented in the 
intervention.
First, an idea was introduced called "scotoma." 
Scotoma is a term used in the field of medicine, 
specifically in the area of optometry and ophthalmology. 
The word literally means a dimness of vision or a blind or 
dark spot in the visual field. Using this idea 
metaphorically, the researcher discussed whether or not 
people can have psychological scotomas about change. 
Typically, a very stimulating discussion resulted around 
this metaphor. In all cases the participants decided that 
people tend to want to be attached to that which is 
familiar to them as opposed to that which is not familiar 
to them. As soon as something unfamiliar is introduced, 
in this case USAir, scotoma is likely to occur. It's as 
if scotoma were a natural human resister to accepting 
change and something that prevents us from accepting 
change. Various people in the class openly gave examples 
of personal scotomas and usually the group members found 
themselves laughing and smiling at the prevalence of 
humans to have scotoma. It allowed managers to see a 
potential reason why we sometimes are not quick to be 
accepting of change. Our own human scotoma, our own 
desire to want to be attached to the familiar, our own way 
of myopically seeing the world sets us up to be resisters 
of change. That point alone was useful to the group
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members because having recognized the idea of scotoma, it 
allowed them to now move on as well as to better assist 
their staff members if they too were feeling any scotoma.
Another idea which was presented as a natural 
resister to change was called "protectors." The idea was 
that people have a tendency to want to protect themselves 
when they get in situations that are unfamiliar or new to 
them. Protectors are really ways in which we tend to 
camouflage our perceived weaknesses.
One way that we can protect ourselves is by 
compensating. Compensation is basically an idea that 
suggests that if a person is not skilled in one area or is 
not familiar with an area, that person may tend to 
compensate for that weakness by excelling in another area. 
An example of compensation might be if a person is not 
skilled at statistics, he or she may tend to excel in 
subjects pertaining to the arts. Another example might be 
that if a person a not familiar with USAir as a company, 
he or she may tend to gravitate strongly to PSA. 
Compensation is a way that we can protect ourselves from 
having to change.
Another protector that people may exhibit is called 
displacement. If a person is unfamiliar or uncomfortable 
with something, or even uncertain about something, he or 
she may want to give it to someone else, or displace it, 
so he or she does not have to own it; thus, protecting 
the person from accepting whatever it is that is making
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that person feel uncertain. An example of displacement 
might be if someone gets lost on the road while trying to 
get to a place that is new and unfamiliar, he or she may 
take it out on the person he or she is with. The person 
may displace that feeling so as to be protected. Another 
example might be that if a person is in a state of high 
ambiguity about the status of his or her job as a result 
of a merger or acquisition, he or she may tend to take it 
out on, or displace it to, his or her significant other.
The ideas of compensation and displacement as 
examples of protectors were discussed in the workshop. 
Participants were extremely open about their own examples 
of when and how they compensated or displaced in order to 
protect themselves. A great deal of discussion, of course, 
centered around the merger. The atmosphere at this point 
in time in the seminar was always open, fun, and light; 
yet awareness was shaping in the minds of the managers 
about the potential, natural, human resisters to change.
After managers developed an understanding about the 
natural human resisters to change, the program moved to 
talking about the value of prioritizing change events. We 
all experience so many changes in our lives, it is 
important that we view those changes in some priority 
fashion.
In this section of the program, some classic time 
management ideas were presented and discussed, after which 
participants had the opportunity to break into a short
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workshop where they identified, prioritized and developed 
an action plan on many of the specific changes that were 
happening in the merger process.
After the small group workshops and after 
participants returned from lunch, it was time to delve 
into the subject of how people tend to react when change 
is announced.
The main idea of this section of the seminar was to 
create an understanding that most people do not just 
accept change and begin their day as if the past never 
happened. Usually, people have a need to end, or 
establish closure, before they are able to move on to 
other things. This closure is a time of mourning that was 
brought out by one manager in the needs analysis group 
discussions. It is a time to deal with the loss of what 
was. During this time of ending, people may have a need 
to rediscover while simultaneously adjusting to the 
reality that that which was familiar will no longer be. 
This time of ending is particularly important in cases 
where change is extreme such as in the death in the 
family, a divorce or a merger or acquisition.
Next, before people can begin, they must have some 
time to make a transition. Since a feeling of 
disorientation is likely to exist, it is crucial to allow 
time for making a transition out of the old and into the 
new. Disorientation can be great during a transition 
since the old is gone but the new is not yet here.
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Lastly, a beginning can evolve. This is the time 
where receptivity tends to be high and testing of the 
waters takes place. Then, and usually only then, can 
acceptance of the change really happen.
After these ideas were presented, another open 
discussion was stimulated where individuals began to give 
examples of situations in which they had to first end, 
then make a transition before they could begin something 
else. These personal examples were the practical 
applications that are often necessary in order to have 
learning and understanding take place. Examples that were 
given from participants also included instances where 
their employees had difficulty with these stages and they 
had expected them to simply begin, without time or 
attention to the ending and the transition.
The discussion in all cases brought out two 
significant points. First, managers have a need to evolve 
through each of these phases. They have a requirement to 
experience the loss, make a transition out of the old and 
into the new, and then begin with an attitude of 
acceptance and ownership. Second, managers discovered 
that they had been impatient with their employees when 
they did not simply begin anew when changes were 
announced. They now realized that that attitude was not 
acceptable. To have an expectation that employees simply 
accept everything that happens, including a merger of 
their company by USAir, is not at all realistic. What is
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realistic is to work together to evolve through the phases 
of accepting change which include time to end and time to 
make a transition.
The discussion continued when managers were asked to 
break into small groups and develop a list of signals or 
behaviors that were likely to be exhibited when a person 
is going through the ending phase, the transition phase 
and the beginning phases.
During a debriefing discussion of results from the 
small groups, typical signals and behaviors that managers 
thought people would manifest were behaviors such as 
anger, tardiness, lack of interest, withdrawal, anxious 
curiosity, and more. After this discussion, the people 
were asked to regroup in the same small groups to identify 
what responses would be most appropriate for each of the 
signals and behaviors exhibited in each phase; ending, 
transition and beginning.
Responses tended to be specific to each phase and 
included remarks such as listening and clarifying, 
informing, supporting, encouraging, getting others 
involved, and more.
The researcher believed that this section of the 
intervention was important in that it exclusively offered 
ideas pertaining to how people can react to change, what 
that reaction is likely to look like, and, most 
importantly, what a manager could do to help facilitate 
staff members' responses to the change.
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Now that some conclusions could be drawn as to how 
people often react to change, the next logical subject 
matter of the program was overcoming resistance to change. 
In this segment, some very specific ideas were presented 
concerning techniques to structure an interaction with an 
individual or a small group to explain a change in a way 
that minimizes resistance.
In a classic systems organic way, five steps were 
described as a tactical approach to a change discussion. 
Additionally, a planning guide of questions was presented 
as a tool to use before one engaged in the actual 
interaction.
To communicate a planned change, one should first 
understand what specifically will change and why. This 
information is needed so a manager can make a meaningful 
analysis of the change prior to it being communicated. 
Some suggested questions to trigger a good analysis are:
1. What are the problems that this change is 
designed to solve?
2. What will exactly change?
3. Specifically, how will people be affected by 
this change?
4. What questions or objections might people have 
about this change?
5. How will you as a manager respond to those 
questions and objections?
In small groups, the group came up with answers to
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these analysis questions as they pertained to the merger 
of PSA and USAir.
Next, the steps to follow for the communication were 
introduced as a possible structure or road map to follow.
1. Describe why the change is needed and the 
specific changes that will be required.
2. Ask for reactions from the person or the group 
to determine where they are at and what is on their minds.
3. Clear up any misunderstandings or questions and 
acknowledge any objections that were made.
4. Ask for any ideas on how to make the change go 
as smoothly as possible.
5. Ask for the support and commitment from the 
person or the group for the change effort.
6. Follow through by monitoring the plan and 
reinforcing the progress.
When a change is announced, people have a tendency to 
ask themselves: "How does this affect me?" If the
manager addresses this concern with specific, honest 
information, it can help to reduce uncertainty and 
mistrust. People tend to be more receptive to change when 
they understand the logical reasons and the thinking 
behind it. This also starts people thinking about what 
they have to do to make the change successful.
Explaining a change and its impact is not just a show 
and tell exercise. Because change temporarily disrupts 
and complicates things, people need access to the right
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information if they are to respond positively to change. 
They need an opportunity to ask questions and get answers, 
not just be talked at. The researcher suggested to the 
managers that when they ask for reactions to a change, 
they should create an atmosphere of openness. By 
listening to what employees have to say, the manager can 
help them feel more involved in the change, and find out 
about any concerns or misunderstandings. In doing this, 
the manager communicates that airing concerns is 
acceptable. Even if nothing new surfaces, the fact that 
the manager really listened to people's thoughts and 
feelings goes a long way to building trust. Listening can 
make the road to change, if not free of bumps, at least 
smoother than it might be otherwise.
Thorough understanding requires an exchange of 
feelings and ideas. People's concerns must be actively 
recognized and directly answered. If they are not and 
people do not have the right information, they cannot do 
their best even when they want to be helpful. Worse, 
people sometimes prepare themselves to resist a change 
because they lack information and anticipate the worst. 
They need enough of the right information to be able to 
work constructively with the change.
It is vital to get people thinking and talking about 
what they can do to make the change work. Once managers 
have discussed their views and all the rationale behind 
the change, a bias for action will help avoid unproductive
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deliberation. Also, because the best ideas often are held 
by the employees who actually do the work on the front 
line, many a required change may be saved from sure 
failure by front line leaders who are willing to tap and 
use their employees' ideas and suggestions.
Effective management is a give and take relationship. 
Preparing people to work through change is no exception. 
If a manager has carefully walked through the change 
requirements and thoughtfully responded to the employees' 
needs, the manager will be more prepared to offer support 
and commitment. The key is to ask for it, not demand it 
or assume the employees will go along because they have no 
choice. Asking for support can establish a binding 
understanding between the leader and the group, even when 
people are not one hundred percent in agreement with a 
change.
The job is not over once the manager has introduced a 
change and made some plans. Change has a way of changing 
along the way, particularly if it is not monitored and 
reinforced. The manager's ongoing attention needs to be 
directed at insuring that everything is progressing as 
planned, or that appropriate adjustments to the plan are 
being made as required.
The people involved in the change need personal 
attention as well. Their tensions and fears may increase 
as the change process moves toward completion. If not 
caught early, this can create new obstacles to achieving
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successful change implementations.
This segment of the program was summarized by- 
suggesting that it is not as hard to manage when things 
are stable, when people are not anxious or hesitant, and 
when there is not much as risk. However, when a manager 
or leader is faced with change, turbulence, uncertainty 
and pressures that can push the organization to new 
heights of accomplishment and prosperity or to all time 
lows of inefficiency and loss, attention needs to be paid 
to how we overcome resistance to change.
Several other ideas were discussed in relation to how 
to overcome resistance to change. The idea of unfreezing 
was introduced and usually lengthy conversations surfaced 
from participants as to their thinking on that concept.
Additionally, some remarks about how to resolve 
conflict were reviewed. Often when a manager experiences 
the need to overcome resistance to change, he or she is 
vulnerable to emerging conflict. Being an effective 
conflict resolver is another critical skill that can be 
extremely useful to the manager as change is presented and 
discussed.
In order to get a sense of what the senior management 
of PSA expected of its management team during this 
acquisition of PSA by USAir, the construct of expectations 
was introduced. Some discussion began around what the 
managers expected of their front line employees as the 
change progressed. Then, the discussion shifted to what
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the managers thought that senior management expected of 
them. A list of ideas was formulated in each session and, 
at all times, included in the list were the items 
mentioned from senior management as described early in the 
needs analysis. Cooperation, open mindedness, 
flexibility, competence, teamwork, and selling the change 
were always included in the list developed by the 
managers. A meaningful discussion typically followed as 
to whether or not these expectations were reasonable. In 
most cases the group members felt that they were.
Each group designed its own change implementation 
guide. One that stood out as being particularly 
interesting was one that was developed around the acronym 
PROACTIVE.
Managers felt that first people need to be prepared 
for the change and that high activity should take place 
around getting prepared. Then the manager should rally 
with a vision. What are all of the exciting possibilities 
that this change will make reality? Operating as a team 
is extremely beneficial as is acknowledging the 
uncertainty that some people may be feeling. 
Communicating what is happening at every available and 
appropriate moment will build trust and telling all you 
can from an honest perspective is essential to a smooth 
change event. Involving others to the extent that that is 
possible is important to gaining commitment, and 
visibility of the manager to answer questions also gains
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commitment.- Lastly, the emphasis of caring can not be 




R Rally with a vision
0 Operate as a team
A Acknowledge uncertainty
C Communicate what is happening
T Tell all you can, be honest
I Involve others
V Visibility is vital
E Emphasize caring
This particular summary that one group developed was 
then shared in every other session because this researcher 
thought that it was an excellent conclusion for a long and 
substantive day.
During the debriefing sessions, the objectives of the 
intervention were once again reviewed to ensure that all 
the planned material had been covered. Then, each manager 
expressed his or her thoughts about what was learned and 
what would be done differently as a result of the program. 
An example of a typical closing remark was: "I believe
that I have such an advantage now because we have taken 
the time today to talk about the change that is happening. 
I have learned so much that I can apply this material not 
only to the PSA-USAir merger, but to any other change that
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meaningful to me was the fact that the company cared 
enough to allow us to attend this program and the fact 
that I now feel equipped with information, understanding, 
and knowledge about the complex subject of change in 
organizations."
Another remark that was representative of the 
reaction to the program was: "This is information that I
can use. I have learned it here today, and I can go out 
and use it tomorrow. The fact that there was so much 
interaction, discussion and practical application made 
this program especially helpful to me. I have changed as 
a result of attending this course on change."
Another response was: "The fact that this seminar
took place has an impact on this merger. We will now be 
able to more fully and consciously facilitate the change 
while simultaneously getting to the end result; as opposed 
to just getting to the end result without facilitating the 
change in the process. Because of our facilitation of the 
change, our employees will be better managed and, 
therefore, more productive."
One last response that was quite interesting for this 
researcher was the following: "It seems as if this course
is a part of something bigger that PSA is trying to do to 
help all of us make the transition more smoothly into 
USAir. I think that the level of communication about what 
is happening has been stellar, and now with this program
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being available to all PSA's management, it seems like 
many efforts are taking place to help us. It's almost as 
if this is only one part of a change implementation 
strategy designed from a leadership which intentionally 
and strategically is leading in changing times."
The programmatic process that was initiated at PSA 
was based on some basic beliefs that this researcher held. 
After the needs analysis was conducted, the program 
content was developed. The program was instrumental in 
assisting PSA managers to maintain the productivity levels 
required to run the airline.
This third leg of the overall five legged change 
strategy was both systems organic and personal therapeutic 
in nature. The lens that was used predominantly came from 
these two models of change.
By using the "Leading in Changing Times" program, the 
managers clearly understood that multiple lenses of 
viewing the merger were created. This sudden jolt of 
USAir purchasing PSA required a higher level thinking 
process to ensure acceptance and understanding. Multiple 
views of the change assisted the managers in their higher 
level thinking.
The Impacting Leader Actions 
The fourth category of the overall change strategy 
deals with the actions that were taken by President and 
Chief Operating Officer Russell Ray. The actions that 
were taken during the specific time of this qualitative
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case study were the ones that will be described in the 
section of this chapter.
This segment will first look at Russell Ray as 
President, followed by a description of his commitment to 
the development and execution of the change strategy, and 
then, the specific actions he took to help facilitate the 
change event. Each of these areas will be linked to the 
applicable models of change as warranted.
A Look at Russell Ray
In the summer of 1985, Russell Ray joined Pacific 
Southwest Airlines as President and Chief Operating 
Officer reporting to Paul Barkley, Chief Executive Officer 
of PSA. Previous to his position at PSA, Ray spent the 
majority of his career with Eastern Airlines, 
headquartered in Miami, Florida. At Eastern, Ray was 
involved in nearly every aspect of airline operations 
during his career. As a senior executive there, reporting 
to Frank Borman, Ray had an array of experiences from a 
variety of different disciplines including marketing, 
station operations, inflight service and flight 
operations. Previous to his work at Eastern Airlines, Ray 
also spent time at McDonnell Douglas Corporation and in 
the United States Navy. He was a proven manager with an 
extensive background in aviation and airline operations.
Along with a full resume of skill, experience, 
education and background, Ray was highly charismatic.
He had a decisive style which advocated hard work, long
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hours, focus, direction setting, goal setting and 
achievement and bottom line results. Simultaneously, Ray 
modeled team work, fair play and above all, communication.
Four significant examples that best describe Russell 
Ray will now be discussed. These examples will help to 
paint a picture of the way in which this man tended to 
operate.
First, Ray deliberately created stories so that they 
could be told within the organization. He specifically 
believed that stories were symbols of how a culture could 
be built within a company. As such, during the first week 
of Ray's employment with PSA, he started a ritual of going 
out onto the airport ramp during the very early hours of 
the morning to talk with the aircraft mechanics. He would 
walk around, introduce himself, shake hands, and ask 
questions of this particular work group. This visibility 
was atypical at PSA and so the stories began of how the 
President had morning coffee out on the ramp instead of in 
his plush office. On one occasion employees told the 
story that Ray even handed out baseball tickets to 
mechanics while saying thanks for getting the aircraft 
prepared to ensure the on time performance of the airline.
Another story that was lived and created by Russell 
Ray was when he actually helped sky caps tag passenger 
bags at the San Diego, California airport. This 
particular event was even covered by the press and ended 
up being spread throughout the organization as a symbol of
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doing what it takes to make the customers happy.
Russell Ray used his charisma to his advantage to 
engage organizational stories. Frequent tales were told 
of Ray popping into a particular office, crew lounge or 
break room when it was least expected. He would shake 
hands, ask questions, give updates on issues of particular 
importance at that time and then move on.
From a cultural symbolic perspective, Russell Ray 
used these types of events as vehicles for conveying 
meaning. Those aspects of an organization that its 
members use to reveal or make comprehensible the 
unconscious feelings, images, and values that are inherent 
in that organization are called organizational symbolism. 
Ray used planned sets of activities such as the ones 
exemplified, to consolidate forms of cultural expression.
Second, Ray was compelled to develop a specific focus 
and direction for the organization. As such, he and his 
direct reports spent a great deal of time and energy 
trying to determine what rally points would exist for the 
organization. An outside consultant was contracted and 
came in to spend several days with senior managers as a 
group to agree upon a framework that would define the 
focus for the upcoming year. In essence, a mission 
statement was being developed.
Laboriously, and only after several months of 
discussions with employees, focus groups, and more 
discussions among senior managers, three "rally
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points" were created that became the mission of the 
organization. They were:
1. Generate superior return on investment each
year.
2. Operate on time.
3. Dominate our markets.
A communications blitz took place after these points 
were established and an entire plan was put in place in 
order to ensure that the points were remembered and 
realized by all employees of PSA. Clarity and focus 
within the company had finally taken place.
Third, Russell Ray had the belief that internal 
communication was paramount to the organization. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive communications plan was 
developed, communicated and implemented. Figure 42 
reflects the belief in internal communications as the 
brochure highlighting PSA's communication strategy was 
exemplified.
In the cover letter to all employees, Russell Ray 
communicated this focus:
The commitment to open communication is a top 
priority with PSA's management team. In the past, 
Employee Forums, newsletters, advisory groups, and 
several other techniques have been used to help keep 
the lines of communications open. We have since 
added, deleted, revised, and fine-tuned some of those 
elements to make communications more efficient and
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Communication is what transforms a promise into reality. It is the words that speak boldly of our intentions and the actions which speak louder than our words. Communication is the power of change. It is the daily triumph of integrity over skepticism.”
PSA’S COMMUNICATION COMMITMENT
Figure 42. Cover of PSA's communication strategy 
brochure.
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effective . . .  We know you want company information 
on a regular basis; you see the importance of meeting 
with management; and you want updates from your own 
supervisors. In other words, you want to hear 
accurate information directly from management and not 
through the grapevine or on the evening news. We 
agree!
The communications brochure described the specific 
communication vehicles which PSA would inaugurate and the 
purpose of each;
1. PSA New Update: This publication capsulized 
both PSA news and external news of interest to employees 
using an unbiased, straight news approach. The content 
included personnel changes, news about the airline 
industry, competition, and relevant national new items.
2. Perspectives from the President; PSA President 
Russell Ray relayed new messages editorially to all PSA 
employees on pertinent topics.
3. Perspectives from the Chairman; Paul Barkley, 
PSA's chairman of the board and chief executive officer, 
provided editorial information to employees regarding 
capital asset purchases, long term goals and broad issues 
relating to PSA and PSA, Inc.
4. PSA Progress; This publication conveyed 
information and educational issues of interest to all PSA 
employees. Generally, topics included PSA Profit Sharing 
and Stock Plan, the 401(k) Plan, financial conditions, and
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information, from the Employee Forums. One member of each 
employee group served on the Progress Editorial Advisory 
Board to provide input before publication.
5. Management Forum: Paul Barkley, Russell Ray and 
executives officers met with the managers of all 
departments twice each year to address important issues 
facing the company.
6. Employee Owner Forums; These meeting enhanced 
two way communication between corporate officers and all 
employees on a variety of issues concerning PSA. They 
were conducted twice each year.
7 PSA Training and Education: This activity
provided the opportunity for employee to enhance and 
develop skills. Over 400 programs were offered each year.
8 . Employee Recognition Lunches; These monthly 
luncheons recognized PSA's peak performers and provided a 
direct communications link between Russell Ray, corporate 
officers, and employees to informally discuss current 
issues affecting the airline.
9. Departmental Advisory Groups: These groups 
provided an opportunity for employees and managers to 
address specific problems and recommend solutions within 
each department of the company. It was employee ownership 
in action.
10. PSA News Hotline: This was a one minute news 
update provided to employees. The Hotline was handy for 
mobile employees such as flight attendants and pilots.
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11. Telephone Blitz: If urgent news of interest to 
all PSA employees was about to break prior to the release 
of other communication vehicles, each department was 
phoned with the news.
12. Special Videos: Employee informational video 
programs were distributed to provide educational support 
and special messages on an as needed basis.
13. Employee Representative Briefings: PSA Vice
Presidents and employee representatives, including key 
union leaders, met together to review PSA's financial 
performance on a quarterly basis.
14. Shareholders' Report: These brochures released 
financial information to stockholders and employees 
regarding the state of the company.
The investigator reviewed the elements contained in 
the communication plan of PSA to highlight the view that 
Russell Ray, who initiated the design of the plan, was 
indeed an advocate of honest and consistent communication 
to the employees of PSA.
Fourth, Russell Ray, along with his senior management 
team, established the corporate goals for the 
organization. These goals were crisp, concise and very 
clear. They were:
1. Strengthen PSA's dominance in the traditional 
California markets.
2. Increase PSA's presence in higher yield 
interstate markets.
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3. Utilize the BAe 146 aircraft's unique
characteristics in size, unit cost, and noise control.
4. Hold PSA's presence in low fare markets until 
profitable expansion could be achieved.
5. Flow new traffic into the PSA system via the Los 
Angeles and San Francisco hubs.
6 . Maximize station productivity by selective
expansion to underserved and new cities, tying them
together.
7. Improve system productivity by increasing
aircraft utilization, improving flight length, pursuing 
off peak charters and cargo revenues.
In just a very short period of time, Russell Ray 
managed to express stories in a way that created symbolism 
for the company, create a mission which employees could 
rally around, design an aggressive communications plan 
which set the tone toward a new way of doing business at 
PSA and establish corporate goals.
These four examples are illustrations which describe 
the kind of emphasis that Russell Ray wanted to take 
during his time as President of PSA. The initiatives 
describe the kind of values that were held by Ray as well. 
Since each of these actions were initiated by President 
Ray in a highly charismatic and persuasive style, they 
tend to paint a picture of the man as they represent the 
activities that he held in high esteem. They also 
reflect his belief system.
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Development.and Execution of the Change Strategy
In early December of 1986, just after it was 
announced that PSA and USAir had entered into the merger 
agreement, a meeting was called for the purpose of 
addressing a change strategy. The participants of the 
meeting were from line operations and staff functions and 
included this researcher who was then Staff Vice President 
of Human Resource Development. Ray's objective was 
communicated as follows: "It's too early to have answers
to all of the questions that are now rampant, but it is 
not too early to come up with a plan as to how we will 
communicate the answers once we have them. Our employees 
need to be kept up-to-date. In order to keep the airline 
running, we should have a thorough change strategy that 
includes a lot of communication to employees so that 
everyone knows what is going on. It's a difficult time 
for us and our employees. The only way to help ease the 
turmoil will be to consistently and accurately 
communicate. We must pay attention to the care and 
feeding of our employees."
In the days that followed that meeting, a number of 
senior managers spent a lot of time designing a strategy 
that would:
1. Constantly and consistently inform all employees 
of the news of the merger.
2. Continuously educate employees about all facets 
of the acquisition.
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3. Assist employees to be well read and 
knowledgeable about the change.
4. Provide practical tools to the managers on how 
specifically to manage through the change.
5. Ensure that senior managers were visible to 
employees as well as supportive.
The managers made a deliberate attempt to ensure that 
employees had the opportunity to view the change event 
from as many different perspectives as possible. The 
managers consciously thought and believed that if multiple 
views of the change could be presented and facilitated as 
part of the overall change strategy, then more 
understanding and less resistance to the change among 
employees would result. The managers further thought and 
believed that the creation of multiple views could be 
stimulated through a deliberate change strategy as opposed 
to assuming that employees themselves would naturally 
create their own multiple views. In essence, multiple 
views could happen by design, instead of by accident, if 
the change strategy incorporated the construct that 
multiple views were more valuable than single views.
Most importantly, Russell Ray and the entire group 
that worked on the change plan operated from the basic 
notion that PSA employees needed to be attended to. This 
basic notion stemmed from a genuine concern and care about 
the employee population as human beings. The more 
smoothly the change could occur, the more likely it
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was that the employees would be free of the excessive 
stresses and pressures that change and uncertainty 
often cause.
So, Russell Ray had a deep commitment, both from a 
personal as well as a professional level, toward the 
development and execution of a comprehensive and high 
caliber change strategy. As such, this commitment 
permeated the organization as an expression of care and 
concern. That commitment alone was a significant element 
in the success of the change during this slice of time in 
which this case study took place.
Actions Taken to Facilitate the Change
The two most significant actions that were taken by 
Russell Ray which helped to facilitate the change and 
which had an impact were a special video taped message to 
all employees and a series of management meetings where 
other messages were delivered. Both of these actions 
originated from Ray's consistent and intense belief that 
communication was paramount.
First, the video taped message will be described, 
followed by critical points made from management meetings.
Shortly after the announcement was made that USAir 
and PSA had entered into a merger agreement in early 
December of 1986, and before the year ended, Ray met with 
this researcher to express his desire to send a message to 
all of the employees of PSA. He indicated that he was 
especially concerned that the news of the potential
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acquisition, could cause some employees to be disturbed 
over the holidays. He was genuinely concerned about that. 
Equally important, Ray expressed his concern that all the 
news would create an unsettled feeling among employees and 
he feared that productivity would suffer. He wanted the 
airline to run in a highly efficient and productive 
fashion, not only over the peak holiday travel period, but 
on into the following year. There was also an expression 
made that captured his sense of sadness that the PSA era 
may be ending. He had started his career with PSA less 
than two years before the merger announcement and he would 
be unable to bring forth the kind of expansion and 
profitability that he had hoped for. The dream of 
remaining an independent carrier had vanished.
Ray wanted to be video taped the next day so that his 
message would get to PSA employees quickly and before the 
holidays. He indicated that no one would write his 
script, that he would prepare his remarks that night, and 
that he would simply speak his thoughts to the camera the 
following day.
The message was taped in Ray's office as he sat at 
his desk and it began as follows:
Well, now is a good time to communicate with the 
employees of PSA. We're into the holiday season, and 
obviously the events of the past week or so have 
caused a need for the sharing of at least my 
thoughts. I guess the only thing that's missing is
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the roaring fire behind me for this little chat.
Ray used an analogy relating his remarks to those of 
the fireside chats that have been associated with the 
President of the United States.
Next, Ray spoke about the state of the airline, 
reporting that it would not be likely that profit sharing 
would occur for the year 1986.
1986 has almost ended. It's been an interesting 
year. They all have been since your careers started. 
This particular year started with a little bit of 
momentum. That is to say we came into 1986 out of a 
fare war in 1985, causing us losses at the end of 
1985 and the beginning of 1986. But then the 
momentum picked up and a great deal of credit goes to 
each of you for the past marvelous summer where we 
set all kinds of records, ending with that momentous 
occasion in July and August when we started to board 
a million passengers per month. Sad to say, right 
after Labor Day the traffic started to subside, and 
it continues to be soft even though the prospect of 
the next two weeks remains strong and I'm optimistic 
about that. But there's a strong unlikelihood that 
we'll make profits for 1986, I'm sorry to report. I 
don't think we'll have losses but it will be close to 
break even, and that will have an effect on profit 
sharing, as you know.
The bad news had been communicated. The fact that no
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profit sharing was likely was a disappointing factor to 
all the PSA employees who have previously given up 15% of 
their pay for 15% of the company.
Next, the news of the merger agreement had to be 
addressed, which at this point in time was also bad news 
for the majority of PSA employees who were still in shock 
about the announcement. Ray went on to deliver his 
message:
As for the situation of the past week . . .  I entered 
my employment with PSA, as you know, in the middle of 
last year with strong thoughts about the dream I had 
of independence for us. And although X maintained 
those thoughts, and so did my fellow managers, 
throughout this past summer and into the fall, those 
dreams of independence became farther and farther 
away as the mergers took place in our area of the 
market. Delta and Western being one, and culminating 
on that day four or five weeks ago when American 
Airlines announced the acquisition of Air Cal; all 
but shattering PSA's hopes for independence. And on 
that day, the telephones began to ring, and all I can 
say about that is we weren't doing the dialing.
Ray began to use emotional language during this part 
of his message through the use of words such as 
independence, dream and shattered. That emotionalism was 
being picked up in the tone of Ray's voice during the 
video tape as well. This emotional description set the
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stage for the next segment of his speech when a tendency 
toward the cultural symbolic tone prevailed.
And that put us into an interesting position because 
what you know, and what the consumer knows and what 
the other airlines in the country knew and still 
know, is that there's a treasure out here on the west 
coast called PSA. A treasure of 38 years, a treasure 
of customer loyalty, a treasure in its people and a 
treasure in its smile. X look back on the 18 months 
I had with you, and I could say to you and say to a 
customer that PSA has more personality than any 
company in the United States. And those treasures 
and that personality is not lost on our competition. 
The best way to appeal to the hearts of any PSA 
employee was to capitalize on the symbolic PSA smile. To
allude to the fact that PSA's smile was a treasure on the
west coast and treat it as if it was suddenly going away 
pulled at the heart strings of many PSA employees.
The next part of the message dealt with expressing a 
vote of confidence in USAir:
USAir has bought a business. It has bought a 
business of people and machines . . . and a
reputation on the west coast. This move has
tremendous value to you, because the airline that we 
are joining has financial strength. It has a track 
record of years of profitability and the ability to 
grow in the years ahead with all the prospects of job
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security that go with it. It brings to the west 
coast the synergies of the east. It reduces for you 
the likelihood of personnel reductions. A track 
record at USAir of very generous wages and benefits, 
and to each of us, to you, a windfall in terms of 
your stock at PSA, when you consider that just 4 
months ago we created a public market for the PSA 
stock at $7, and today the price is $17.
This was the hard part for PSA employees to swallow. 
Even though many employees recognized that rationally the 
USAir merger would be good, they had difficulty dealing 
with the emotional side of the merger that the "treasure" 
that they had helped create and build would be drowned. 
However, the consequences of USAir not being in the 
picture were significant. Russell Ray continued:
The alternatives to the USAir merger are not happy 
ones. As I mentioned just a minute ago the 
telephones that were ringing came from all kinds of 
people in the country, some of whom you've read about 
and perhaps would rather not want to be associated 
with.
This statement hinted at the fact that Frank Lorenzo 
of Texas Air Corporation had been one of the people 
interested in taking over PSA. Lorenzo's reputation in 
the industry was not one that tended to focus on the human 
element. In fact, his reputation was that he was a union 
buster and a wage and salary slasher.
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Russell Ray continued his message in a way that once 
again tended to focus of the cultural symbolic factors.
I can pledge to you that in the weeks and months 
ahead that you are going to have accurate, timely 
information that will affect you individually. And 
you can count on that accuracy because you need to 
know the truth for your own welfare and for your own 
peace of mind. As for me, I'm intending to eat, 
drink, sleep, think PSA every minute. I'm committed 
to that, and I've been committed to that since I 
walked in here in August of last year. I intend to 
run it harder and more aggressively than we ever have 
before, given the fact that we have 2,000 more 
employees than we had two years ago and we're half 
again as big.
The use of words such as pledge, truth, welfare, 
peace of mind, and committed once again bring out symbolic 
expression. Ray concluded his remarks.
I'm committed. And when that day come, I'm committed 
to the prospect that this airline will be as good as 
it was, if not better than it was the day the 
acquisition was announced. And all I can do is ask 
from you that same commitment to excellence. That 
same degree of enthusiasm that put the PSA 
personality in front of everyone else. The retention 
of customer confidence is so important. You know, 
somehow, I believe that whether it be in the hearts
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of our.employees, or on the minds of our customers, 
or on the noses of our airplanes, there will always 
be a smile.
Again the word committed was used, along with 
excellence, enthusiasm, PSA personality, confidence, 
hearts, and smile. Ending the message with the cultural 
symbolic tie to the PSA smile gave the message a very 
dramatic point of view for many PSA employees.
Russell Ray's message was an extremely critical 
element in the communications strategy of PSA after the 
announcement was made that PSA had been acquired. The 
complete transcription of this message shows the reader 
that Ray was deeply attached to PSA, even though his 
length of time employed with the carrier was less than two 
years. This deep attachment was also felt by many PSA 
employees and was the reason why the emotions were so high 
about the fact that PSA would dissolve. The organization 
lived in its symbols, stories, rituals, myths and, in its 
smile.
The manner in which this particular communication 
addressed the cultural symbolic aspects of the change 
event is evidenced by the content, style and language used 
by Russell Ray in this extremely important and highly 
visible video taped message. The fact that Ray took 
action in a way that produced a video taped communication 
is also illustrative of his strong belief and practice in 
communicating with the employees.
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Shortly after the announcement was made that USAir 
and PSA had entered into a merger agreement in early 
December of 1986, Ray initiated a series of meetings with 
his key management team to discuss the progress of the 
acquisition exclusively. Furthermore, these meetings 
would strengthen the communication that Ray felt was so 
essential during times when ambiguity was so high. Of 
particular interest were the themes that were developed 
during these meetings. As reflected from this 
researcher's field notes, two predominant trends or areas 
of emphasis emerged from the perspective that Ray took in 
the meetings.
Over the six month period, Ray held nine such 
meetings. In attendance were his officer team; inclusive 
of this researcher. Typically the meetings followed a 
similar agenda. The operation of the airline was usually 
discussed in terms of schedule reliability, weather, on 
time performance and so on. Then, a brief update was 
usually given as to the status of the merger including a 
review of key open issues that were taking place as a 
result of the labor negotiations, plans for integrating 
the two carriers, a request list for materials that USAir 
needed to properly review the operation and any other 
significant points regarding USAir in general. Last, a 
discussion usually began around some principle that was 
introduced by Russell Ray. It is this area that is of 
particular interest because it reflects the thinking of
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Ray and his.cabinet during the change cycle.
The first theme or area of emphasis that came out of 
the meetings was symbols to the customer. Ray had a deep 
concern during this time of transition that PSA not lose 
the confidence of our customer base. Because turbulent 
times were beginning and were likely to continue for 
awhile, he wanted PSA customers to know that they could 
continue to rely on the airline for their transportation 
needs. As such, Ray began discussions around the 
following idea: "Just because we are going through some
uncertain times, it does not mean that our customers will 
have go through uncertain times. All of our customers 
need to continue to have confidence in PSA. I suggest 
that we create some symbols to emphasize this as we move 
through the next several months. Greater attention is 
going to need to be paid to ensure customer loyalty. This 
type of transition is the kind of thing that could 
substantially influence our passenger loads. We all have 
to be aware of that. Particularly our ground handling 
personnel, our inflight personnel and our reservations 
personnel. We need to come up with ideas on how best to 
maintain customer confidence."
As a result of these meetings, several activities to 
develop customer confidence were, in essence, blitzed 
throughout the company.
The first example of an action taken related to all 
of the ways in which the PSA smile could be capitalized
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on. Inflight employees were given buttons to wear as 
symbols of the change being an advantage to the customer. 
These buttons simply said, "Our smiles are getting 
bigger." Announcements were made over the public address 
system in the aircraft indicating that PSA and USAir were 
teaming up and that the PSA smile was spreading to the 
east. Inflight napkins were printed which expressed the 
growing smile idea. Even gate agents eventually wore 
buttons and made similar announcements to customers.
Stories were told during these meetings with Russell 
Ray about specific customers who had written or called 
saying that they were shocked about the PSA smile possibly 
going away. One customer had evidently called in and said 
that to take PSA out of California was like taking Mickey 
Mouse out of Disneyland. This story became one that was 
told over and over again in the halls, offices, break 
rooms, and crew lounges. In fact, there was a kind of 
•uprising that emerged about preserving the PSA smile.
Customers who were loyal to PSA were concerned about 
whether USAir could measure up to the standards they had 
come to enjoy as frequent PSA flyers. In the meeting in 
late January of 1987, Ray said: "Our customers for now
must believe that the PSA smile is not going to vanish. 
If anything it's just going to get bigger and better. 
Somehow customers have a tendency to equate their 
confidence level in the organization with the symbol that 
they identify with, and that's the smile on the nose of
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our aircraft. Our customers identify with the PSA smile."
The next radio and television advertising spots for 
PSA captured the idea that PSA and USAir had teamed up and 
that the smile was going coast to coast. The symbol of 
retaining customer confidence had landed in the smile.
In another meeting with Ray and his officer team, he 
expanded on the idea that a smooth operating airline, one 
that was on time, was also going to lend value to customer 
confidence. "If our customers suddenly notice that our 
product quality has slipped during this time of 
transition, they will be very likely to go elsewhere . . . 
to another airline that is not going through the kinds of 
changes that we are currently experiencing. On time 
performance was never more important than it is now. The 
integrity of our product, the schedule, must be upheld. 
We must ensure that our passengers remain loyal to PSA."
In another management meeting, the message of 
maintaining customer service was spotlighted: "The best
way to ensure that our customers continue to have 
confidence in us is to continue to provide them with the 
kind of service they have grown to expect. Our 
reservation lines should be answered quickly and 
courteously. Reservations agents should go about 
their business in a positive way, serving the customer 
with his travel plans. Ticket and gate agents should be 
friendly and efficient, always keeping the customer 
informed if irregular operations occur. And, our flight
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attendants should continue to show their personalities in 
the same way that put PSA on the map. Customer service, 
along with on time performance, and along with protecting 
the image of our smile should be the key to maintaining 
customer confidence."
Another theme that was prevalent in the content of 
the meetings that Ray had with his directors dealt with 
what could be done symbolically to ensure that PSA 
employees remained committed to the airline. Just as 
customers needed to see that there was no need to lose 
confidence in the airline, so the employees needed to 
understand the same point. Discussion took place around 
this theme in several meetings.
Obviously, the entire communications plan was an 
integral part in maintaining employee confidence, as best 
as they could, during this time of turmoil. However, Ray 
capitalized on the word pride: "Our employees have always
had a sense of pride toward the company and that shows. 
If we can help employees understand that the PSA smile 
will never go away, as a matter of pride it will always be 
within us, then maybe they will still feel that sense of 
pride in their jobs. Our employees, just like our 
customers, identify with the PSA smile."
As a result, the company store was stocked with PSA 
paraphernalia. Employees were buying up everything they 
could with the PSA logo on it. Everything from PSA 
t-shirts, to coffee mugs, clocks, duffle bags, and
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poster was printed which pictured all of the different 
types of aircraft that PSA had flown during its history. 
These were bought immediately and orders were taken for 
more.
Stories were told about the good old days and a new 
kind of camaraderie was developing. During the later 
months of March, April and May of 1987, a farewell to PSA 
idea grew. Ray indicated in one of his meetings: "There
is a kind of energy that is happening about all this 
farewell to PSA stuff. Many employees want to hold a big 
farewell party. I think it is something that we should 
think about endorsing. The more our employees can be open 
about PSA dissolving, the better it will be for all of 
us."
Employee confidence was built by encouraging 
employees to take time to end their relationships with 
PSA, not just begin with USAir. By fostering a kind of 
mourning and taking time to feel their loss, the employees 
of PSA were building confidence because they banded 
together in this ending or mourning process.
Many critical points were made from the messages 
given by Russell Ray to his key management team. It 
should be noted that Russell Ray himself used the term 
symbol very frequently. It was almost as if he knew he 
was operating from a cultural symbolic lens because he 
freely used the language that is often associated with
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that frame of change. Words such as stories, rituals, 
symbolism/ and culture were all consciously used by Ray.
So the themes that were predominant from the series 
of management meetings with Ray were the strategic use of 
symbols to facilitate customer confidence and the 
strategic use of symbols to foster employee confidence. 
The meetings, then, are important because they show an 
obvious cultural symbolic emphasis that is insightful to 
this research.
In looking at Russell Ray as President, four examples 
were used to paint a picture of actions taken which 
reflected the internal values of Ray. These examples can 
be summarized as follows: (1) the way in which Ray
expressed stories to create symbols for the company, (2) 
the actions taken to develop a mission for PSA, (3) the 
aggressive communications plan that emerged even prior to 
the merger announcement, and (4) Ray's insistence that 
corporate goals be established and articulated.
The actions that were taken by Russell Ray when 
he initiated the idea that a change strategy needed to be 
developed and executed, demonstrated his commitment to 
communication.
The video taped message to all employees and the 
series of management meetings show the influence that Ray 
had with regard to facilitating the change event.
These actions distinctly reveal a cultural symbolic 
lens. Although this model of change and the events
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described here will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 
VI, it is safe to say that the cultural model was 
operationalized during the change, predominantly in this 
fourth leg of the overall change plan.
Being a facilitator of change in a culturally 
symbolic way involves the creation of a vision and then 
engaging others to pursue that vision. In doing so the 
recognition of symbols and language becomes a very 
integral part of organizational change itself. 
Additionally, if we study organizations and organizational 
change, we must examine how we think and talk about them, 
what we use as symbols for expressing meaning within the 
organization, and if a social world been created. All of 
these issues are necessary in any endeavor to study 
organizational change in action.
Essentially, the impacting leader actions in this 
portion of the case study bring to life a kind of 
awareness of the importance of this role in a major 
organizational change such as the merger of USAir and 
Pacific Southwest Airlines. Change itself requires a new 
vision, new symbols and new language. The ones that 
existed before, however, can not be totally erased because 
they form the basis for comparison of cultures. We gain 
our understanding of a culture only by comparing it with 
other cultures.
If all of this can be effectively facilitated along 
the way, followers can be cared for in a way that nurtures
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commitment, respect and most importantly, smooth 
transition from the old to the new.
The Grass Roots Movement
The fifth and last category of the overall change 
event deals with the feedback that was captured from PSA 
and USAir front line employees. The type of feedback that 
was collected by the researcher was specifically in 
written form from the computer communications network. 
Because these messages were unsolicited commentary, they 
became raw data that was very pure. The purpose of the 
computer network was to communicate operational 
information among employees in various different cities, 
not to communicate individual views. The PSA and USAir 
networks linked together in April of 1987; as a result, 
messages could be sent back and forth between companies.
Whenever communications messages were sent from one 
station to another, a printed copy was released for 
posting if appropriate. Essentially the computer 
communications network was electronic mail. The pieces of 
mail, however, were sent to every location on the network 
as opposed to one specific mailbox.
During the months of April, May and June of 1987, 
after the PSA and USAir computer systems were linked, the 
computer print-outs contained a voluminous amount of 
employee expression.
This computer chatter was actually against company 
policy, as the purpose of this sophisticated computer
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network was to ensure that the airlines were running 
smoothly. It was not to be used by employees for their 
own expression of thought. However, because the merger 
was such an important change in the lives of the 
employees, the two companies did little to stop this 
computer chatter.
The grass roots feedback and expression for both PSA 
and USAir employees that occurred during April through 
June of 1987 will now be described.
On April 21, 1987, Vice President of Labor Relations 
Paul George sent a letter to the Teamsters union 
representative, Marvin Griswold. This letter got into the 
hands of some employee who then sent it over the computer 
network. The letter triggered a flood of employee comment 




"Your April 17, 1987 letter to me was hand delivered 
to my office on the afternoon of April 20. Your letter 
contains a number of inaccuracies and misconceptions. 
Therefore, the following is being offered in the interest 
of clarifying the record and in the hope that Teamsters 
Local 2707 will reconsider its current negotiating 
position, including its decision not to allow its members 
to vote on the company's fully integrated 4/10/87 final 
offer.
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"PSA's proposals were hand delivered to your office 
on April 16 along with my letter to you of that date. On 
that day and before PSA's press release the Teamsters 
chose to publicly disclose the specific status of our 
negotiations, including the nature of the proposals then 
pending at the bargaining table. The PSA press release 
you complained about was disseminated in response to the 
actions of your local and was consistent with what I 
advised you of in my hand delivered letter. Since April
9, 1987 when you first presented me with a last minute 
proposal calling for wage, benefit and work rule snap 
backs, I have consistently emphasized both verbally and in 
writing that issues concerning post merger wages, benefits 
and work rules, like representation, were subjects that 
PSA neither had authority to negotiate, nor an ability to 
control. During our meeting in Washington D.C. on April
10, and in my letter to you of the same date, I made it 
clear that unless the Teamsters were prepared to withdraw 
its demand for wage, benefit and work rule snap backs, in 
any form, further negotiations would be fruitless. You 
have always known that PSA could not negotiate on the post 
merger issues contained in the Teamsters April 9 demands.
"When we spoke by telephone on April 13, you 
indicated that Local 2702 had a new proposal which solely 
addressed supplemental severance outplacement trust fund 
issues. On at least two occasions during that telephone 
call, you assured me that the new proposal which you
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wanted to present contained no snap back demands. Based 
on your representations, I agreed to fly to Los Angeles to 
meet with you the next morning. Despite your 
representations, when we met in Los Angeles you presented 
a proposal that not only contained snap backs, but also 
contained an obvious substitute for wage snap backs in the 
form of a demand that, upon the merger, all PSA Teamster 
represented employees be immediately paid on the basis of 
the USAir wage scales. During our meeting of April 14, I 
rejected the Teamsters' proposal and again reiterated that 
PSA has never had the authority to negotiate concerning 
the wages, benefits or work rules that would be applicable 
to PSA's current employees after the merger with USAir. 
PSA's rejection of the proposal was confirmed in my letter 
to you of April 16, 1987 which was hand delivered to you.
"Your letter of April 17 expressly stated that the 
Teamsters will not submit the company's fully integrated 
4/10/87 proposals to the membership for a ratification 
vote. PSA is obviously disappointed that the Teamsters 
have decided not to allow the individuals whom it 
represents to have a voice in determining their own 
future. As I have indicated on numerous occasions, the 
4/19/87 proposal represents one of the strongest employee 
protection packages ever offered in the airline industry. 
PSA believes that your members should be given the 
opportunity to vote on PSA's final offer.
"Finally, with respect to your requests that PSA
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return to the bargaining table in order to resolve the 
remaining few outstanding issues, I will reiterate that 
PSA has, at all times, been willing to return to the 
bargaining table to discuss any issues pertaining to the 
supplemental severance outplacement trust fund. PSA's 
willingness to return to the table was, and continues to 
be, conditional on the Teamsters' withdrawal of the 
demands that (1) PSA Teamsters represented employees 
receive the USAir rates of pay immediately upon the date 
of the merger, and (2) that other benefit and work rule 
snap backs be implemented immediately upon the merger. If 
I receive a new written proposal from the Teamsters which 
eliminate these two demands, and assuming you can assure 
me that there would still be sufficient time to complete 
the ratification process prior to April 30, 1987 so that 
PSA can satisfy the condition set forth in the agreement 
and plan of merger with USAir, I would be more than 
willing to meet with you for the sole purpose of 
discussing and resolving the sole remaining issue— the 
supplemental severance and outplacement trust fund.
- Paul George
Vice President, Labor Relations"
The release of this letter was the green light that 
accelerated the grass roots communication movement. The 
computer chatter that followed was like a dam breaking. 
Just as the water would surge from the breaking cement so 
did the expression and communication from both PSA and 
USAir employees. The first computer message that
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immediately followed from a PSA employee was, "Please be 
advised the previous message did not come from the main 
office." The employee who sent this message wanted to 
state that this letter was confidential and the employee 
had taken a bold risk to send it over the computer 
network.
The next message read, "I don't think anyone cares 
who the message came from, only if the information is 
valid."
Another employee wrote, "The last telex by Paul 
George, Vice President of Labor Relations, is a phony. 
Paul George is on his honeymoon. Call his office and 
ask."
Anger was beginning to be a common emotion which 
could be sensed in numerous messages. One such message is 
typical of them, "PSA employees want to vote. If the 
Teamsters won't let us, then let's do something about it. 
This is not the time to sit back and wait to see what will 
happen. We have bastards dictating our futures. Any 
USAir employees out there willing to give us some advice?"
At this point, the USAir employees began to get 
involved in this communications fervor. On May 6, 1987 
the first message was sent from a brave USAir employee. 
"I've been employed with USAir for about 20 years and 
never have I seen anyone or heard of anyone getting the 
shaft from my company. USAir treats all of us 
outstanding. We get the same as most carriers and more
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than others. I grant you some airlines need a union but 
we are not one of them. Why pay for something when you 
have a company that is willing to give to you for free. 
Well not totally free, you have to give them a honest 
day's work. Let's all just get together and make one 
strong airline that can not just survive but prosper, and 
we will all have a secure job for the future."
Another USAir employee expressed these thoughts: "We
all hope that your frustrations with the union will turn 
out successfully. . . . From those of us that have worked 
for an airline represented by the Teamsters— Braniff— let 
me tell you that USAir management takes better care of its 
employees. . . . You have much to gain and little to lose 
by opting out of the union."
On May 7, 1987, a USAir employee advised, "Don't let 
the guys in the black hats feed you a lot of lies. This 
is a great company and one I'm sure you would be proud to 
work for."
Still another USAir employee reported, "Ed Colodny is 
the best airline president in the industry— bar none— do 
you really think we're lyin'?"
A USAir employee named Dave from Boston sent a 
message that said, "After working with Lake Central, 
Allegheny and USAir, you couldn't find a better employer 
to work for anywhere. They will listen to anything you 
have to say or ask and find the answer if they don't know. 
Go with USAir. You won't regret it."
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On May 7, 1987, a PSA employee sent part of Chairman 
Paul Barkley's letter to all PSA employees over the wire, 
"There is no turning back the clock. Our future is here, 
now, in the form of a beneficial merger with USAir. 
Without the merger, PSA could survive only by cutting 
costs through station closings, aircraft sales and 
layoffs. Almost every financial analyst who has recently 
studied PSA has reached the same conclusion based 
primarily on the growing presence and strength of United, 
American and Continental in PSA's traditional markets and 
the continued expansion of low cost competitors. At the 
same time PSA does not have the financial resources or 
computer marketing support possessed by the major airlines 
competing in our marketplace. We find ourselves caught 
between two sets of equally aggressive competitors without 
the tools necessary to compete. Without this merger with 
USAir, our future as an independent airline would be bleak 
because our independence in the new reality of our 
industry is under attack. Life as usual at PSA is not an 
option. We can't risk losing this merger. We must make 
the merger with USAir happen."
The word was out that voting on the proposal was 
ready to happen. One desperate PSA employee wrote, "This 
vote we will cast will probably be the most important 
decision we may be faced with in our lives. What we do 
now will not only affect our own bargaining unit but the 
other three units as well. Let's face it, no agreement can
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be perfect. I think our union reps have done their very 
best for us at the table. The agreement has been signed 
by the company and union, a no vote will not send them 
back to the table, it will terminate the chance we have to 
survive. If PSA is forced to compete on its own, it will 
have to restructure in a drastic way. Layoffs would be a 
result. Five or ten years ago we could use leverage to 
force an issue. If we didn't like the way things were 
going, we could work for the airline next door. . . . Not 
so anymore, those airlines have been a part of the merger 
mania we are experiencing. Good jobs are a very precious 
commodity. We all have mortgages to pay, kids to feed, 
and pension plans to lose. Please, let's consider that we 
also hold the futures of many other employees in our 
hands."
Many PSA employees were lobbying for a yes vote on 
the contract, as exemplified by the previous quote. It 
was a strenuous time, and USAir employees continued to 
promote their company to PSA employees, "Just for the 
record, I've been with this ol' company for close to 22 
years. I've seen strikes come and go, seen this outfit 
handle some pretty gnarly situations but never have I 
heard of it being unfair or not caring about its people. 
Not saying it don't make mistakes, it has, but it tried to 
rectify them when discovered. If you folks can get the 
problems straightened, we are waiting to welcome you."
Messages at this point, from May 7, 1987 on, were
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actually beginning to clutter the system. It was like the 
airline operation shut down. The number of operationally 
related messages compared to the messages that were part 
of the grass roots movement was quite small. The 
communications movement essentially took over the network, 
despite PSA managers' attempts to at least lessen it. 
Stopping the message sending completely was not possible 
at this time.
USAir employees continued to articulate their views 
about USAir. "A very warm hello to all the folks at PSA. 
We are aware that you are holding ratification proceedings 
of the merger proposals. To let you know the way we feel, 
we are excited and happy that you have the right to choose 
to be a part of USAir. USAir has been good to me for 21 
years. As with any merger there will be some rough spots, 
but I believe you will find the USAir management fair and 
honest with you. True some companies need union 
representation, however, it is my belief that USAir is not 
one of them. True my view is slanted but try USAir 
without a union. Give us a chance, I do not think you 
will be sorry. Best of luck and get out and vote."
PSA employees were trying to set the record straight. 
There was a lot of conflicting information as to the 
status of their jobs. One PSA employee encouraged voter 
turnout: "We have been advised by the Teamsters that in
order to vote, you must attend a ratification meeting. I 
urge you to attend a meeting and vote in favor of the
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agreement to allow the merger to go forward. In order for 
the merger to go forward, each of the four Teamster 
represented groups must vote in favor of ratification."
One PSA employee indicated that she was not in favor 
of the merger by sending a message that said, "Rambo woman 
says if you're scared, buy a dog."
The response to that message from another PSA 
employee who obviously disagreed with that message was, 
"Attention Rambo woman: We can save our money . . . you
are tough, you can protect us. Get ready to pay all our 
bills for us when we don't exist."
USAir employees continued to send encouraging 
messages across the computer network.
"To the Teamsters who are recommending a no vote. 
Stop. We have a round table policy and a grievance system 
second to none plus a pay scale and benefits package close 
to the top in the industry. We also enjoy an open door 
policy both at the station level on up. Big daddy looks 
out for us workers so we really do not need 
representation."
"From a 36 year employee of USAir, there is no better 
place work. Very employee oriented."
"The only thing you folks could lose would be the 
right to pay union dues."
"Hope the ratification process is going well. We 
hear that Teamsters are recommending a NO vote. That's up 
to you, but USAir is the best there is in the airline
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industry for the way they treat their employees. I say 
this as a Teamster employee from USAir in Buffalo, 
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia or Boston."
"We have been at the mercy of USAir from the start 
and what has it gotten us? We are among the highest paid 
in the airline industry."
"Ed Colodny is a man of his word and well respected 
by all of the USAir employees."
"I really believe the PSA people will get a good deal 
and we will all end up with a strong company. Believe me 
we don't need unions. Looking forward to meeting and 
merging with our western allies."
"I have worked for 7 managers in 4 cities in the last 
22 years. Looking forward to the next 22 years. Don't 
worry."
"It sounds like the union is telling you horror 
stories about other mergers. The fact is that you will be 
part of one big family. I was with Mohawk Airlines and we 
merged in April of 1972. We had very strong feelings with 
Mohawk and were deeply hurt with our loss. It was a loss. 
But it was for the best. We are all proud to be a family 
member of USAir and look forward to you, PSA, as a family 
member. With a strong and fair company like USAir, a 
union is not needed, it can just confuse the issues. 
Hope my comments help."
"I was one of the union organizers for Allegheny in 
1976 and voted NO too. But that was 1976 and this is
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1987. I wouldn't vote for a union here at USAir because 
the company has been a lot fairer in recent years. Not 
just Teamsters, any union. True, there are a lot of 
things that we have no say in, such as the annual raises, 
when other airlines took cuts, and the Christmas bonuses 
we have received the last 3 years. We understand there 
will be no raise this year, but then again, PSA and 
Piedmont are not cheap properties. A combined 
PSA/Piedmont/USAir will be a strong airline to be 
contended with by the biggies. Come on over. We want and 
need PSA."
"USAir is a great company to work for, and I might 
add, with. We have always been treated fairly which goes 
right along with our success. Obviously some work rules 
are bound to change as we change and the industry changes. 
But we will be stronger than ever with PSA and Piedmont 
and will be a competitive force to be reckoned with."
"Just thought I'd chime in. I've been a part timer 
with USAir for over a year now and really believe that I 
couldn't be treated any better. I have full insurance 
benefits, two weeks paid vacation a year and a whole bunch 
of great coworkers throughout the system. To all PSA part 
timers, hope to be working together soon."
"To all concerned PSA employees. You can be advised 
that the only way you could be treated as well as USAir 
employees is to work for yourself. USAir's equation for 
success is success divided not only by management but
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employees as well. The employees at USAir are as 
important as anyone else and all are made to feel that 
appreciation. You can look forward to working as USAir 
employees with anticipation, not consternation. Welcome 
aboard to all at PSA."
Several messages made comments on wage issues. "I 
don't know much about it. I have real empathy for you 
folks as you know what you have now but have to look into 
the unknown. It must be very difficult to make a 
decision. It's easy to give advice to a person when 
you're not wearing their shoes. The only way to look at 
it is what do you have now. A job and a pay scale. What 
will you have with USAir - a job and a pay scale. I can 
tell you would like a little more but from what little I 
know they aren't taking anything away."
"From 15 years experience with USAir and 10 years 
with an airline which needed a union, I can't see that 
USAir would pitch you a raw deal. The majority here have 
the utmost respect and confidence in Mr. Colodny. We have 
under his leadership become a Cinderella airline in the 
industry. I like playing on a winning team."
"Many years ago a union was trying to unionize the 
customer service agents. The union signup forms, with a 
letter telling us of the benefits, were given to us as we 
picked up our paychecks. The waste basket in that office 
had to be emptied several times as most agents threw them 
away. Over half the basket was filled with envelopes that
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had not even been opened and read. Some were torn to 
shreds which reflected the vehement opposition to the 
union drive. These were agents from the two merged 
airlines and Allegheny. Except for some ramp agents, we 
felt no need for a union while working for a company which 
treats us like real people."
"Over twenty years with the company and I can 
truthfully say they have never done me dirt. If you feel 
you do a good job for your company, then you can be proud 
of your work and let it do the talking for you, and USAir 
will listen. Very anxious to meet our friends out on the 
coast. Really looking forward to getting to know people 
that think like we do."
"I've been with USAir 14 years. We are the best. Our 
president is the best and our managers are the best. It 
seems like every decision is done with regard not only to 
the company but to all the employees. USAir has treated 
us like kings and queens. We are the best."
"In response to the PSA Phoenix operations request 
for comments, I have 25 years with Lake Central, Allegheny 
and USAir. Before that 7 years with Ozark. After going 
through 2 mergers and a name change, I firmly believe all 
employees were treated fairly and at this time I can think 
of no company I would rather work for than USAir."
Interspersed with the raving reviews about USAir from 
USAir employees, there were occasional remarks from some 
PSA employees that were pointed and somewhat creative.
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An example is this message about one of PSA's Teamsters 
union representative, "If bullshit was electricity, Ed 
Rubano would be a powerhouse.1
Messages from USAir employees around May 9, 1987 were 
actually getting a bit dramatic, as exemplified by these 
remarks.
"You remember the song I have never been loved so 
much in all my life? They may not please all the people 
all the time but they try. Most of us have been around 20 
to 30 years and hope to be around for awhile yet. We went 
through mergers with Lake Central, Mohawk and Allegheny, 
then a name change and everybody pulled together and the 
results have sure pleased us. Welcome aboard. If you
want to complain, you can. If you want to make things
better, you can do that also."
"Joining USAir over 10 years ago was one of the best 
moves that I ever made in my life. This airline is fair, 
high paying and has been developing in such a positive way 
over the past few years that I am proud to call myself a 
USAir employee."
"I was with the company for 3 months when I got
cancer and spent many weeks in the hospital and
treatments. I had two days of sick time and had many 
expenses from just moving to take the job. USAir 
explained that each situation was reviewed individually 
and if they could they would make a sick time advance. 
They advanced me 6 weeks plus. When I did come back they
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worked with me for over 3 months to help me back onto the 
job because I had limited stamina. Without all this I 
would have been hurting. It was almost 4 years before I 
got back to normal, USAir working with me all along the 
way. No one could ask for more."
"What are your options? A buyout from a less 
sympathetic carrier like Northwest or TWA. Certainly 
going it alone doesn't look real promising right now."
Starting on May 11, 1987 the results of clusters of 
votes were filtering in. These results were informally 
communicated over the computer network by employees of 
PSA. Some of these messages are given below.
"Pasco voted all yes. That's 100%. Everyone is in 
favor of the merger."
"Way to go Phoenix. Your YES votes are in. We love 
you. Any more precincts in yet?"
"Do they count the votes right at the meeting? How 
did you find out the results?"
"Seattle voted by a show of hands and then called in 
the vote to Local 2707. Out of 60%, 120 YES, 0 NO."
"Portland votes are in. Even though we're small, we 
sure are mighty. 20 FOR and 0 AGAINST."
In the middle of these voting results, someone 
scolded a fellow PSA employee who had complained that he 
or she was tired of all this computer chatter about the 
voting. "My dear complainer of Santa Ana. I know of no 
better way to turn the vote against this merger than by
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your constant complaining. Please stay off the wire . . . 
for the merger1s sake."
Another PSA employee spoke out about the rumor that 
some people were voting no because of pressure. "We've 
been hearing rumors that some agents have voted no after a 
three hour meeting and very negative presentations given 
by the Teamsters. Then they regretted their last minute 
change of mind after it was too late. Unless you are 
truly, firmly committed to a no vote, don't be influenced 
by fatigue and a very slanted presentation. Think twice 
before you cast your ballot. All our futures are at 
stake."
Interestingly, on May 15, 1987, Vice President of
Labor Relations Paul George sent a message over the system 
which said, "The contract modification ratification vote 
by the four Teamster represented PSA employee groups will 
conclude Sunday. The votes will be counted the same 
evening. USAir previously agreed to extend the deadline 
for completion of the PSA USAir acquisition agreement to 
May 17 to allow for the vote."
Since it was impossible to stop the communication 
from front line employees over the computer network, Paul 
George decided that he too would do some communicating 
over the wires. He essentially joined the grass roots 
movement. From May 15 on, various senior managers of PSA 
began to use the network as an update device, similar to 
the purpose of the PSA USAir Merger Update.
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On May 17, 1987 the Public Relations Office of PSA 
released this message over the network. "PSA today 
announced it has been informed by the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 2707, that the agreement 
between PSA and the Teamsters has been ratified by each of 
the four Teamster represented bargaining groups in voting 
which concluded yesterday. 'We are very pleased with the 
support shown by our employees for this acquisition,' said 
Paul Barkley, PSA Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 
'The acquisition of PSA by USAir is a tremendous 
opportunity for PSA and its employees to be a vital part 
of a major carrier in this industry.’ Results from 
Reservations: 350 YES, 67 NO. Flight Attendants: 621
YES, 10 NO. Maintenance: 388 YES, 377 NO. Stations:
934 YES, 155 NO."
The messages continue even after the voting was over. 
There were expressions aimed at the employees in the 
Maintenance Department because the vote was so close in 
that particular work group. "Anybody anywhere know anyone 
in the auction for a couple west coast maintenance 
bases . . .  or perhaps 377 aircraft mechanics . . .
mentality not guaranteed . . . but the price . . . cheap 
. . . cheap . . . cheap."
Most of the communications at this point were 
expressed in a tone of celebration. "Tell Ed thanks for 
his patience. Speaking for Redmond, we are damned happy 
to be on board. Congratulations, and a huge thanks to all
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who put us here."
Other messages of this sort included, "Well, we did 
it. We can now be more secure about our jobs and our 
livelihood. As for me, I'm proud to be a part of USAir, 
and I think we'll all be the better for this fantastic 
day."
On May 18, 1987, Vice President of Station
Operations A1 Crellin released his message, "During the 
recent months we have had voluminous unauthorized messages 
generated by station agents. While I understand some of 
the motivation behind these messages, we cannot continue 
using the twix for this purpose. Any further unauthorized 
use of the company computer system will subject you to 
discipline. So let's get back to running the airline."
This message still did not stop the employees of PSA 
from sending unauthorized communications. Some of the 
continued views were, "We hope that the 377 mechanics that 
voted NO have kidney stones that pass as hard as they 
vote."
Another employee wrote, "Not 11 votes, but 6 . If 6 
votes went the other way, we would have been history. 
Nice to have knuckleheads holding our future."
The last part of May, 1987 passed with a significant 
decrease in the amount of computer chatter over the wires. 
As June of 1987 began, so did the escalating number of 
messages from employees on the network that were not work 
related. The messages now dealt with how USAir would
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begin integrating the pass and free travel benefits to all 
employees. As this message exemplifies, "I know we're not 
suppose to be sending messages over the wire, but look 
what happened before when we started this. We got the 
whole darn country involved, including PSA and USAir 
employees talking to one another. It made checking the 
print out load more fun. I think we can use this vehicle 
to be heard. Let's put some pressure on for finding out 
what is going to happen to our pass benefits. After all 
that's why many of us are in this business. Let's see 
what we can do to generate some ideas on this. Let's talk 
some more."
The first response was, "I'm a USAir employee from 
the south. I never been west of the Mississippi. Anyone 
in Bend, wherever the hell that is, want to have lunch?"
"I'm a PSA employee in Fresno. Bend is in Oregon. 
You know that state near Washington.. .and I don't mean 
D.C. If you come on over to Fresno, you'll have an entire 
station ready to take you out to lunch and show you our 
splendid city. What are your pass benefits like?"
And, so the fervor began again. From coast to coast, 
employees were now mischievously and energetically 
chatting with one another. As one USAir employee said to 
PSA, "Your pass benefits are better than ours. We have to 
pay a higher amount and our parents and dependents only 
have a limited amount that they can use each year. Yours 
are all unlimited and the fee is less. As far as I know,
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USAir would like to incorporate some of PSA1 s ideas on 
this one. We could use a better system."
A flight attendant from PSA got on to the network and 
said, "What about commuting? I commute from Seattle, 
Washington to Los Angeles. So far, so good. Anyone out 
there a commuter? Hope it's as easy on USAir as it can be 
here at PSA?"
The senior managers of PSA were once again concerned, 
in a light way, about all the chatter that was continuing 
to happen. They decided that they might be better off 
adhering to the old cliche, "If you can't lick 'em, join 
'em." As such, Morton Rible, Vice President of 
Administration, released the following message in order to 
address the views and questions of employees: "Beginning
July 1 and continuing through the effective date of the 
merger, PSA employees and eligible family members (spouse, 
unmarried dependent children under 2 1 , and parents) will 
have the opportunity to experience the route system of 
USAir and Allegheny commuters on an unlimited, space 
available basis, and no charge." The message went on to 
read, "USAir employees and their families will be 
traveling with PSA under similar conditions. After the 
merger is completed, all PSA employees and retirees will 
adhere to USAir's existing pass policies."
Employees showed their delight as evidenced by this 
statement: "PSA passes will be honored on USAir and USAir 
passes will be honored on PSA. That's the very best news
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I've heard all year. This merger is already unbelievable. 
Pinch me. Surely, I'm dreamin'."
Morton Rible further communicated: "All PSA
personnel should request PSA trip passes through their 
department head as they currently do. Silver pass holders 
should obtain trip passes from PSA prior to proceeding to 
a USAir gate. PSA trip passes will be honored at USAir 
gates. PSA employees will be boarded after USAir 
employees in the order of arrival at the gate."
More and more employees sent their views of support 
over the wires. To get to the heart of an airline 
employee, the best factor to introduce is pass benefits. 
However, there were some differences in USAir's rules from 
PSA's rules. Those rules were described by senior 
managers over the twix: "There are some differences
between PSA's policies and those currently existing at 
USAir. No companion passes are available for travel on 
USAir. No positive space vacation passes are available 
for travel on USAir. USAir's dress code does not allow 
boarding of anyone dressed in jeans or denims of any 
kind."
Employees of USAir retorted by sending messages such 
as: "Boy, PSA should have bought USAir. At least we would 
have a better pass benefit package."
Employees of PSA responded by saying: "It's not very
appealing to be last on the list. The fact that USAir 
will place us on the aircraft only after USAir employees
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makes us feel like step children. Where's all this talk 
about camaraderie and teamwork. In fact, I thought I 
heard Ed Colodny even call it family."
In the middle of June of 1987, an employee of PSA was 
disciplined for using the computer network for personal 
views. At that point, all computer chatter ceased. What 
continued were messages pertaining the operation of the 
airline and on some occasions there were condensed 
versions of the PSA USAir Merger Updates and other 
memorandums and letters. Just as dramatically as it 
started, the expression of opinions ceased.
This fifth leg of the overall five legged change 
strategy was both personal-therapeutic and 
political-economic in nature. The lenses that were 
predominantly used came from those two models of change.
The grass roots movement was essentially part of the 
unfreezing process which is strongly linked to the 
personal-therapeutic model. The fact that this unfreezing 
led to the emergence of an extremely strong interest 
group unveils the political-economic model in action.
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study is to determine the degree 
to which the organizational actions of Pacific Southwest 
Airlines exemplify the predominant models of 
organizational change. In order to fulfill the purpose of 
this study and to sufficiently answer the associated 
research questions, this researcher described the change 
process involved in the acquisition of PSA by USAir. The 
following segment of this report presents a summary of the 
significant points associated with each of the five change 
actions. Since each of the five change actions are 
essentially a different pair of eyes viewing the change 
event, a review of the critical points as to how those 
eyes saw the world are important. From those significant 
points, conclusions will be drawn by the researcher as to 
the relationship between the change action and the 
dominant models of change. When specific conclusions are 
drawn one at a time for each change action and the 
associated models of change, then some overall conclusions 
will be drawn with regard to the collective view of the 
case study. The latter is the heart of this research. It 
is here where the four research questions which were part 
of the purpose of the study will be once again asked and
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answered. Furthermore, this segment of the report will 
discuss the implications for future research in the area 
of organizational change and the strengths and weaknesses 
of this particular case study.
Summary and Conclusions 
Each of the five change actions will now be 
discussed, consecutively so as to build a point of view 
which ultimately will synthesize the actions taken with 
each respective relationship to the models of change. 
First, a summary and conclusions will be drawn about 
the internal mechanisms for articulating change (PSA News 
and PSA USAir Merger Update) . Next, conclusions will be 
discussed about the external mechanisms for articulating 
change" (newspaper articles). Then, a summary of the 
programmatic processes" (the workshop entitled, "Leading 
in Changing Times") will be developed. Next, conclusions 
will be presented about the impacting leader actions of 
President and Chief Operating Officer Russell Ray. 
Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the grass roots 
movement or the employees' views of the change.
Internal Mechanisms for Articulating Change 
The primary conclusions that this researcher has 
developed from the information gathered from the internal 
mechanisms for articulating change evolved from the 
systems-organic and the political-economic models of 
change.
The fact that the PSA USAir Merger Update was even
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
263
developed, written and disseminated clearly demonstrates 
the view that communicative intervention was necessary in 
order to educate the members of the organization about the 
change event. This is evidence of organizational 
development. The goal of the internal mechanisms for 
articulating change, like the overall goal of 
organizational development, was to link conceptual 
framework and strategy while renewing the organization 
through a process of having people within the organization 
learn and interact through a set of interventions. This 
change action was a process involving change on the 
interpersonal level, the subsystem level and the overall 
organizational level.
Specific examples of when the internal mechanisms for 
articulating change reflected the systems-organic model of 
change include the following.
1. Immediately after the December 8 , 1986 
announcement of the agreement to acquire PSA, an 
intervention was planned and communicated. The December 
9, 1986 PSA News Update announced that USAir1s Chairman 
Edwin Colodny would be at PSA headquarters to interact 
with seven different work groups in six separate 
interventions.
2. The first issue of the PSA USAir Merger Update 
was symbolic of the company's desire to not only 
communicate to employees, but to get feedback from 
employees as well. The question and answer format of the
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communications vehicle shows the interplay.
3. Interaction, intervention and feedback played a 
vital role in the change actions viewed from a 
systems-organic lens. Only four days after the announced 
agreement to merge with PSA, the company had blitzed 
the PSA system with several communications in this 
question and answer format, which in itself implies 
interaction, and which had the intent of helping the 
people in the organization learn.
4. The December 19, 1986 release of PSA USAir 
Merger Update spotlighted the videotaped message from PSA 
President Russell Ray. The message was to communicate and 
educate employees on the background of why the merger 
happened.
5. A communications hotline was created and 
communicated. The hotline was evidence of the executives' 
continued efforts to demonstrate that the company was 
there to listen. PSA cared about what the employees 
needed to ask and insisted that communication responses 
would be accurate, honest and consistent.
6 . Throughout the change cycle, the managers of PSA 
continually reminded employees that there were numerous 
vehicles available to get information, learn, and give 
information about the change. This constant and 
consistent message of PSA managers wanting to communicate 
with employees is noteworthy.
7. On January 30, 1987, the PSA News Update
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announced that nine meetings would be set up in many 
geographic locations so that employees could get answers 
to their questions regarding the profit sharing plan and 
the labor protective provisions. The meetings were 
intended to be open forums where employees could express 
their views as well as request information they needed in 
order to vote for or against the merger.
8 . In March, 1987, when TWA and Piedmont entered 
the picture, right in the middle of an already highly 
ambiguous time, the news and communications vehicles 
published by PSA focused on those events, so again 
employees and the overall organization could learn the 
issues.
These examples reflect the predominance of the 
systems-organic model of change. Of all of the models of 
change, this model stands out as one which clearly 
prevailed during this part of the change action.
The internal mechanisms for articulating change were 
primarily systems-organic in the early stages and became 
increasingly political in the later stages. Like any 
organization, PSA was political in nature; and like any 
organizational change of this depth and breadth, political 
behavior was paramount. Specific examples of when this 
change action reflected the political-economic model of 
change include the following.
1. The political view became evident in the January 
13, 1987 PSA USAir Merger Update. A variety of different
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questions pertaining to special interest groups emerged. 
The different groups or people mentioned were the 
Department of Transportation, the Teamsters, PSA company 
officers and USAir President Ed Colodny.
2. On January 22, when the PSA pilots union 
announced that an agreement had been reached, political 
behavior was set in motion. The fact that PSA had 
successfully concluded contract negotiations with this 
employee group, a group that is known for its leadership 
and policy setting initiative, and that the pilots' 
contract was the first such agreement, was intended to 
shift any anti-agreement thinking and any tactical delays 
in negotiating.
3. When the noncontract employees followed with 
their agreement to the provisions of the merger, the 
special interest groups in favor of the merger were 
growing, but there were still opposing coalitions with 
which the managers had to deal. Nonetheless, a political 
focus was emerging as the voting groups aligned in favor 
of the merger.
4. On February 17, 1987, information was released 
that still another group had joined the pro merger 
coalition— the PSA dispatchers. This action was 
significant since three groups had now approved the 
merger.
5. As of March, 1987, the question and answer 
format of the PSA USAir Merger Update subsided. Instead,
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a more narrative style was used which seemed to focus on 
the groups that approved the merger. Certainly that 
change in style reflected that a more political lens was 
viewing the world.
6 . On March 5, 1987, the directors of PSA 
communicated that the United States Department of 
Transportation approved the merger.
7. On March 11, 1987, the managers of PSA 
communicated that the PSA crew controllers approved the 
merger.
8 . On March 16, 1987, the shareholders of PSA voted 
to approve the acquisition.
9. The Teamsters were holding out. In a tactic
designed to put pressure on PSA and USAir and to stall the 
agreement process in the hope of gaining more power, the 
Teamsters filed a lawsuit against PSA.
.10. PSA declined to arbitrate, which was the essence 
of the lawsuit, and the federal court ruled in favor of 
PSA and dismissed the teamster lawsuit.
11. In an effort to put pressure back on the
Teamsters, the senior officers communicated on March 24, 
that the date for the acquisition to be completed had been 
moved forward.
12. The Teamsters resisted this pressure. They
continued to hold out. As a result they regained some
power and influence as the feasibility of the merger 
occurring as planned became vulnerable.
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13. The Teamster resistance allowed the union 
officers to mobilize resources as they gained the kind of 
publicity they wanted by resisting USAir's demands for 
immediate concurrence.
14. Between April 20 and 28 of 1987, PSA employees, 
a special interest group of their own, began to manifest 
their anger. This anger put the ultimate pressure on the 
Teamsters, and the officers finally agreed to put the 
agreement up for vote. The favorable vote secured the 
merger.
The shape of this change action evolved out of the 
special interest groups and the coalition forming process. 
The very essence of the political-economic model of change 
was in such actions.
The systems-organic and the political-economic models 
of change best summarize the internal mechanisms for 
articulating change. The first conclusion regarding the 
change action as it relates to the models of 
organizational change is visualized in Figure 43. The 
darkened cells represent those models of change that best 
explain why certain internal mechanisms were used by PSA 
to articulate the change event. The undarkened cells 
represent those models of change that may have some 
explanatory power, but far less than the two models that 
are dominant.
External Mechanisms for Articulating Change
The main conclusion that this researcher has with
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Dimensions of Planned Organizational Change
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Figure 43. Systems-organic and political-economic models 
of change are predominant when viewing the internal 
mechanisms for articulating change.
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respect to the external mechanisms for articulating change 
is that the lens for viewing evolved from the 
cultural-symbolic and the political-economic models of 
change.
The recognition of symbols, rituals, language and 
other cultural aspects of an organization cannot be 
ignored when an organizational change is in action. Such 
is the case with PSA's symbols, rituals, language and 
other cultural aspects. Of particular relevance here is 
the extent to which the members of the press capitalized 
on the PSA smile as a major story during the acquisition 
process.
Specific and significant examples of when the 
external mechanisms for articulating change reflected the 
cultural-symbolic model of change include the following.
1. On the morning of December 8 , 19 86 in the
hometown of PSA, the press announced the intended merger 
of PSA by USAir in a highly emotionalized and culturally 
symbolic way. Words chosen for the headlines capitalized 
on the symbolism of PSA growing up and flourishing in 
southern California, as if the airline were a person that 
had just died.
2. In mid-December, the save-the-smile movement 
began. The press captured and sensationalized the smile 
of PSA as a major story. The question, of course, was 
would the PSA smile stay and be painted on all USAir 
airplanes too, or would it be painted over and die some
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culturally agonizing death?
3. The identity of an era was correlated to the PSA 
smile. The identity of that era was sweeping the press in 
stories such as "Please Don't Stop Smiling, PSA" and 
"USAir May Catch PSA's Smile and Keep It."
4. In January of 1987, the story of the symbol of 
PSA, the PSA smile, continued to be a dominating news 
story. The history of the PSA smile was told, the 
marketing analysis of the effectiveness of the PSA smile 
as it related to consumers was described, and the various 
predictions as to the disposition of the PSA smile were 
rampant.
5. The PSA BAe 146 aircraft was an object of the 
symbol of PSA since it was named, "Smiliner." This 
airplane was written about in newspapers as if it were a 
person. The "Smiliner" was a protagonist in the 
continuing story of the PSA smile. The antagonist was 
USAir.
6 . Many newspapers featured pictures of the PSA 
smile in the form of photos of airplanes, employees, 
documents, such as the PSA schedule and buttons.
7. Even in the months of May and June of 1987 
writers for the press began expressing that the PSA smile 
was in the hearts of the passengers of PSA and employees 
of PSA. The story of the smile moved from literal to 
highly symbolic. Like the concept of dignity or respect, 
the smile was something that was within people.
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8 . Finally, the members of the press revealed that 
PSA would lose its corporate identity, effective January, 
1988, but that the grin would remain for awhile on the 
airplanes and would last forever in people's hearts.
These examples reflect the dominance of the 
cultural-symbolic model of change. Of all the models of 
change, the cultural-symbolic model stands out as one 
which directly prevailed with the external mechanisms for 
articulating change.
Even more dominant was the political-economic model 
of change. This model sees organizations as political 
systems with political actors. The actors have their own 
interests and stakes and stands. Coalitions are framed 
within a political environment and the organization 
changes as a result of shifts in rewards, supply and 
demand, interest groups, negotiation and bargaining. 
Clearly, this view was exemplified by the writers of the 
numerous newspaper articles that reported the PSA-USAir 
merger development. Hard hitting instances of when this 
change action reflected the political-economic model of 
change include the following.
1. In late December of 1986, the San Diego Union 
broke the story about the potential conflict between PSA 
and the Teamsters' Local 2707.
2. The first pro merger coalition was formed when 
the pilots of PSA agreed to the provisions of the merger, 
and the story began. The pilots' agreement represented
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the first consensus in favor of the merger.
3. In January, 1987, the United States Department 
of Transportation gave tentative approval to the merger. 
Simultaneously, the press editors were stirring up a story 
by suggesting that there could be mid-merger turbulence as 
PSA employees who belonged to the Teamsters union found 
themselves in the powerful position of being able to stall 
or possibly block the proposed acquisition.
4. In February, 1987, the thrust of the news 
focused around two primary issues. The first was the 
continued resistance on the part of the Teamsters 
coalition to reach an agreement regarding the contract 
provisions for the proposed merger. The second was the 
fact that the PSA dispatchers had reached agreement on the 
contract changes.
5. Pressure on the Teamsters from its members 
began. The Teamsters' position was being opposed as 
exemplified by this headline: "PSA Attendants Urge
Teamsters to Agree to Contract Changes." The Teamsters 
responded by telling the press that the petitions were 
based on erroneous assumptions about USAir's proposed 
acquisition of PSA. Clearly, a division between groups 
had taken place.
6 . Action groups formed consisting of PSA employees 
against the Teamsters. The groups were designed to 
publicly pronounce their collective views against the 
opinions of the Teamsters.
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7. The Teamsters took action too. They sued PSA in 
an attempt to force arbitration. The press summarized 
this struggle for power and influence in an article 
entitled "Teamsters Suit Could Peril PSA Merger."
8 . The Southwest Dispatchers Association was the 
second of four major unions representing PSA employees to 
agree to the merger provisions. This story was 
sensationalized.
9. The four dominant news issues in the month of 
March, 1987 were TWA's play for USAir and USAir's bid for 
Piedmont, the PSA Crew Controllers contract agreement, the 
shareholders approval of the merger and more unrest 
between the Teamsters union and its membership.
10. A grass roots effort to replace the Teamster had 
begun when PSA employees were unable to get detailed 
information about the negotiations to modify labor 
contracts. The Teamsters were being ousted!
11. During the month of April, 1987, the press 
presented the PSA-USAir merger like a highly political 
suspense movie. The events that were published were 
reaching a climax. PSA as an independent carrier was 
weakening. Time was running out, and the Teamsters 
represented employees of PSA wanted to vote on the issue.
12 With only one week left until the merger 
deadline, employees of PSA were in a turmoil that moved 
them to anger over the Teamsters' actions. The members 
placed constant pressure upon the Teamsters through
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aggressive communication and picketing.
13. Voting for the merger provisions finally 
happened. The press waited. On the morning of May 18, 
1987, the news revealed that the Teamster members voted in 
favor of merging with USAir.
14. Once the highly political activities of the 
change event subsided, so did the press coverage.
Like a pair of eyeglasses, the external mechanisms 
for articulating change were political-economic as 
evidenced by the previous key points. The very essence of 
the political-economic model of change was once again 
evident in the actions of various groups and individuals 
as they participated in the change event.
The cultural-symbolic and the political-economic 
models of change best explain the external mechanisms for 
articulating change. The second conclusion regarding the 
change action as it relates to the models of 
organizational change is visualized in Figure 44. The 
darkened cells represent those models of change that best 
explain why certain external mechanisms were used to 
articulate the change. The undarkened cells represent 
those models of change that may have some explanatory 
power, but far less than the two models that are dominant.
The Programmatic Processes
The primary conclusions that this researcher has 
developed from the information gathered from the 
programmatic processes evolved from the systems-organic
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Figure 44. Cultural-symbolic and political-economic 
models of change are predominant when viewing the external 
mechanisms for articulating change.
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and the personal-therapeutic models of change.
The fact that the senior managers of PSA approved, 
endorsed and fully supported a formal intervention for the 
entire management team of the company, certainly suggests 
a deliberate organizational development or systems-organic 
perspective. The intervention in this case was a one day 
management development workshop. The intervention was 
designed to address the problems inherent in the change 
event from a systems-organic framework. At a time when 
change and corporate life are synonymous, human resources 
executives must learn to support their clients in 
understanding the dynamics of change. While there are 
many well developed approaches to managing complex change 
on a rational or systems level, what was missing were 
equivalent actions from other change models that help 
affected people stay on track in an efficient and 
productive way.
This researcher deliberately initiated the 
intervention called "Leading in Changing Times" to 
capitalize on the value of the systems-organic lens and to 
blend it with the personal-therapeutic model of change.
Specific examples of when this change action 
reflected the systems-organic model of change include the 
following.
1. The researcher believed that a seminar 
intervention would be vital for managers of PSA so that 
development, knowledge, education, skill building,
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technique building and understanding of the change would 
occur. Without this learning, the operation of the 
airline during the transition could be in jeopardy, 
productivity could sufficiently decline and the merger 
could be thwarted.
2. The intervention was designed to support PSA 
managers not only so that the business would run normally, 
but so that managers would not feel the stresses and 
frustrations which are associated with the type of change 
that a merger process inevitably causes.
3. Spending a full eight hour day with colleagues 
in a structured intervention was necessary to encourage 
managers to help themselves and their employees to see the 
change from as many lenses as possible.
4. A series of informal discussion groups were
formed so that feedback could be received and ultimately
incorporated into the design of the workshop.
5. Functioning in an advisory capacity, the group 
members openly expressed their views regarding the 
questions asked by the researcher. The feedback loop was 
in place.
6 . Feedback was also received from senior vice 
presidents about what they expected from the management 
team during the transition period of the acquisition.
7. The program, "Leading in Changing Times" was a 
specific systems-organic action which PSA executives took 
to help facilitate the change event at PSA.
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8 . The content of the entire program meant that 
individuals had to learn, thus allowing the organization 
to change and shift. The interpersonal, the subsystem, and 
overall organizational levels were impacted by the way 
this intervention affected the participants.
These examples reflect the predominance of the 
systems-organic model of change in the programmatic 
process. Considering all of the other change models, this 
model stood out as obviously one best explained this 
change action. Since the change action was in itself an 
intervention, the program automatically blended with the 
systems-organic paradigm.
Equally as obvious was the personal-therapeutic model 
of change. Changes that originate at the individual or 
personal level are crucial if resistance to a merger is to 
be eventually overcome. The internalization of change at 
the interpersonal level is essential. Organizational 
change results only when individuals believe and value the 
change. This model of change gets to the very root of the 
change itself. The personal-therapeutic model focuses on 
the psychological implications of change and shifting the 
personal views and ways of thinking of the participants 
from old to new constructed realities.
A synthesis of the more pertinent examples from the 
programmatic processes which clearly reflect the 
perspective of the personal-therapeutic model of change 
follow:
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1. The researcher determined from the needs 
analysis she did in preparation for the intervention that 
a personal-therapeutic emphasis was necessary. From a 
program design point of view, the researcher discovered 
that managers needed to feel more prepared, have a better 
understanding of what was expected of them during the 
change cycle, experience the loss, learn how to overcome 
resistance to change, help employees evaluate conflicting 
information and basically learn about the reasons why 
people react to change the way they do.
2. The workshop began at the interpersonal level.
A discussion took place which focused on questions about 
how the managers themselves were dealing with the change 
and how they felt their people were dealing with the 
change. Heated discussion ensued wherein deep seated 
emotions were vented. The discussions were debriefed on 
an individual level.
3. The intervention was designed to unfreeze the 
participants by getting at the deep issues concerning each 
person.
4. The fact that the natural human resisters to 
change were part of the curriculum demonstrates the 
personal-therapeutic focus in the content of this program.
5. The program content dealt with the idea that 
managers needed to learn not only how people react to 
change, but also to learn how to recognize the reactions 
of people having difficulty going through change.
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6 . Listening can make the road through a change 
event, if not free of bumps, at least smoother than it 
might be otherwise. This was a major premise modeled, 
talked about and encouraged during the intervention.
7. People involved in the change need personal 
attention as well. Their tensions and fears may increase 
as the change moves forward. If not caught early, these 
behaviors can create new obstacles to achieving a 
successful implementation of change. The fact that the 
workshop occurred is evidence that this kind of personal 
attention occurred.
8 . A personal-therapeutic view would require the 
manager during any change to focus not only on getting to 
the end result, but to also focus on facilitating the 
change while simultaneously getting to the end result. 
This premise was the backbone of the intervention.
The personal-therapeutic lens provided a crystal 
clear explanation during this third leg of the overall 
change strategy. It is a lens that can often be 
overlooked, and it is a lens that is absolutely necessary 
if a change can be real.
The systems-organic and the personal-therapeutic 
models of change explains much of what happened during the 
programmatic process. The other models of change were 
represented to some extent as well but were less 
pronounced. The third conclusion is illustrated in Figure 
45. Once again, the darkened cells represent those models
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Figure 45. Systems-organic and personal-therapeutic 
models of change are predominant when viewing the 
programmatic processes.
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of change that were more apparent for the programmatic 
process. The undarkened cells are intended to make the 
point that those models of change provided little 
explanation on the programmatic processes.
The Impacting Leader Actions 
The main conclusions that this researcher has 
developed from the information gathered from the impacting 
leader actions evolved from the cultural-symbolic and the 
systems-organic models of change.
Change within organizations requires new visions, new 
symbols and new language. The visions, symbols, and 
language that existed before, however, cannot be totally 
erased because they form the basis for comparing cultures. 
The members of the organization gain insight and a deeper 
understanding of a culture when it is compared with other 
cultures. Being a facilitator of change in a culturally 
symbolic way involved the creation of visions and then 
engaging others to pursue those visions. In doing so the 
recognition of symbols and language becomes a very crucial 
part of the organizational change process itself.
The actions taken by the perceived leader of the 
organization bring to life a kind of awareness of the 
importance of this role in a major change such as a merger 
or acquisition. Specific examples of when this change 
action reflected the cultural-symbolic model of change 
include the following.
1. Russell Ray deliberately created stories so that
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they could be told within the organization. He 
specifically believed that stories were symbols of how a 
culture could be built within a company.
2. Ray used his charisma to his advantage and told 
organizational stories. Frequent stories were told of Ray 
popping into a crew lounge or break room when it was least 
expected. Ray used these types of events as vehicles for 
conveying meaning.
3. The best way to appeal to the hearts of any PSA 
employee was to capitalize on the symbolic PSA smile. To 
allude to the fact that PSA's smile was a "treasure on the 
west coast" and treat it as if it were suddenly going to 
go away, pulled at the heart strings of most employees. 
Ray did this as an expression of the importance of the 
smile as a symbol.
4. The constant and consistent use of such words as 
pledge, pride, truth, commitment, excellence, enthusiasm, 
PSA personality, hearts, and smile suggests that Ray could 
use a language that was culturally symbolic in nature.
5. Employee confidence grew as Ray encouraged 
employees to have time to end the idea of PSA. Like a 
kind of fostered mourning, or a time span to feel loss, 
the employees of PSA banded together in the ending or 
mourning phases. Ray facilitated these transitions.
6 . Ray had a deep commitment, both from a personal 
as well as a professional level, toward the development 
and execution of a change strategy. As such, this
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commitment permeated the organization as a symbolic 
expression of care and concern.
7. Ray also facilitated the use of the PSA smile to 
create stories. A story was told during a meeting with 
Ray of a customer who had written and indicated that 
taking the PSA smile out of California was like taking 
Mickey Mouse out of Disneyland. Ray told this story over 
and over again in the halls, offices, and lounges. In 
fact, there was a kind of uprising that emerged shortly 
thereafter about preserving the PSA smile.
These specific summary points are representative of 
the dominance of the cultural-symbolic model of change in 
Ray's action as a leader. Of the five primary models of 
change, Ray favored words and actions that reflected the 
cultural-symbolic model of change.
Another model of change that appeared to be equally 
dominant was the systems-organic model of change. Ray's 
actions tended to be intervention oriented. His primary 
purpose was to facilitate learning on the part of the 
members of the organization. The communications and 
feedback processes were so intricately designed and 
fostered, as were the deep belief system surrounding the 
ideal of honest and open communication. Specific 
examples of when the impacting leader actions evidenced 
the systems-organic model of change are:
1. Ray was compelled to develop a specific focus 
and direction for the organization. As such, he initiated
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a process or series of interventions, coordinated by an 
outside consultant, to mutually develop the rally points 
for the organization.
2. The strong belief in communications was 
paramount to Ray. As such, he initiated a comprehensive 
communications plan which consisted of several components, 
most of which involved interventions, feedback, learning 
forums, and more.
3. Through another series of interventions, Ray, 
along with his senior management team, established the 
corporate goals for the organization.
4. Ray fully recognized, in a classic 
systems-organic way, that the PSA organization had to 
renew. Like an organism, PSA had grown, developed, was 
now changing and would ultimately, die. Like any system, 
the interrelated and interdependent parts needed to be 
internalized in order for a massive change such as the 
merger to successfully happen. This systems-organic view 
of organizations was the basis from which Ray initiated 
the overall change strategy team.
5. A deliberate attempt was made to ensure that 
employees had the chance to see the change event from as 
many perspectives as possible. This would create the 
learning that is so valued in the systems-organic mode.
6 . Ray and the entire change strategy team operated 
from the basic belief that PSA employees needed to be 
attended to. This belief stemmed from a genuine concern
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and care about the employee population as human beings.
7. A minimum of nine interventions were planned and 
implemented for the purpose of ensuring that the senior 
management team of PSA had the information the executives 
needed to manage effectively. Ray structured his 
managers' meetings in a way that allowed for an open and 
honest information flow.
8 . Ray was available and visible. He was 
approachable by employees and he frequently engaged in 
informal interventions in the lunch room with small groups 
of employees.
The cultural-symbolic and the systems-organic models 
of change can best summarize the impacting leader action 
segment of this research. The fourth conclusion regarding 
the change action as it relates to the models of 
organizational change is visualized in Figure 46. The 
darkened cells represent those models of change that best 
explain why the impacting leader actions were used by PSA 
to articulate the change event. The undarkened cells 
represent those models of change that may have some 
explanatory power, but far less than the two models that 
are dominant.
The Grass Roots Movement
The primary conclusion made by this researcher is 
that the grass roots movement viewed the change from a 
personal-therapeutic and a political-economic lens.
The personal-therapeutic model of change suggests
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Figure 46. Cultural-symbolic and systems-organic models 
of change are dominant from viewing the impacting leader 
actions.
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that change originates at the individual or personal 
level. It focuses on the psychological perspectives of 
the change and the movement of personal views and ways of 
thinking from the old to new constructed realities. Never 
was this more prevalent in this case study than in the 
grass roots movement. The grass roots movement itself 
began as a result of an individual need to express 
individual views. A summary of some of the more pertinent 
examples from the grass roots movement which clearly 
represent the perspective of the personal-therapeutic 
model of change are as follows.
1. The feedback data collected was in the form of 
unsolicited commentary from a sophisticated computer 
network which the PSA and USAir employees used in an 
unauthorized way to express individual thought.
2. The release of a letter to the union from Vice 
President of Labor Relations Paul George was the green 
light that accelerated the grass roots movement. The 
messages sent after the Paul George's message expressed a 
lot of anger.
3. PSA and USAir employees voiced their concerns, 
their worries and their frustrations over the wire. Such 
messages were equivalent to the classic unfreezing process 
in the personal-therapeutic model. Employees initiated a 
communications movement which essentially took place over 
the network, despite some attempts by PSA managers to stop 
it.
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4. Every message was individualized. Message after 
message appears on the printouts. Suffice it to say that 
each person, either from PSA or from USAir, felt that he 
or she had something of value to say. The network 
suddenly provided a framework for them to speak out.
These statements are illustrations of the 
predominance cf the personal-therapeutic model of change 
in the grass roots movement. The fact that the messages 
occurred, occurred in such volume, and occurred without 
authorization and against policy is representative alone 
of the need that each individual had to contribute his or 
her view.
The political-economic model of change was equally 
important to the grass roots movement. The employee group 
had become a powerful coalition in the merger process. 
Political behavior became evident in the context of the 
messages that were sent over the computer network. The 
network itself became an action channel for employees to 
be heard. Some specific examples of when this change 
action evidenced the political-economic model of change 
are as follows.
1. On April 21, 1987, the message from the Vice 
President of Labor Relations triggered a surge of employee 
messages because the employees were outraged with what the 
letter said: that the union was holding up the merger
deal. Employees began to speak out and join in the change 
process more and more. Suddenly, a large and powerful
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coalition had developed.
2. One employee said, "If the Teamsters won't let 
us, then let's do something about it." This message 
united the employee group, and followers began speaking 
out.
3. Even USAir employees joined the coalition. On 
May 6, 1987, the USAir employees began to get involved in 
the communication fervor. Statements such as "Don't let 
the guys in the black hats feed you a lot of lies," were 
not uncommon. The coalition had support.
4. The computer network became a political focal 
point for articulating voting strategy. The word was out 
that voting on the proposal was ready to happen. PSA 
employees expressed their concern, and it was a stressful 
time. USAir employees continued to promote their company 
to PSA employees thereby influencing the thinking of PSA 
employees.
5. The network was used as an information data 
base. If conflicting information was received, an 
employee would simply ask someone to set the record 
straight and usually someone who knew the answer would 
respond with accurate data. If that did not occur, then 
views would be expressed until accuracy was determined.
6 . Like the national voting polls over the national 
television network, voting polls were taken over the 
computer network as to those who were for or against the 
merger.
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7. When voting did commence, the network was used 
to communicate the disposition of the vote for each 
individual geographic location.
8 . Since it was difficult to stop the 
communications of front line employees over the wires, the 
Vice President of Labor Relations decided that he too 
would communicate over the network. He essentially 
joined the grass roots employee coalition.
The personal-therapeutic and the political-economic 
models of change best summarize the grass roots movement. 
The fifth conclusion regarding the change action as it 
relates to the models of organizational change is 
visualized in Figure 47. The darkened cells represent 
those models of change that best explain why the grass 
roots movement occurred at PSA, which further articulates 
the change event. The undarkened cells represent those 
models of change that may have some explanatory power, but 
far less than the two models that are dominant.
Overall Conclusions
Now that each of the five individual change actions 
have been summarized and conclusions have been drawn as to 
their relationships to the specific models of change, a 
collective view can now be discussed as it pertains to the 
big picture of this case study and the specific research 
questions that the study was chartered to address.
This section of Chapter VI focuses on the four 
research questions that need to be addressed in this case
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Figure 47. Personal-therapeutic and political-economic 
models of change are predominant from the viewing the 
grass roots movement.
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study so that the researcher can effectively accomplish 
the purpose of the research.
The answer to the first question is embodied in the 
the context of this chapter but can now be summarized. 
The first research question asked: "What specific actions
were taken by PSA to deliberately facilitate the change, 
who initiated these actions, and why?"
The actions that were taken to facilitate the change 
were internal mechanisms for articulating change, 
external mechanisms for articulating change, the 
programmatic processes, the impacting leader actions and 
the grass roots movement. These actions were fully 
initiated by President and Chief Operating Officer Russell 
Ray and the change strategy team, consisting of selected 
PSA executives including this researcher. The PSA USAir 
Merger Update was specifically initiated by change 
strategy team member, Morton Rible, because the team 
agreed that consistent and honest communication in written 
form must take place during the transition period of the 
merger. The newspaper article collection and distribution 
was initiated by change strategy team member, Bill 
Hastings, because the team agreed that the media offered 
another view of the change that may be helpful to the 
employees. The programmatic processes were initiated by 
this researcher, and the team agreed that a structured 
intervention would significantly complement the other 
measures which were taken to ensure that productivity did
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not plummet. The impacting leader actions were initiated 
by Russell Ray, and he team fully concurred that his 
actions were critical in his role as President and Chief 
Operating Officer of PSA. The grass roots movement was 
initiated by the employees of PSA and USAir, and from this 
movement messages were collected by this researcher for 
the purpose of providing still another lens from which to 
view the change event.
The second research question is: "To what extent
does this case exemplify and operationalize the five 
primary models of organizational change?"
Figure 48 is the heart of this case study. Some 
observations that can be concluded from viewing this 
figure are:
1. People viewed the merger differently because in 
part there were five distinct change activities that 
helped them view the process through five different pairs 
of eyes.
2. The systems-organic and the political-economic 
models were the most common frames for viewing the change. 
The systems-organic model explained three of the five 
change events: the internal mechanisms for articulating
change, the programmatic processes and the impacting 
leader actions. This demonstrates the overall dominance 
of this model. Additionally, the political-economic model 
explains three of the five change events: the internal
mechanisms for articulating change, the external
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Figure 48. The extent to which the case study exemplifies 
and operationalizes the five primary models of 
organizational change.
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mechanisms for articulating change and the grass roots 
movement. This, too, demonstrates the overall dominance 
of this model.
3. The rational-managerial model of change did not 
prevail as a model which explained the change event. In 
fact, in none of the five actions did this model provide 
an explanation.
4. Even though the change strategy was designed to 
provide different lenses for viewing the change, the 
change strategy team had no idea which lenses would 
emerge as dominant. Based upon this point, the change 
strategy team members did not meet their objective as 
fully as they had wanted since none of the five change 
actions had the rational-managerial as a dominant pair of 
eyes. The intent of the change strategy team was to build 
a plan which would incorporate the explanations of all 
change models.
5. The fact that a change strategy team was created 
to facilitate the change determined ahead of time that the 
systems-organic model would be a dominant model. The 
thinking that was required to even initiate a change 
strategy team comes from a systems-organic domain, and 
hence the systems-organic explanation stemmed from the 
vision of Russell R a y  to create the team.
The third research question is: "To what extent was
the implementation of this organizational change skewed 
toward one single paradigm of change or to a more
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multidimensional paradigm of change?"
The answer to this question is that neither one 
single paradigm of change nor a fully multidimensional 
paradigm of change explains the merger of PSA by USAir. 
The paradigm is, however, more multidimensional than it is 
singular.
The multidimensional aspects of the explanation of 
the change are evident in that the personal-therapeutic 
model explained two of the five change actions, the 
systems-organic model explained three of the five change 
actions, the cultural-symbolic model explained two of the 
five change actions and the political-economic model 
explained three of the five change actions.
The implementation of this organizational change was 
not skewed to only one paradigm of change. If that were 
so, one model would have had to have explained all five 
change actions. This did not occur. As a result, the 
single frame answer has to be rejected.
The emphasis of the explanation was multidimensional 
but not fully multidimensional. The rational-managerial 
model was not used to explain any change action. The 
other four models, however, did provide explanations in 
two or three of the change actions.
Overall, the systems-organic model emerges as 
dominant for two key reasons. First, Russell Ray had a 
systems-organic mindset and as a result he initiated and 
created the change strategy team. Second, once created,
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the change strategy team was naturally inclined to do 
systems-organic activities both because of the mission 
passed down by Ray and the mindsets of its members 
(including this researcher). Systems-organic activities 
are what change strategy teams do. It is inherent to 
their function. If they did not do systems-organic 
activities, they would be dysfunctional.
The last research question: "What conclusions can be
drawn so that scholars and practitioners of organizational 
change can gain from the thick description of this case 
study and its relationship to the predominant change 
models?"
In addition to the conclusions offered, scholars and 
practitioners should draw some of their own specific 
conclusions after reading this case. That point is 
important because this researcher hopes that the readers 
would take responsibility to generate ideas and issues 
that directly relate to their change events that are not 
known by the researcher. The reader is asked to take 
responsibility by seeking applications from the 
qualitative data presented.
Along with that notion, the researcher believes that 
there are many conclusions that can be drawn.
First and foremost, we as scholars and practitioners, 
must change our thinking about how we think about change. 
As the analysis of this study reveals, change is a complex 
process which requires multidimensional views in order to
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better facilitate understanding on the part of the 
organization's members. The tendency of some 
organizations might be to initiate a change strategy plan, 
as in the case of PSA during the acquisition period. The 
tendency of most organizations, however, is to focus on 
the end result, not a change strategy plan. Typically, 
the attention that a change usually receives is based upon 
all the ways in which the end result can be achieved, void 
of how the change is facilitated while getting to the end 
result. Getting to the end result often becomes our 
framework instead of getting to the end result and 
facilitating the process along the way to the end result.
Second, change is multidimensional. The more 
singularly a change is viewed, the more myopic our vision 
is, thus shrinking our understanding. The more 
multidimensional a change is viewed the more broad our 
vision is, thus expanding our understanding. The fact 
that this case study was explained from the perspective of 
four of the five models of change supports the idea that 
change is multidimensional. If only the internal 
mechanisms for articulating the change were used to 
describe and explain the change that was happening, for 
example, clearly a narrow view of the change would have 
resulted. Combining the description and explanation of 
the change from the lens of other models added dimensions 
to the change.
Third, a multidimensional view of change does not
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happen coincidentally. It happens through a deliberate 
effort to blend change theory and organizational change 
strategy. It happened in this case study by this 
researcher having knowledge of the models of 
organizational change and then transferring that knowledge 
into the development of a change strategy that would 
deliberately incorporate multiple explanations of the 
change through the use of multiple change actions.
Fourth, one way to determine whether or not a change 
was successful is to pay attention to the degree to which 
resistance occurs and how long it takes until the change 
is accepted. This can be done only if an effective change 
strategy is in place that encompasses feedback loops. The 
grass roots movement is an example in this study of one 
such feedback loop. This principle has value because of 
the belief that resistance to change can be correlated 
with declines in productivity and acceptance to change can 
be correlated with stability or inclines in productivity.
Fifth, the people involved with the change strategy 
team influenced the way in which the change was 
facilitated. The tendency of those involved to facilitate 
change from a systems-organic and political-economic lens 
impacted the outcome.
Sixth, even though this change is viewed as 
successful (the merger did take place), the specific 
actions taken cannot necessarily be replicated in any 
organization, because PSA tends to be a systems-organic
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and political-economic culture. In essence, the darkened 
boxes reflect the culture of PSA as well as the outcome of 
the change.
Last, more qualitative research is needed in the area 
of organizational change in action. Taking a slice of 
time and holding it still so that is can be thickly 
described contributes to the literature if only to see 
change theory come alive. This case study is an example 
of change theory in action.
Strengths
The strength of this investigation lies in the fact 
that it puts the various elements of scholars' models of 
organizational change to the test in the life of one 
change event. It answers the questions: "Can these
change theories and models be applied in the life of a 
real change event in the corporate arena, and if so, how 
was it operationalized?" This study builds upon the work 
of other researchers by describing how one change event 
exemplifies each of the major components in the various 
change models. That is, the models are legitimized by the 
fact that they are being operationalized in an 
organization that experienced a major change.
This investigation also contributes to our 
understanding of organizational change by offering a more 
indepth description of how organizational change can be 
facilitated. The study enables researchers and 
practitioners to examine the actions and behaviors of one
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organization which was engaged in a transformation that 
merged one company into another one. Like a cocoon that 
changes to a butterfly, the social realities of that 
existence change. In providing a thorough, descriptive 
analysis of USAir's acquisition of Pacific Southwest 
Airlines, this study moves both scholars and practitioners 
to an increased understanding of the nature of 
organizational change.
The fact that this researcher was a participant 
observer, a member of the change strategy team, an 
employee and an officer of PSA, and the investigator is a 
strength to this study. Immersing oneself into the very 
fiber of the change event is at the core of the 
ethnographic research practice.
The essential strength of this investigation then is 
that it provides researchers with an operational model of 
a theoretical construct. This is valuable because it 
shows that while the concept of organizational change is 
sometimes difficult to grasp and often appears to be 
ideal, organizational change models can be put into 
practice. Thus, for scholars interested in expanding the 
field of organizational change as an academic discipline, 
the models presented in this study serve as a starting 
point for conducting future investigations that examine 
other organizational changes in action. For 
practitioners, this study is rich with examples that can 
be used as tools in developing different processes of
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organizational change. If, as the concept suggests, 
educating members of the organization is a key ingredient 
in how social realities are constructed and reconstructed, 
then future facilitators of change must have a variety of 
indepth examples that show how education can be used to 
facilitate organizational change.
Weaknesses
Perhaps the most significant weakness in this study 
is that the researcher was unable to observe the 
organizational change under investigation for a long 
period of time, or at least until the integration of the 
two airlines was complete. Obviously, in the spirit of 
true participant observation, it would have been optimal 
to follow the change event through the year 1987 and on 
into 1988. Assuming that would have been possible, the 
time and expense involved in such an extended method was 
beyond the scope of the resources available to this 
investigator.
Another weakness is the study stems from the fact 
that the observations made during this organizational 
change are vulnerable to certain elements of distortion. 
With the exception of first hand observations through long 
term residence in the organization, there is no simple way 
to account for the inherent, subjective views that seep 
into research of this nature.
Still another weakness is the researcher's own 
selection of material to be presented in this study. That
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selection is another basis for some distortion. As the 
research progressed it became increasingly difficult for 
the researcher to remain untouched by the events that were 
happening. As is their natural tendency, the people of 
PSA were extremely committed to the organization and had a 
way of expressing that commitment in a meaningful and 
caring way. Since the researcher was a part of what each 
employee was feeling, it influenced how the study is 
presented, the data collected and the analysis of the 
data. Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid this kind 
of human limitation.
A distortion also emerges in this study as a result 
of the researcher's biases about organizational change.
It may be argued that a researcher seeking to uncover a 
given specified concept such as organizational change in 
action could create a self-fulfilling prophecy in which 
she constructs a distorted image of the event that is 
consistent with the concept under investigation. However, 
this argument is weakened as it relates to this study by 
several factors. First, the researcher set out to develop 
a line of research that sought to examine many 
organizations in the midst of change. Through an initial 
examination of these organizations, it became apparent 
that one emerged as not only the best example of 
organizational change in action, but indeed as a 
potentially true example of organizational change in 
action. Thus, rather than entering this research with an
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a priori assumption that this organizational change would 
be more multidimensional in nature than the next, the 
researcher critically compared what was actually happening 
with the theoretical constructs that had been internalized 
in her education.
Future Research
With the strengths and weaknesses of this study in 
mind, there are several areas in which future research is 
warranted. While this study presents a starting point for 
conducting qualitative investigations that examine 
organizational change in action, the models offered should 
be applied in their entirety to other change events. This 
will enable future researchers to describe in more detail 
if and how the models can be operationalized. Obviously, 
a concept as broadly based as organizational change will 
not be operationalized in the same manner by different 
organizations. Therefore, future studies that focus on 
how the concept is being operationalized in other 
organizations would also serve to confirm or not confirm 
the utility of the models as descriptions of the nature of 
organizational change.
Methodologically, future researchers could build upon 
this work through participant observation for an extended 
period in an organization where organizational change is 
happening. Moreover, these researchers should attempt to 
examine organizational change in as many different 
contexts as possible. By investigating events in a
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variety of contexts over time, these researchers would be 
able to determine the consistency with which these events 
demonstrate organizational change in action and whether or 
not such consistency is essential to being a facilitator 
of change.
An argument could be made for investigating 
particular aspects (e.g. power and politics, symbolic 
leadership, organizational systems) of organizational 
change more thoroughly. However, this approach may be 
premature given that the frameworks have yet to receive 
widespread validation so that the theories can be 
translated in action. If researchers and practitioners 
are going to conduct studies that truly further our 
understanding of organizational change, they must engage 
in broad based studies that transcend singular views of 
change. Thus, future studies that incorporate all of the 
models of organizational change and examine the concept 
holistically will contribute to a new and growing paradigm 
that will enhance our understanding of organizational 
change in action.
Concluding Remarks
Along with modern life has come the change 
revolution. The magnitude and amount of change that is 
all around us, and within us, often create difficulties 
among organizations, communities and even countries. 
Change in organizations is common and constant. From an 
organizational perspective, the idea of seeing, creating
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and facilitating change is one of the most difficult, 
perplexing and challenging opportunities faced by 
organizational theorists, managers and leaders.
There is a change crisis facing American business and 
the world today. It is, therefore, vital that we as 
scholars, practitioners, managers and leaders confront the 
problems associated with narrow views or single models of 
change and develop a new understanding of change as a 
constant, fluid, ongoing, dynamic, always present and 
evolutionary process which moves individuals and 
organizations.
It is the hope of this researcher that the story of 
USAir's acquisition of Pacific Southwest Airlines will 
inspire readers to examine the potential for facilitating 
change for themselves and their organizations and 
encourage them to realize that intended, real change in 
organizations does not happen by coincidence. It happens 
by members of the organization taking initiative to 
develop comprehensive change strategies that attend to 
people and, in the process, keep their organizations 
productive.
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